Nelson v. Nelson

Citation2002 MT 151,50 P.3d 139,310 Mont. 329
Decision Date02 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 01-109.,01-109.
PartiesM. Elizabeth NELSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Robert Y. NELSON, Defendant/Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Montana

Robert E. LaFountain, Billings, Montana, For Appellant.

J. Dennis Corbin, Miles City, Montana; Brent R. Cromley, Billings, Montana, For Respondent.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 M. Elizabeth Nelson (Elizabeth), appeals from the order of the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Custer County, granting summary judgment in favor of Robert Y. Nelson (Robert), on the grounds that Elizabeth's cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

¶ 2 The sole issue is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Robert. We reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On May 14, 1998, Elizabeth filed a complaint, alleging she suffered injuries while working on a ranch operated by Robert. At the time of her injuries, Elizabeth and Robert were married, but the couple later divorced. As part of the ranch operation, Robert applied pesticides and insecticides and also inoculated sheep against sore mouth disease. Elizabeth assisted Robert with ranching activities on a regular basis from 1989 until their divorce proceedings began in 1994. Elizabeth claimed that on several occasions from 1989 to 1994, she was exposed to pesticides and insecticides (chemicals) as a result of Robert's improper methods of application. Additionally, in July, 1989, while Elizabeth was holding a sheep in preparation for inoculation, Robert's assistant, Merle Nelson, accidentally injected Elizabeth's hand with bovine ecthyma vaccine, a vaccine containing the live virus for sore mouth disease. Elizabeth became dizzy immediately after the injection and lapsed into unconsciousness. After regaining consciousness, Elizabeth continued assisting with inoculating sheep throughout the rest of the day.

¶ 4 From 1989 through 1998, when Elizabeth filed the complaint in this matter, Elizabeth received extensive medical evaluations and treatments for numerous physical ailments which either surfaced or worsened subsequent to her exposure to the chemicals and the vaccine. Elizabeth suffered from many medical problems including rheumatoid arthritis, sleep apnea, Pickwithian syndrome, recurrent blistering on her feet and in her mouth, diabetes, hypothyroidism, headaches, and severe upper respiratory problems.

¶ 5 Elizabeth's physicians were uncertain of the possible cause and effect relationship between her numerous physical ailments and her exposure to chemicals and the vaccine. One of her physicians, L. Keith Scott, M.D. (Dr. Scott), noted in an August 11, 1995 letter that:

The cause of much of her problem is still in question. She was exposed to multiple chemicals and has been seen by the toxicology unit at the University of Colorado. They did find that she did have some over exposure to certain chemicals but still have not addressed cause and effect relation.

¶ 6 Elizabeth sought medical treatment from Richard A. Nelson, M.D. (Dr. Nelson) on March 6, 1996. Dr. Nelson contacted the Centers for Disease Control in order to obtain information on human reactions to injection with bovine ecthyma vaccine, but no information was available, as Elizabeth was the only known person to have ever been injected with the vaccine. Regarding his belief as to a possible causal connection, Dr. Nelson stated in a letter dated May 20, 1996, that:

[Elizabeth] has a significant list of physical disorders, not the least of which are asthma, reactive airway disease, rheumatoid arthritis, toxic exposure to nervous system associated with agricultural chemicals including herbicides, pesticides, and being directly injected with the vaccine for sore mouth disease.... This resulted in a systemic autoimmune reactivity associated with skin and mucus membrane disorders.

¶ 7 Elizabeth filed her complaint against Robert on May 14, 1998, for damages incurred as a result of her exposure to the pesticides and insecticides and the injection of the bovine ecthyma vaccine. Robert moved for summary judgment, arguing that Elizabeth's cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for negligence. Robert argued that Elizabeth knew of her injuries more than three years before this action was filed, as evidenced by a Motion for Modification of Separation Agreement she filed in the parties' marital action on May 10, 1995. In the motion, Elizabeth's attorney represented that "[a]t the time and entry of the decree, [Elizabeth] suffered from certain damages which were undisclosed or unknown to her or to her physicians. She had undergone an extensive amount of testing, evaluation and examination, but no determination of the cause of her problems existed." The motion also stated:

After entering into the Separation Agreement, the doctors now believe that the cause of her problem may very well stem from certain poisons used on the ranch....
The injuries suffered as a result of improper use of these chemicals . . . constitute a life threatening and life long problem....

¶ 8 Following a hearing on October 25, 2000, the District Court entered an order and memorandum granting Robert's summary judgment motion. The court concluded that Elizabeth's claim accrued when she was accidentally injected with the bovine vaccine in July of 1989, and that her complaint was therefore barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Elizabeth appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 We review appeals from summary judgment rulings de novo. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Services, 2000 MT 381, ¶ 19, 304 Mont. 1, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 1042, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation that the district court uses, based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Sleath, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). We set forth our inquiry as follows:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred.

Sleath, ¶ 19 (citing Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 1999 MT 328, ¶ 21, 297 Mont. 336, ¶ 21, 993 P.2d 11, ¶ 21). We review a district court's interpretation of law to determine if it is correct. Steinback v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 2000 MT 316, ¶ 11, 302 Mont. 483, ¶ 11, 15 P.3d 872, ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment to Robert?

¶ 11 In its memorandum and order granting summary judgment, the District Court concluded Elizabeth was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-204(1), MCA, because Elizabeth immediately suffered injuries following the injection, and thus "sustained obviously tortious injuries in July, 1989." The court distinguished Elizabeth's claim from Hando v. PPG Industries, Inc. (1989), 236 Mont. 493, 771 P.2d 956, wherein we held that the onset of the statute of limitations is determined by applying the discovery rule and establishing when the injured person knew, or in the exercise of due diligence, should have known of the facts constituting the cause of action. The District Court reasoned that Elizabeth's injuries following the injection, unlike Hando's latent injuries which developed over time, were "obvious" and "immediate," noting Elizabeth instantly suffered unconsciousness after being injected with the vaccine. Accordingly, the court did not consider the averments in Elizabeth's motion to modify the separation agreement.

¶ 12 Elizabeth argues the statute of limitations was tolled until the date her physical ailments were causally connected to the chemicals and the vaccine injection; thus her claim (filed in May, 1998) was filed within three years from the date Dr. Nelson first established the causal connection (May, 1996). Elizabeth contends that although she lost consciousness after the injection, the vaccine did not leave immediately noticeable effects, and that her subsequent physical problems surfaced over the course of time, and were not causally linked to the injection until 1996. Elizabeth contends the District Court erred in its interpretation of Hando, arguing Hando is not distinguishable from her situation.

¶ 13 Robert agrees with the District Court and asserts that this case is not controlled by Hando, arguing that Elizabeth's injury was obviously tortious, unlike Hando's latent disease or injury. Robert also alleges Elizabeth knew of the causal connection between the injection and her physical ailments as early as May 10, 1995, as evidenced by her motion for modification of the settlement agreement.

¶ 14 The statute of limitations in Montana in an action for negligence is three years. Section 27-2-204(1), MCA. The period of limitation begins when the claim or cause of action accrues and is not postponed because of lack of knowledge of the claim or cause of action by the party to whom it has accrued. Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. However:

[t]he period of limitation does not begin on any claim or cause of action for an injury to person or property until the facts constituting the claim have been discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by the injured party if:
(a) the facts constituting the claim are by their nature concealed or self-concealing.
. . . .

Section 27-2-102(3), MCA. Addressing this so-called "discovery rule," we have held that "when the facts constituting a claim or cause of action for personal injury are, by their nature, concealed or...

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