Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 89-5981

Decision Date21 February 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-5981,89-5981
Citation923 F.2d 1528
PartiesScott NELSON and Vivian Nelson, Individually and as Husband/Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SAUDI ARABIA, King Faisal Specialist Hospital, Royspec, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Jorge A. Duarte, P.A., Miami, Fla. and Anthony D'Amato, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Ill, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Maureen E. Mahoney, Lathan & Watkins, Washington, D.C., for Saudi Arabia.

Marc Cooper, Cooper, Wolfe & Bolotin, P.A., Miami, Fla., for King Faisal Hosp. and Saudi Arabia.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and RE *, Chief Judge.

RE, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants, Scott and Vivian Nelson, appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, dismissing their claim against defendants-appellees, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Specialist Hospital, and Royspec, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.

Scott Nelson was hired, in the United States, as a monitoring systems engineer for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital (the Hospital) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Nelson alleged that, in the course of performing his duties under his employment contract with the Hospital, he was detained and tortured by agents of the Saudi government in Saudi Arabia in retaliation for reporting safety violations at the Hospital.

Nelson brought suit for his injuries against Saudi Arabia, the Hospital, and Royspec, a corporation owned and controlled by the government of Saudi Arabia (collectively Saudi Arabia). Nelson alleged subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the FSIA). The district court concluded that Nelson's claims were not based upon the commercial activities of Saudi Arabia carried on in the United States, as required by the FSIA, and granted Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On appeal, Nelson contends that the district court erred in granting Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss. Nelson asserts that, since his detention and torture were based upon his recruitment and hiring in the United States by an agent of the Saudi government, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.

The question presented is whether the district court erred in determining that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. More specifically, did the Since we conclude that Nelson's detention and torture were based upon the recruitment and hiring of Nelson in the United States by an agent of the Saudi government, and that the recruitment and hiring was a commercial activity of Saudi Arabia, we hold that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

court have jurisdiction in this action for damages for the detention and torture of Nelson by agents of the Saudi government, in Saudi Arabia, in retaliation for Nelson's conduct during his employment in Saudi Arabia in a position for which he was recruited and hired in the United States by an agent of the Saudi government.

BACKGROUND

In 1983, Scott Nelson, while in the United States, saw a printed advertisement recruiting employees for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital (the Hospital), in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The recruitment was conducted by the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), an independent corporation which, in 1973, had contracted with the Royal Cabinet of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to recruit employees for the hospital.

After submitting an application, Nelson was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by two officials of the Hospital. Subsequently, he returned to the United States, and entered into a contract of employment with the Hospital as a monitoring systems engineer. The contract was signed in Miami, Florida, in November, 1983.

Nelson commenced employment at the Hospital on December 7, 1983. As stated in the Hospital's job description for monitoring systems engineer, Nelson was "[r]esponsible for the development and expansion of electronic monitoring and control systems capabilities." He was also responsible for recommending "modifications of existing equipment and the purchase and installation of new equipment."

Nelson alleges that, on March 20, 1984, in the course of his duties at the Hospital, he discovered certain safety hazards, and reported these safety hazards to an investigative commission of the Saudi government. Nelson states that, on September 27, 1984, he was summoned to the Hospital's security office by agents or employees of the Hospital. He alleges that, from the security office, he was moved to a jail cell where he was "shackled, tortured and beaten" by agents or employees of the Saudi government. Nelson states that he was imprisoned for 39 days, during which time he was never informed of any charges against him, nor was he ever accused of a crime. He further states that his wife was told by a Saudi government official that he could be released if she provided sexual favors.

Nelson and his wife, Vivian Nelson, sued Saudi Arabia, the Hospital, and Royspec, a corporation owned and controlled by the Saudi government which acts as a purchasing agent for the Hospital. Nelson sought compensatory and punitive damages under 16 counts, and asserted that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, codified at 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1602-1611. Saudi Arabia moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The district court concluded that "the link between the recruitment activities and the Defendants is not sufficient to establish 'substantial contact' with the United States," within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1603(e). Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-1791, slip op. at 5 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 11, 1989). The district court also noted that "even if the court had determined that [the Hospital] and Saudi Arabia had carried on commercial activities having substantial contact with the United States through the indirect recruitment activities, the court would be unable to find a nexus between those activities and Nelson's complaint." Id. at 8. Accordingly, the district court granted Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby dismissing the action against all defendants.

DISCUSSION

In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed.

                287 (1812), the Supreme Court adopted the common law doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.  As noted in The Schooner Exchange, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity rests on principles of comity between nations.  See id. at 135-36.    See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1967, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983)
                

On the question of foreign sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has generally deferred to the decisions or recommendations of the Executive Branch of government. See id.; Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90, 63 S.Ct. 793, 799-800, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943) (discussing reasons for deferring to Executive Branch). Consequently, "[f]or more than a century and a half, the United States generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this country." Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. at 1967.

The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is closely related to the act of state doctrine. As articulated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897), under the act of state doctrine:

Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

Id. at 252, 18 S.Ct. at 84. See also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1859 n. 7, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976).

Neither the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity nor the act of state doctrine are as widely applied now as in the past. Indeed, it was suggested years ago that the act of state doctrine had "earned a well-deserved rest." E. Re, Foreign Confiscations in Anglo-American Law 170 (1951). See also Cardozo, International Law in the New York Courts--1953, 40 Cornell L.Q. 97, 109 (1955) ("the urge to grant sovereign immunity has also lost much of its force"). Surely, "the mere assertion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is no more effective if given the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the label 'sovereign immunity.' " Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705, 96 S.Ct. at 1866.

The present restrictive attitude in the application of the act of state doctrine is reflected in Justice Scalia's opinion in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 701, 107 L.Ed.2d 816 (1990). In Kirkpatrick the plaintiff, an American corporation that unsuccessfully bid on a public works contract in Nigeria, sued the defendant, an American corporation that was the successful bidder on the contract. The plaintiff brought suit for damages, and contended that the defendant, which had pled guilty to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, had paid bribes to Nigerian officials in order to obtain the contract. See id. 110 S.Ct. at 702-03. The defendant moved to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the act of state doctrine. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reversed, and the Supreme court granted the defendant's writ of certiorari. See id. at 703-04.

In Kirkpatrick, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Saudi Arabia v. Nelson
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 23 d2 Março d2 1993
    ...Cf. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 54-55, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 3041-3042, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Pp. ____. 923 F.2d 1528 (CA 11 1985), SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in which K......
  • Mones v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 31 d2 Julho d2 2007
    ...to Camp. 42. See Questionnaire at 1 43. See Synopsis of Responses. 44. See Reservations Declarations. 45. See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir.1991) ("Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other foreign State ...."); Smart v. State Farm Ins......
  • Tubular Inspectors, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, s. 91-6156
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 16 d1 Novembro d1 1992
    ...gloss is that the Supreme Court will this term hear argument in a case allegedly decided under the "nexus test." Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir.1991), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2937, 119 L.Ed.2d 562 (1992). In Nelson, the plaintiff was recruited by an ad......
  • Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 90-3059
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 13 d4 Junho d4 1991
    ...a bond or link that connects the foreign state to the wrongful act for which it is sought to be held liable." Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir.1991). Other cases refer simply to a "connection" between the claim and the commercial acts. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT