Nelson v. State

Citation250 S.W.3d 386
Decision Date26 February 2008
Docket NumberNo. ED 88797.,ED 88797.
PartiesRonnie NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Scott Thompson, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Stephanie L. Wan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Presiding Judge.

We decide a novel issue of law: whether an individual, who has never had a driver's license, and therefore argues that he has never had a "driving privilege," may nevertheless stand convicted of driving while his driving privilege is revoked. The movant, Ronnie E. Nelson, appeals the motion court's denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, wherein he contends that a factual basis did not exist for his pleas of guilty to the offense of driving while revoked. We reject this argument and affirm the motion court's judgment.

Factual Background

The prosecuting attorney of Jefferson County, Missouri, charged the defendant with five counts of the class D felony1 of driving while his driving privilege was revoked, in violation of Section 302.321 RSMo. (2003) (Matthew Bender, LEXIS, through 2002 legislation)(amended 2005), along with other offenses, which are not at issue in this appeal.

After the movant and the State reached a plea agreement, the movant appeared before the plea court to enter his pleas of guilty in each of the five cases. The prosecuting attorney recounted the evidence in each case. As is pertinent to the driving-while-revoked charges, the prosecutor specified five different occasions in 2004 and 2005 when the movant operated a motor vehicle on a certain highway in Jefferson County while his driving privilege was revoked. The prosecutor noted that the movant's driving privilege had been revoked multiple times by the State of Missouri, and that a revocation, which initially took effect on April 4, 1986, remained in force. The prosecutor also observed that the movant had numerous other point revocations and two 10-year denials of his driving privilege. And, as reflected in the informations, and acknowledged by the movant at the plea hearing, the movant had previously been convicted three times of driving while revoked and driving while intoxicated in 2000 and 2001.

The movant admitted the recited facts and also affirmed that he has never had a driver's license. After the prosecutor set forth the range of punishment for the offenses and announced the State's recommendation, the plea court inquired into the voluntariness of the movant's pleas and reviewed his various rights and the consequences of pleading guilty, all of which the movant stated he understood. The movant then pleaded guilty to five counts of driving while his driving privilege was revoked.2 The plea court found that the movant's pleas of guilty were voluntarily and intelligently made, with a full understanding of the charges, the movant's rights, and the consequences of the pleas. The plea court further found that a factual basis existed for the pleas, and then accepted the movant's guilty pleas and sentenced the movant to five concurrent terms of four years' imprisonment.

After being delivered to the Department of Corrections, the movant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment and sentence. Appointed counsel then filed an amended motion. As grounds for relief, the movant alleged that the plea court impermissibly accepted his guilty pleas and entered convictions because a factual basis did not exist for the pleas. The movant posited that because he had never held a driver's license or driving privilege, he could not have had his license or privilege canceled, suspended, or revoked so as to be eligible for criminal liability under Section 302.321. Thus, he argued, there was no factual basis for his pleas of guilty to the offense of driving while revoked.

The motion court denied the movant's motion for relief. The court acknowledged that the movant has never had a Missouri driver's license. The court reasoned, however, that the State had not charged the movant with driving while his driver's license was revoked or suspended, but had instead charged the movant with driving while his operating privilege was revoked or suspended. The court noted that Section 302.321 specifically authorizes the prosecution of any individual who operates a motor vehicle on a highway when his driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked. The movant now appeals the motion court's ruling.

Standard of Review

This Court's review of a motion court's denial of a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Dorsey v. State, 115 S.W.3d 842, 845 (Mo. banc 2003); Flores v. State, 186 S.W.3d 398, 399 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). We presume the motion court's findings and conclusions are correct. Wilson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. banc 1991). A motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a full review of the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. banc 1997); Flores, 186 S.W.3d at 398.

Discussion

A plea court may not enter judgment on a guilty plea unless it determines there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 24.02(e). The purpose of Rule 24.02(e) is to aid in the constitutionally required determination that a defendant enter his plea of guilty intelligently and voluntarily. Orr v. State, 179 S.W.3d 328, 329 (Mo.App. S.D.2005); Myers v. State, 223 S.W.3d 165, 167 (Mo.App. S.D.2006). "The Rule is designed to protect an accused who may appear to be pleading voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature of the charge, but who does so without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge." Orr 179 S.W.3d at 329. "The need for this protection requires courts to reject a guilty plea if the facts do not establish the offense." Id.

"A factual basis exists if the defendant understands the facts presented at the guilty plea proceeding and those facts establish the commission of the charged crime." Martin v. State, 187 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). The record in this case reflects that the movant expressed an understanding of the charges against him and the facts giving rise to the charges. Indeed, the movant does not contend that he misunderstood the nature of the charges or their underlying facts. Rather, he exclusively argues that those facts do not establish the commission of the charged crimes.

The State charged the movant with driving while his driving privilege was revoked, in violation of Section 302.321. That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A person commits the crime of driving while revoked if he operates a motor vehicle on a highway when his license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended or revoked under the laws of this state or any other state and acts with criminal negligence with respect to knowledge of the fact that his driving privilege has been canceled, suspended or revoked.

Section 302.321.1.

The movant argues that a reading of various Missouri statutes reveals that an individual holds a "driving privilege" for purposes of Section 302.321 only where he applies for and is awarded such a privilege through either licensure or the "limited privilege" provision of Section 302.309.3 Thus, he contends that the imposition of liability under Section 302.321 for "driving while ... driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked" does not apply to him because he never held such a privilege by virtue of either licensure or the explicit grant of a "limited privilege" pursuant to Section 302.309.

In support of his proposition that a driving privilege is awarded through licensure, the movant points to the language of two different statutory sections: Section 302.041 RSMo. (2000) and Section 302.150 RSMo. (2000). Section 302.041 RSMo. (2000), which provides that licensure by a municipality is not required, states that "[a]ny person licensed to operate a vehicle may exercise the privilege thereby granted upon all highways in this state...." (Emphasis added.)4 Section 302.150 RSMo. (2000), which deals with nonresident drivers, provides that "[t]he privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this state given to a nonresident hereunder shall be subject to suspension, revocation or disqualification ... in like manner and for like cause as a license issued hereunder may be suspended, revoked or disqualified."5 The movant credibly posits that this section suggests that a nonresident driver, though failing to hold a Missouri license, nevertheless enjoys a driving privilege in Missouri by virtue of his or her out-of-state license, and that Missouri has the power to revoke this privilege. Other than licensure, the movant points to the "limited privilege" provision of Section 302.309 as the only other avenue by which one is vested with a "driving privilege" for purposes of Section 302.321. Section 302.309, which authorizes the issuance of a hardship license, states that under certain conditions "the court or director may grant such limited driving privilege as the circumstances of the case justify if the court or director finds undue hardship would result to the individual...." Section 302.309.3(2).6

We agree that the term "privilege" may refer to the actual vested privilege to drive, which exists by virtue of licensure by a state or an award of a limited driving privilege. But we also hold that it can refer to the potential unvested privilege to seek licensure. We rest this conclusion on traditional principles of statutory construction and an examination of caselaw.

The movant's argument hinges on...

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