Nelson v. White, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:14-cv-81-MTP
| Decision Date | 09 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:14-cv-81-MTP |
| Parties | TAIRE NELSON PLAINTIFF v. DANNY WHITE, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [52] filed by Defendants Scott Frye, Correll Singleton, Danny White and the Motion for Summary Judgment [56] filed by Defendant Charles R. Mayfield. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the applicable law the Court finds that the Defendant Charles R. Mayfield's Motion for Summary Judgment [56] should be granted and that Defendants Scott Frye, Correll Singleton, Danny White's Motion for Summary Judgment [52] should be granted in part and denied in part.
On September 22, 2014, Plaintiff Taire Nelson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his Complaint [1] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations in Plaintiff's complaint arise from his arrest and while he was a pre-trail detainee at the Natchez Police Department and Adams County Jail ("ACJ").1 In his Complaint [1] and as clarified in his testimony at the Spears2 hearing, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendant Correll Singleton for use of excessive force during arrest and claims against Defendants Scott Frye, Danny White, and Charles Mayfield for denial of adequate medical care.
Plaintiff alleges that on April 24, 2014, he was at a friend's house in Natchez, Mississippi, when Defendant Officer Singleton approached him, informed him he had a warrant for his arrest,and immediately shot him with a taser.3 Plaintiff claims he was tased multiple times, which caused him to fall to the ground injuring his hand, leg, and back. (Omnibus Transcript [40] at 24.) He was then placed under arrest and was taken to the Natchez Police Department.
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Singleton's report only said he was tased three times when he actually tased him four times. Plaintiff alleges this violated police department policy. He claims that tasing him four times when he was already subdued was excessive force.
After being taken to the Natchez Police Department by Officer Singleton, Plaintiff alleges he was placed in a holding cell. Plaintiff claims he requested a sick call form, and Police Chief Danny White brought him a form and spoke to him about his injuries. According to Plaintiff, he informed Chief White that his leg was hurting but did not mention that his hand was hurting. Plaintiff claims Chief White gave him Tylenol and instructed him to submit the sick call form. According to Plaintiff, this was the only contact he had with Chief White.
Allegedly, a few days later, Plaintiff asked Kim Singleton4 about the status of his sick call form. According to Plaintiff, Kim Singleton conferred with Captain Scott Frye, who stated that he would check on Plaintiff within three days. However, Frye allegedly did not check on him within three days. (Omnibus Transcript [40] at 21.) Instead, approximately a week and a half after Plaintiff was arrested, Kim Singleton allegedly removed Plaintiff out of his cell so that Captain Frye could see Plaintiff's hand. At that time, Captain Frye sent Plaintiff to Natchez Regional Hospital. According to Plaintiff, at the hospital, he was informed that he had a broken hand and needed surgery. Plaintiff alleges, however, that he was not taken back to the hospital for surgery.
Plaintiff alleges that on May 21, 2014, just few days after his hospital visit, he was transferred to the ACJ, where he submitted a sick call form. According to Plaintiff, he was provided Tylenol but no other treatment. Plaintiff named Sheriff Charles Mayfield as a Defendant, but Plaintiff alleges that he had no contact with Sheriff Mayfield during his stay at the ACJ. Allegedly, on June 20, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and taken to Central Mississippi Medical Center where a cast was placed on his hand. (Omnibus Transcript [40] at 29-30.)
Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages for his pain and suffering. Defendants filed their Motions for Summary Judgment [52][56], arguing that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only when "the record indicates that there is 'no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The Court must view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. However, the nonmoving party "cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or 'only a scintilla of evidence.'" Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). In the absence of proof, the Court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
There is no genuine issue for trial "[i]f the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir.1999). The Fifth Circuit "assign[s] greater weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the facts evidentfrom video recordings taken at the scene." Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183,187 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)). A court need not rely on the plaintiff's description of the facts where the record discredits that description, but should instead consider "the facts in the light depicted by the videotape." Id. (citing Harris, 550 U.S. at 381).
As an initial matter, Defendant Mayfield argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies while housed in the ACJ and the claims against him should be dismissed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §1983] or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). The Fifth Circuit takes "a strict approach" to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Johnson v. Ford, Fed. App'x 752, 755(5th Cir. 2008)(citing Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 866(5th Cir. 2003)).
ACJ has a grievance procedure in place as outlined in the prison rules. ([56-10]). The rules dictate that any inmate who believes he has not been treated correctly should fill out a grievance form located at the commissary terminal in each cellblock. Id. Shift Supervisors investigate the grievances once the form is filled out. Id. Plaintiff signed a document when transferring into ACJ jail stating that he would read these posted rules and follow them. ([56-12]). Plaintiff admits in his Complaint[1] that he did not utilize the administrative remedy program at ACJ because "jails don't have ARP complaint forms or procedure." However, Plaintiff's ignorance of the grievance procedure does not relieve him of the obligation to exhaust administrative remedies. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (); see also Plaisance v.Cain, 374 F. App'x 560, 561 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (). As Plaintiff failed to submit a grievance form at ACJ, Defendant Mayfield's Motion for Summary Judgment [56] should be granted. Nonetheless, the Court will discuss summary judgment based on the merits of Plaintiff's claim. As discussed below, Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants, except the excessive force claim against Defendant Singleton, should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Singleton amount to a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Qualified immunity protects public officials from this type of suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). The defendant must initially plead his good faith and establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001). Once the defendant has done this, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut this defense by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. Id. A claim of qualified immunity requires the court to engage in a two-step analysis. The court determines whether the defendant has violated an actual constitutional right, see McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002), and if the answer is "no," the analysis ends. Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007). If the answer is "yes," then the court considers whether the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. Id. at 411.
Prior to January 2009, this two-step process was a mandatory sequential analysis, meaning that courts were required to first analyze "step one"—the constitutional violation question—before moving to "step two." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U .S. 194, 200-01 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v.Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The mandatory nature of this sequential analysis was undermined in Pearson v. Callahan, in which the Court held that while courts may analyze...
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