Nelson v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 23 June 1928
• Docket Number: No. 18100.,18100.
• Citation: 162 N.E. 144,331 Ill. 11
• Parties: NELSON v. WILSON et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

331 Ill. 11

162 N.E. 144

NELSON

v.WILSON et al.

No. 18100.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1928.

Commissioners' Opinion.

Suit by Ada Wilson Nelson against Alfred Wilson and others. Decree of dismissal, and complainant appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County, Francis S. Wilson, judge.

William Reeda, Charles E. Peace, and William Jaffe, all of Chicago, for appellant.

Charles J. Trainor, of Chicago, for appellees.

PARTLOW, C.

On July 19, 1924, appellant Ada Wilson Nelson filed her bill in the circuit court of Cook county against appellees Alfred Wilson, Eva Erickson, Irv. Erickson, the Chicago Title & Trust Company, John C. Berg, and Emma C. Berg to set aside certain deeds. Two years later an amended bill was filed. A demurrer was sustained to the amended bill, it was dismissed for want of equity, and an appeal has been prosecuted to this court.

The bill alleged that appellant was born in Sweden on July 31, 1885. When she was 9 years old she was brought to this country by Clara J. Wilson and Alfred Wilson, her aunt and uncle, and she lived with them as their child for many years. Her name was Eda Maria Alm, but she was known as Ada Wilson. Clara Wilson, who was her father's sister, owned two lots in Chicago. On one of them was a two-story frame house, and the other was vacant. Clara Wilson died January 5, 1898, leaving a will, in which she devised the lot on which the house was located to appellant, subject to the homestead rights of the testatrix's husband, who was to have the use of the premises as long as he occupied them as a home. The will directed the executor to sell the vacant lot and use the proceeds for the education and support of appellant. The executor refused to act, and the surviving husband was appointed administrator with the will annexed, and he filed an inventory showing no personal estate. The real estate was subject to a trust deed for $600 to the Illinois Building & Loan Association. Two claims were allowed against the estate, amounting to $265. On March 6, 1901, a petition was filed to sell the real estate to pay debts, and ten years later the petition was dismissed.

The bill alleged that appellant, by reason of her having been brought to this county by her aunt and uncle when a mere child and having lived in their household at various times, was told they would adopt her; that by virtue of said relation Wilson exercised a parental control over and a fiduciary relation toward her, and that she as a dutiful child submitted to his will, orders, and commands; that immediately after the death of Clara Wilson, Wilson began conniving, scheming, and designing to deprive and divest appellant of the property; that in 1900 he married Ida C. Wilson, and with her assistance continued to so conspire, scheme and connive; that for the purpose of accomplishing this end he told appellant it was necessary that she quitclaim the property to him; that he falsely and fraudulently told her that the property would be sold by the sheriff to pay debts against the estate, when in truth and in fact the only claims filed against the estate were two doctor bills, aggregating $265; that he falsely and fraudulently represented to her that if she would quitclaim the property to him it would be safe from sale and execution and would revert to her after his death; that at that time she was 18 years of age and had no worldly experience and was not familiar with transactions of this kind, and by reason of the utmost trust, confidence, and implicit faith which she had in Wilson, on July 7, 1904, she executed a quitclaim deed to him for the property, which deed was recorded July 13, 1904; that in furtherance of the conspiracy Wilson and wife executed a quitclaim deed to the property to John C. Berg, dated December 3, 1904, and recorded December 5, 1904, and on the same date Berg and wife executed a quitclaim deed to Wilson and wife, which deed was recorded on the same date; that there was born to Wilson and wife a male child, who is now of age, and the bill prayed that he be made a party defendant to the bill; that Ida Wilson died in 1916, and title to the premises vested in Wilson; that the quitclaim deed executed by appellant to Wilson recited a consideration of $1, but in truth and in fact $100 passed from wilson to appellant at that time, and upon information and belief it is alleged that the property is of the reasonable value of $15,000; that the consideration of $1 recited in the deed and the $100 paid were wholly inadequate and unconscionable; that by reason of her youth, inexperience, and ignorance as to the nature and effect of such transactions, and by reason of the fiduciary relation towards and undue influence over her by Wilson, and by reason of the several false and fraudulent misrepresentations and threats that the property would be sold by the sheriff unless it was conveyed by her to Wilson, she executed the quitclaim deed without knowing or being informed of its full import and effect; that shortly after the death of Clara Wilson appellant was forced to seek work, and at the age of 14 began to do housework and continued to so work until she was married to Roy Nelson in 1918; that she received small wages, which were barely sufficient for the necessities of life; that by reason of the parental control and fiduciary relation toward her by Wilson and the undue influence and complete domination over her will by him and her utmost confidence and implicit faith in him, she was unaware of the fraud which had been perpetrated on her until 1923, when she was so advised by her friends; that she was then in poor financial circumstances and unable to seek redress; that Wilson occupied a portion of the house on the premises; and that Eva Erickson and Irv. Erickson, his daughter and son-in-law, occupied the rest of the house; that there was executed by Wilson and wife to the Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee, a trust deed dated September 12, 1911, to secure the payment of $600, due in five years, which indebtedness in barred by the Statute of Limitations (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, c. 83) and has been paid although not released of record. The prayer was that the deed of July 7, 1904, from appellant to Wilson, the deed from Wilson to Berg, and the deed from Berg to Wilson and wife be vacated and set aside; that the rights of appellant under the will of Clara Wilson be determined and the title be decreed to be in appellant.

Appellant insists that the bill stated sufficient facts to excuse and explain any laches on her part and that the demurrer was improperly sustained. She insists that laches should not prevail where the bill alleges fraud and the commencement of an equitable action for relief within a reasonable time after the discovery thereof; that the allegations of the bill as to a fiduciary relation, parental control, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, ignorance, youth, and inexperience were sufficient to overcome any charge of laches.

[1][2] Equity does not encourage or enforce stale claims. McMeen v. Grant, 268 Ill. 64, 108 N. E. 677. Mere lapse of time is no bar to equitable relief where a reasonable excuse for the delay appears from the bill. Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill. 500, 149 N. E. 495;Moneta v. Hoffman, 249 Ill. 56, 94 N. E. 72;Middaugh v. Fox, 135 Ill. 344, 25 N. E. 584. A delay beyond the time fixed by the statute of limitations must be explained by averments in the bill before a complainant will be entitled to relief. Totten v. Totten, 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295;Coryell v. Klehm, 157 Ill. 462, 41 N. E. 864;Harding v. Durand, 138 Ill. 515, 28 N. E. 948;Walker v. Ray, 111 Ill. 315. In Howe v. South Park Com'rs, 119 Ill. 101, 7 N. E. 333, and Oliver v. Ross, 289 Ill. 624, 124 N. E. 800, it was held that the party who challenges the title of his adversary to real property must be diligent in discovering that which will avoid the title and render it invalid and must be...