Nelson v. Tradewind Aviation, LLC.
| Decision Date | 24 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | 34838.,Nos. 34625,s. 34625 |
| Citation | 111 A.3d 887,155 Conn.App. 519 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jeffrey NELSON v. TRADEWIND AVIATION, LLC. |
Jeffrey J. Tinley, with whom were Amita S. Patel, and, on the brief, Stephen E. Pliakas, Waterbury, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).
Stephen J. Fitzgerald, with whom was Joshua R. Goodbaum, New Haven, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).
KELLER, MULLINS and BEAR, Js.
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant, Tradewind Aviation, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following a jury trial in favor of the plaintiff, Jeffrey Nelson, and the plaintiff cross appeals from the court's punitive damages award and its decision to reserve the question of statutory prejudgment interest for itself instead of the jury. The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) denied its amended motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to set aside the verdict, (2) failed to recognize that an absolute privilege should attach to the alleged defamatory statements, (3) failed to conclude that the element of malice, required to defeat its qualified privilege and to find defamation and intentional interference with a business expectancy, could not be proven because of the mandatory nature of its alleged defamatory disclosures under the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 44703(h) (2012) (PRIA), and (4) granted the plaintiff's motion for punitive damages. In his cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) awarded punitive damages in an amount that was less than his cost of litigation, and (2) failed to instruct the jury on statutory prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our review. The defendant hired the plaintiff as a second in command pilot on April 12, 2007. The plaintiff attended the defendant's mandatory training program, passed its “ground school,” and successfully completed a “flight check ride” with the defendant's owner in May, 2007. As a second in command pilot, the plaintiff had a number of responsibilities, including assisting the pilot in command, collecting, weighing, and loading the passengers' baggage, and checking the balance of the total weight in the plane to ensure that its distribution was safe for flying. Over the course of the summer of 2007, the plaintiff copiloted 137 flights from New York and New Jersey to Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket, and he worked with a total of thirteen different pilots in command. All of the passengers on those flights arrived safely at their destinations, and none complained about the plaintiff's performance.
If one of the defendant's pilots was unable to fly safely, Kaj Wren, the defendant's chief pilot, would have removed him or her from flying status.1 Similarly, the plaintiff's immediate supervisor, assistant chief pilot Adam Schaefer, had the authority to remove a pilot from a flight if he observed that the pilot was not competent to fly safely. Neither Wren nor Schaefer ever removed the plaintiff from flying status for a performance based reason or disciplinary reason. Although some senior pilots did complain about the plaintiff, he was never given a written warning, disciplined, or suspended. Additionally, the plaintiff was never offered or sent for any additional training after he completed ground school.
The defendant operated six planes at a time during the 2007 summer season because of an increased demand for its services. During the following six month off-season, however, it operated only two planes, which meant that the number of employed pilots was cut from eighteen to six. At a meeting on August 28, 2007, the defendant's owner announced that he had more pilots than he needed for the upcoming off-season, and that there would be layoffs, with preference for continued employment given to those pilots who committed to stay for the full off-season. The plaintiff was concerned by that announcement because he was the “least experienced” among the recently hired pilots. The plaintiff subsequently committed to continue his employment for only one-half of the off-season.
Around this time, the defendant also required that the plaintiff submit to a random drug test. Schaefer requested the test because he believed the plaintiff was on drugs that day, as the plaintiff had bloodshot eyes, was fidgety, and was avoiding eye contact. The decision, however, had nothing to do with the plaintiff's performance as a pilot, and the test report indicated the reason for the test was “random selection.” The plaintiff's test came back negative. The plaintiff never violated the defendant's drug or alcohol policy.
On September 7, 2007, Schaefer told the plaintiff that the defendant would be unable to continue to employ him. Schaefer said nothing about the plaintiff's performance and suggested that the plaintiff might wish to resign because it would “look better” to future employers. The plaintiff decided not to resign because it would render him ineligible for unemployment benefits, and, therefore, he was laid off. Schaefer gave the plaintiff a packet of unemployment paperwork and told him to go to the defendant's human resources office to complete it. The defendant's human resources office supervised the completion of the paperwork, which reflected that the plaintiff was laid off due to “Lack of Work.”2
In December, 2007, the plaintiff interviewed with and was offered a job by Republic Airways (Republic). As part of his initial interview, the plaintiff completed and signed three forms required by PRIA. The first form, titled “Air Carrier and Other Records Request (PRIA),” authorized the defendant to provide Republic's third party representative, Phenix Group, Inc. (Phenix), with the plaintiff's records. The second form, titled “Authorization for Release of [Department of Transportation] Drug and Alcohol Testing Records Under PRIA and Maintained Under Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR) Part 40,” authorized the defendant to provide Phenix with copies of the plaintiff's drug and alcohol testing records. The final form, titled “Airman Notice and Right to Receive Copy—Air Carrier and Other Records (PRIA),” required that the defendant notify the plaintiff that his records were requested within twenty days of the request, provide the plaintiff with a complete copy of all of the documents provided to Phenix, and allow the plaintiff an opportunity to submit written comments to correct any inaccuracies in the records.
The defendant received the plaintiff's PRIA forms on December 24, 2007. Schaefer responded on behalf of the defendant, and faxed to Phenix the completed “Request for PRIA Pilots Records” form and accompanying records on January 16, 2008. In response to the first question on the form, which asked “[w]hat is the applicant's current employment status with your company or affiliates,” Schaefer checked the box, “Terminated (Involuntary).” The fifth question read: “Within the past five years, has the applicant ever been removed from flying status for any performance or professional competency reason?” Schaefer responded, “Yes.” After this form was faxed to Phenix, Julia Irving, a Republic employee, called Schaefer asking for information pertaining to the plaintiff's termination, and Schaefer transferred the call to Wren. After completing the telephone call with Irving, Wren instructed Schaefer to draft a letter that was faxed directly to Irving later that day. The letter stated:
On January 17, 2008, the defendant faxed the plaintiff's negative drug test report from the summer of 2007 directly to Irving with a cover sheet that stated:
The defendant did not notify the plaintiff within twenty days of December 24, 2007, that the PRIA records request had been received. Additionally, despite receiving the plaintiff's request to receive a complete copy of all of the documents sent to Republic, the defendant sent to the plaintiff copies of only the records from his successful training. The defendant did not send the plaintiff a copy of its response to the “Request for PRIA Pilots Records” form that it sent to Phenix, which included the statements that he was terminated involuntarily and that he had been removed from flying status for performance or professional competency reasons.
Similarly, the defendant did not send to the plaintiff a copy of the letter it sent directly to Republic, which stated that the plaintiff was terminated for failure to perform to the company standard and that he had been given opportunities to discuss the need for improvement. The defendant additionally did not provide the plaintiff with a copy of the negative drug test report and the accompanying cover sheet that were sent directly to Republic. According to the PRIA forms, it was the defendant's obligation to send the plaintiff a complete copy of the records that it had sent to Republic. Because the defendant failed to send copies of all of these documents to the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not know about the additional records that the defendant had sent to Republic. Republic revoked its job offer to the plaintiff on January 17, 2008.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant on December 19, 2008, and the case was tried to a jury in October, 2011. The jury found the defendant liable for defamation with malice and for intentional interference with a business expectancy. The jury found that the plaintiff proved by a...
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