Nelson v. Long Lines Ltd., No. C02-4083-MWB (N.D. Iowa 6/11/2003)
| Decision Date | 11 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. C02-4083-MWB.,C02-4083-MWB. |
| Parties | PHILIP NELSON, Plaintiff, v. LONG LINES LTD., a South Dakota Corporation, and CHARLES LONG, in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Plaintiff Philip Nelson ("Nelson") has filed a 13 page, 147 paragraph complaint alleging that his former employer, defendants' Long Lines LTD., a South Dakota Corporation, and Charles Long, in his individual capacity (collectively "Long"), (1) discriminated against him because of his age, (2) failed to pay him overtime compensation, (3) violated, during his employment, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) should be estopped from denying Nelson the benefits of Long's promises, and (5) was unjustly enriched at Nelson's expense. Long contends that Nelson's complaint fails to comply with the brevity and simplicity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Long requests that the court strike certain paragraphs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), or, in the alternative, Long requests the court direct Nelson to file more definite statements for certain paragraphs. In addition, Long requests that the court strike Count III for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Nelson worked for Long and allegedly performed a variety of duties, including but not limited to grounds keeper, general maintenance, security, receptionist, and personal valet, see Comp. ¶¶ 7, 9,11, 21, and 27. Nelson alleges that he was abruptly terminated on May 2, 2001. Nelson further alleges that his duties were assigned to two individuals and that one of these individuals was 30 years younger and the other individual was 10 years younger than Nelson. see Comp. 1 69. Nelson filed a complaint with this court on September 19, 2002. The complaint contains 147 paragraphs. After dispensing with jurisdictional and venue averments, see Comp. ¶¶ 1-6 at 1, Nelson proceeds to lay out, in approximately five pages, the "Facts" covering Nelson's work history with Long, beginning in 1989, the date he was first hired by Long, and encompassing years 1989 to 2001. see Comp. ¶¶ 7-65 at 2-6. After his work history is set out, Nelson lays out his claims against Long: "Count I, Age Discrimination under Federal Law;" "Count II, Overtime Compensation;" "Count III, Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing DURING Employment;" "Count IV, Promissory Estoppel;" and "Count V, Unjust Enrichment." see Comp. ¶¶ 66-138 at 7-12. Finally, the complaint states a nine paragraph prayer for relief requesting injunctive relief, compensatory damages, attorney fees and also includes a paragraph giving notice of Nelson's intent to petition the court to add punitive damages. see Comp. ¶¶ 1-9 at 12.
On October 18, 2002, rather than answering Nelson's complaint, Long filed "Defendants' Motion to Strike, Motion for a More Definite Statement, and Motion to Dismiss Count Three" pursuant to Rules 8, 12(b)(6), and 12(f). Long contends that the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement that the complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and Rule 8(a)(3)'s requirement for "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (3). Not only does Long contend the complaint violates Rule 8, but Long asserts that it will suffer prejudice as a result of this violation because it will be required to engage in discovery of matters that are outside of the limitations period and involve predecessor employers. Further, Long contends that "Count III, Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing During Employment," should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Iowa Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this cause of action and the complaint contains no set of facts that would entitle Nelson to relief. Further, Long contends that paragraphs, 7-18, 20-28, 30, 38-43, 49-50, 52, 70-71,76-78, 92, 97-98, 105-119, of the complaint should be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f) because the paragraphs contain "redundant, immaterial, [and] impertinent" matter. In addition, Long contends that the complaint covers matters outside of the statute of limitations period for all causes of action, includes evidentiary matters, and contains conclusions of law not appropriate for inclusion in a complaint. Alternatively, Long requests that if the identified paragraphs are not stricken by the court, the court require that Nelson provide a more definite statement as to paragraphs 25-40, 58-63, 92, 107, 110-112 and 130-133 as to the time the alleged conduct occurred.
On November 15, 2002, Nelson filed his opposition to defendants' motions. On November 19, 2002, Nelson filed his resistance and memorandum in opposition of defendants' motions disputing Long's contentions. On November 25, 2002, Long filed its reply and reiterated defendants' motion to strike, motion for more definite statement and motion to dismiss count three. The parties have not requested oral arguments and the court will now consider the defendants' motion to strike, motion for more definite statement and motion to dismiss count three fully submitted.
Long asserts that the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) (2)'s requirement that the complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and 8(a)(3)'s requirement for "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (3). Long asserts the complaint is excessively long and neither "short" nor "plain."
The Federal Rules employ a notice-based pleading system. See Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 316 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. NationsMart v. Carlon, 524 U.S. 927, 118 S.Ct. 2321, 141 L.Ed.2d 696 (1998); Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to plead only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed: "The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party `fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Cos., 121 F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1997)). Thus, a plaintiff is not required to plead all the facts underlying the alleged claim, the Rules simply require a "short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
However, in contrast to the cases cited by Long, involving excessively long complaints, Nelson's complaint is not excessively long, nor is it complex or confusing. See McHenry v. Renne et. al, 84 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996) (); see also Kuehl v. FDIC, 8 F.3d 905 (1st Cir. 1993) (). Rule 8 does not prohibit a party from providing a reasonably detailed description of the facts involved, nor does it prohibit a party from providing the context and history from which the alleged claims arise. Therefore, the court finds no violation of Rule 8(a)(2).
Long argues that pursuant to Rule 8(a)(3), Nelson is required to state "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3). Long contends that the paragraphs included in Nelson's prayer, that reference amounts, are inappropriate and unnecessary and prejudicial to Long, "inasmuch as the Plaintiff's claim is based on federal question, not diversity jurisdiction." Defendant's Motion to Strike ¶ x. at 4.
However, Nelson argues that the Iowa rules of pleading remedies do not preempt the Federal Rules because the Iowa common law claims alleged are supplemental to the federal claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. and that the Federal Rules do not prohibit Nelson from referencing amounts under the Federal Rules. The court agrees with Nelson that referencing an amount in his demand is not prohibited by the Federal Rules nor is it prejudicial Long. Therefore, the court finds no violation of Rule 8(a)(3).
Long contends that the complaint covers matters outside of the statute of limitations period for all causes of action, includes evidentiary matters, and contains conclusions of law not appropriate for inclusion in a complaint.
Rule 12(f) states, in pertinent part, that "the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added). In ruling on a Rule 12(f) motion, the court has considerable discretion. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Central Missouri Electric Coop., Inc., 278 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously interpreted Rule 12(f) and held that because the rule is stated in the permissive, it has always been understood that the district court enjoys "liberal discretion" thereunder. Thor Corp. v. Automatic Washer Co., 91 F. Supp. 829, 832 (D.C. Iowa 1950). However, despite this broad discretion, striking...
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