Neppl v. Signature Flight Support Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 02-232(DSD/SRN).,CIV. 02-232(DSD/SRN).
• Parties: Jamin NEPPL, Plaintiff, v. SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

234 F.Supp.2d 1016

Jamin NEPPL, Plaintiff, v. SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. CIV. 02-232(DSD/SRN).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

December 10, 2002.

Michael L. Lander, Esq. and Lander Law Office, and Mark A. Greenman, Esq., Ruth Y. Ostrom, Esq. and Greenman & Ostrom, Minneapolis, counsel for plaintiff.

Daniel C. Gerhan, Esq., Holly M. Robbins, Esq., and Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Richard S. Meyer, Esq. and Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, PA, counsel for defendant.

ORDER

DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and upon plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. For the reasons stated, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part and plaintiff's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Defendant provides ground services at the Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a "ramp lead." His principal duties included plane de-icing and baggage handling. Plaintiff was a member of a collective bargaining unit and was represented by the International Association of Machinists ("IAM"). On January 15, 2001, plaintiff became ill and was hospitalized. He underwent gall bladder surgery the following day. Plaintiff contacted defendant to report his hospitalization and informed defendant that he would not be able to work for some period of time. He was told to bring a doctor's note to his employer after being released from the hospital.

Plaintiff was released from the hospital on January 18, 2001. He was instructed by his doctors to see his primary physician in two to three weeks. Plaintiff made an appointment to see his doctor on February 7, 2001. The doctors at the hospital also provided plaintiff with one or two documents indicating that he would be unable to work for two to three weeks. Plaintiff claims he took that paperwork to defendant's offices and showed it to a supervisor.¹ He was instructed to return the following Monday, January 22, 2001 to meet with Robert Pflipsen ("Pflipsen"), a representative of defendant's human resources department.

Plaintiff and Pflipsen met on January 22, 2001. During that meeting, Pflipsen provided plaintiff with a document entitled "Employer Response to Employee Request for Family or Medical Leave." The form indicated that plaintiff was eligible for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") from January 15, 2001 until February 7, 2001, provided he furnished a medical certification of a serious health condition by January 30th, and a fitness-for-duty certification before resuming his duties. Pflipsen gave plaintiff a form entitled "Certification of Healthcare Provider" to be completed by plaintiff's physician. Plaintiff informed Pflipsen of his February 7th follow-up appointment.

One of plaintiff's supervisors contacted him on February 3, 2001 and asked plaintiff to come in and work. Plaintiff reminded the supervisor that he was still on medical leave. When the supervisor persisted, plaintiff agreed to work that afternoon and evening, despite still believing himself to be on medical leave. Because defendant was short of staff, plaintiff ultimately worked three consecutive shifts, de-icing planes for approximately twenty-five hours. Before leaving work on February 4th, plaintiff was asked to work again the following day, February 5th. Plaintiff claims he merely agreed to consider working the following day. [Neppl Aff. at ¶ 9.] Defendant alleges that plaintiff agreed to work on Friday, February 5th but neither came to work nor called in to report his absence. Plaintiff did not go to work on February 5th, but reported on February 7th as originally discussed with Pflipsen. Plaintiff did not have the certification of healthcare provider with him on February 7th. When plaintiff informed his supervisor that he did not have the certification, he was told he could not go back to work without a doctor's note. Plaintiff claims he had been unable to attend his February 7th doctor appointment due to a snow storm. Plaintiff initially claimed that after seeing his doctor the following day he showed the certification to two of his supervisors, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Osberg. [Answer to Def's Interrogatories at # 2.] He has become less clear about which of his supervisors actually saw or received the certification on February 8th. [Neppl Aff at ¶ 11; Neppl Supplemental Aff. at ¶ 2.] Defendant claims that plaintiff did not bring the required certification on February 8th. [Aff's of Pflipson, Johnson, Osberg and Ptacek.]

Upon arriving at work on February 8th, plaintiff was instructed to wait in the office and not to begin working. After his union representative was summoned, plaintiff was given a notice of termination for an unexcused absence on February 5, 2001. The notice of termination stated that the termination was pursuant to the company's attendance policy for plaintiff's third no-call no-show in a twelve month period.²

Defendant has moved for a partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiff's FMLA claims are exclusively subject to the grievance and arbitration clauses in the collective bargaining agreement between defendant and IAM. Defendant also asserts that plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.³ Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment on Count I of his complaint, alleging defendant's violation of the FMLA. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part and plaintiff's motion is denied.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In order for the moving party to prevail, it must demonstrate to the court that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

On a motion for summary judgment, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of its claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

a. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant's motion raises the question of whether or not an employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement with a general arbitration clause has waived the right to bring statutory claims, in this case under the FMLA, against his employer in federal court.⁴ The court finds on the facts presented here that plaintiff has not waived his right to bring his FMLA claim in the judicial forum.

While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue in this specific context,⁵ many other circuits have considered the competing interests raised by this question. See e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir.1997) (considering the arbitrability of Title VII, ADA and ADEA claims pursuant to a CBA and contrasting the interest in allowing bargaining groups to establish comprehensive dispute resolution schemes with the interest, expressed by Congress, in statutory and judicial protection of certain "vulnerable groups").⁶ The United States Supreme Court and Congress have made it clear that arbitration is not a disfavored mechanism for resolution of most disputes, particularly in the labor-management context. See the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA") 29 U.S.C. § 185; the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (the Steelworkers trilogy); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). However, despite the general policy favoring arbitration, all but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that union representatives cannot waive individual employees' statutory rights to a judicial forum. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.1996) (compelling arbitration of Title VII and ADA claims under an arbitration clause in a CBA).

After Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers cases, it is indisputable that most collectively bargained arbitration agreements must be enforced. However, arbitration is a creature of contract and the arbitrator's authority stems entirely from its terms. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53, 94...