Nelson v. Thornberg
Decision Date | 30 October 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 80-2259. |
Citation | 504 F. Supp. 199 |
Parties | Larry A. NELSON, partner of Nelson Machine and Welding, and as administrator of the Nelson Machine and Welding Partnership Estate, Plaintiff, v. Jim THORNBERG and Grain King Corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Thomas Herlocker, Roberts & Herlocker, Winfield, Kan., Roger D. Stanton, Weeks, Thomas & Lysaught, Overland Park, Kan., for plaintiff.
Kent E. Whittaker, Joseph C. Benage, Hillix, Brewer, Hoffhaus & Whittaker, Kansas City, Mo., A. C. Cooke, Cooke, Ballweg, Borth, Wilson & Simpson, Prairie Village, Kan., for defendant.
This matter is presently before the court on defendant Grain King Corporation's motion to dissolve a pre-judgment attachment of a bank account. Plaintiff filed his petition in the District Court of Cowley County, Kansas, on June 25, 1980. The petition states claims for breach of contract, malicious interference with contract rights, fraudulent conversion, and punitive damages. Defendants removed the case to this court on July 21, 1980. Before the Cowley County District Court was aware of the removal, plaintiff filed an affidavit in garnishment prior to judgment and a bond seeking garnishment of checking account No. XX-XX-XXX at First National Bank of Winfield, Kansas. An order of garnishment issued and was served on the garnishee bank at 10:15 a.m. on July 22. The return also notes that service on the defendant was accomplished through "Jim Thornberg by 1st National." The vice president of the bank mailed a copy of the garnishment order to Thornberg on July 28, 1980. Defendants concede that they had actual notice of the garnishment by July 31, 1980. On September 25, 1980, plaintiff sought and we issued an order appointing a special process server to serve Grain King with the order of garnishment. The return from Sheriff Gerald D. Allen of Cerro Gordo County, Mason City, Iowa, states that the order for garnishment was served on September 29, 1980.
Grain King attacks the garnishment on several theories. First, the defendant has filed a reply with an affidavit of Jim Thornberg to the answer of the garnishee. The bank answered that when served with the order of garnishment it held $9,525.66 belonging to the defendants in checking account No. XX-XX-XXX. Grain King denies that it maintained account No. XX-XX-XXX at the garnishee bank on July 22, 1980, and submits correspondence dated June 13, 1980, requesting that the account be closed. This contention is not raised in the defendant's motion to dissolve the order of garnishment and we need not address it.
Grain King's second theory is that the affidavit submitted in support of the order of garnishment is defective for its failure to specify with particularity the facts in support of the grounds asserted for the garnishment. In Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 221 Kan. 369, 559 P.2d 1148 (1977), Justice Prager found the Kansas pre-judgment attachment statute unconstitutional for four reasons; namely, (1) plaintiff was not required to post a bond if defendant was a nonresident or a foreign corporation, (2) plaintiff was permitted to state merely conclusory allegations in the statutory language without allegations of specific facts, (3) the order of attachment issued by the ministerial act of the clerk of the court, and (4) the defendant had no right to a hearing immediately after the seizure. The attachment statutes were subsequently amended to address these defects. K.S.A. 60-704 (Supp.1979) now requires the affidavit to state:
(1) The grounds upon which the attachment is sought, specifying with particularity the facts in support of such grounds, (2) that the plaintiff has a just claim against the defendant, and (3) the amount which the affiant believes the plaintiff ought to recover, after allowing all just credits and set-offs.
K.S.A. 60-701 provides the following grounds for pre-judgment attachment:
In pertinent part, plaintiff's affidavit reads as follows:
The affidavit also incorporates the petition with its claim of fraudulent conduct by the defendant.
We find the above to be adequate to support the order of garnishment.
Defendant's third theory in support of its motion to dissolve is that plaintiff failed to strictly and diligently pursue the extraordinary remedy of pre-judgment garnishment by failing to timely provide the defendants with legal notice of the order. Grain King contends that its statutory right to a hearing within five days of moving to dissolve an order of garnishment is meaningless unless the statute also requires timely service.
Service and return of service are provided in K.S.A. 60-717(b) (Supp.1979) as follows:
The order of garnishment shall be served on the garnishee, together with two (2) copies of the form for the garnishee's answer prescribed in K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 60-718 and returned by the officer making service in the same manner as an order of attachment. If the order is served prior to a judgment on the plaintiff's claim, said order shall also be served on the defendant, if he or she can be found, but failure to serve the defendant shall not relieve the garnishee from liability under said order.
K.S.A. 60-706(b)(1) (Supp.1979) provides for the service of an order of attachment as follows:
In addition to the process required under article 3 of this chapter, the order of attachment shall be served upon the defendant, if...
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