Nelson v. St. Joseph & Grand Island Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 June 1918 |
| Citation | 205 S.W. 870,199 Mo.App. 635 |
| Parties | O. H. NELSON, Respondent, v. ST. JOSEPH & GRAND ISLAND RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court.--Hon. L. A. Vories, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
Culver & Phillip for respondent.
R. A Brown for appellant.
Plaintiff, an employee engaged in the operation of defendant's interstate passenger train, brought this suit to recover overtime compensation claimed to be due under the Act of Congress of September 3, 5, 1916, known as the Adamson Law. [39 U.S. Stats. 721, c. 436.]
So far as applicable to this case, said Act provides that beginning January 1, 1917 "eight hours shall, in contracts for labor and service, be deemed a day's work and the measure or standard of a day's work for the purpose of reckoning the compensation for services of all employees who are now or may hereafter be employed" by any railroad interstate carrier (with certain exceptions not material to this case) "and who are now or may hereafter be actually engaged in any capacity in the operation of trains" in interstate and foreign commerce.
Section 2 of said Act provides for the appointment of a commission by the President to observe the operation and effects of the institution of the eight-hour standard workday, during a period of not less than six nor more than nine months, and to report in thirty days thereafter.
Section 3 provides that pending said report, and for a period of thirty days thereafter, the compensation of railway employees subject to the Act for a standard eight-hour workday should not be reduced below the present standard day's wage "and for all necessary time in excess of eight hours such employees shall be paid at a rate not less than the pro rata rate for such standard eight-hour workday."
Plaintiff's contract of employment was made in December, 1916, that is, after the Act was passed; and the services for which overtime compensation is herein sought were rendered between January 1, and May 19, 1917. So that no question of plaintiff's right to recover can arise over the character of plaintiff's services or the period during which they were rendered or the status of the defendant as an interstate carrier subject to the Act. The sole contention made by defendant is that the Act does not apply to plaintiff's contract of employment. Defendant bases this contention upon the fact that there is no provision in the contract for overtime compensation nor clause defining what shall constitute "a day's work," and upon the claim that the contract fixed plaintiff's compensation at a stipulated sum per calendar month. The contention, in reality, rests wholly upon this last claim. For, the absence of any express provision in the contract relating to overtime compensation or defining a day's work must be deemed to have been urged only in emphasis of the last claim or to exclude the possibility of the Act being made applicable by the wording of the contract elsewhere and aside from that portion thereof relating to the specified compensation and how it should be paid. The contract having been made after the enactment of the law, and the services having been rendered after it had gone into effect, the mere absence of any provision in the contract calling for overtime pay or of any provision specifying what should constitute a day's work, cannot alone defeat plaintiff's right, since the law would supply the place of such absent provisions, unless it is clearly inapplicable to the contract on account of the other reason given, namely, the claim that the contract can in no way be so regarded or interpreted as to permit the ascertainment of a day's wage, but must be deemed to have fixed plaintiff's compensation at a stipulated sum per calendar month. It is thus seen that defendant's contention comes down to the proposition that the Adamson Law affects only such contracts as refer to a day's work or a day's pay and merely provides that, in such contracts, a standard day of eight hours shall be understood instead of the theretofore existing standard day; and that where, under his existing contract of employment, an employer's compensation was not reckoned on the basis of "a standard day" nor with reference to a day's work, there is nothing in his contract to which the new standard could be applied and, therefore, the rate of compensation is not affected by the Act.
It is true that the Act neither abrogates existing contracts nor makes new ones, and it may very well be that if an employee makes a contract to which it is impossible to apply the law then the employee may not be able to claim any benefits under that law. But it cannot be successfully maintained that there is anything in the wording of the Act showing that the intention was that the law should apply to some and not to all. The Act fixes eight hours "as the measure or standard of a day's work for the purpose of reckoning the compensation for services of all employees" engaged in the movement of interstate trains. And there is nothing elsewhere in the Act which can be construed as creating any distinction between employees so engaged, whether their contracts provide they are to be paid a certain rate per month, per mile,...
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