Neubeck v. Neubeck

• Decision Date: 20 November 1922
• Docket Number: No. 17.,17.
• Citation: 119 A. 26
• Parties: NEUBECK v. NEUBECK.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

119 A. 26

NEUBECK

v. NEUBECK.

No. 17.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 20, 1922.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by Wilhelmina Neubeck against William H. Neubeck. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Martin P. Devlin, of Trenton (John H. Kafes and Charles J. Falcey, both of Trenton, on the brief), for appellant.

Edgar W. Hunt, of Trenton (Katzenbach & Hunt, of Trenton, on the brief), for respondent.

TRENCHARD, J. On October 10, 1919, Wilhelmina Neubeck left her husband, William H. Neubeck, and withdrew from the family domicile. On October 14, 1920, she tiled the bill in this case. By it she prays a decree, directing her husband to account for the rents, issues, and profits of six parcels of improved real estate in the city of Trenton (which were acquired after their marriage and the title of which stands in their joint names) and for the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents due and to become due. Upon the hearing in the Court of Chancery the bill was dismissed, and the wife appeals.

We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the bill cannot be sustained. It appeared that the accounting was sought, not only with respect to the dwelling formerly the family domicile, and still the domicile of the husband, but also with respect to five other properties which are in the possession of tenants, and the rents of which are collected by the husband. The learned Vice Chancellor held that, inasmuch as the complainant, as he found, had deserted her husband without justification, and was actually living in adultery at Pittsburgh with another man, which finding we think was justified, she was not entitled to come into a court of equity, in view of the doctrine of unclean hands. But we think that doctrine has not the scope thus given it, for reasons which we will hereinafter state.

We think this case, in its legal aspects, is quite like, and is ruled by, O'Connell v. O'Connell, 117 Atl. 634, decided in this court after the decision of the present case in the court below. We there declared that where, as here, the title to lands rests in a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, the wife holds in her possession during their joint lives one-half of the estate in common with her husband, and that the respective rights of the parties as between themselves were those of tenants in common. We further held that where a husband and wife thus owned property as tenants in common, the wife was entitled to an accounting of the rents collected by her husband from the common property, even though she had deserted her husband without justifiable cause, and had refused to return at the solicitation of her husband.

We think it follows therefrom that, where (as here) the husband and wife own property as tenants by the entirety, the wife, even though she has deserted her husband without justifiable cause and is living in adultery, is entitled to an accounting of the rents and profits collected by her husband from the common property.

In the O'Connell Case we pointed out that the principle upon which the rule rests is that a tenant in common, in leasing the common property and in collecting the rents from the lessees, acts not only in his own right, but as the representative of his cotenants, and that consequently to the extent that the moneys so collected represent the rental value of the interest of his cotenants it is held in trust by him for their use.

It is suggested that the instant case differs from the O'Connell Case for the reason that all of the purchase money for the property was paid by the husband out of his earnings. But that, if true, is immaterial. Assuming that it was a gift by the husband to the wife, her title is as valid as if her interest was purchased out of her own funds. If the gift was conditional upon the wife being true to her marriage vows, it may be that the Court of Chancery would set it aside upon a proper case being made, but that is not this case. So long as the title stands, she is entitled to have her rights enforced against her cotenaut.

The theory adopted by the Vice Chancellor that the door of the Court of Chancery was closed to the wife under the doctrine of unclean hands is in effect disposed of by the O'Connell Case. The fact that the doctrine was not specifically mentioned therein makes no difference. The desertion by the wife was an outstanding fact upon which the decision turned. However, we now state the reasons why the doctrine has not the sweep accorded it by the Vice Chancellor.

While the maxim, "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands," has a very wide application, it has also its limitations. It does not repel all sinners from courts of equity, nor does it apply to every unconscientious act or inequitable conduct on the part of the complainants. The inequity which deprives a suitor of a right to justice in a court of equity is not general iniquitous conduct unconnected with the act of the defendant which the complaining party states as his ground or cause of action, but it must be evil practice or wrong conduct in the particular matter or transaction in respect to which judicial protection or...