Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, Civ. No. HM-87-1383.
| Decision Date | 29 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. HM-87-1383. |
| Parties | Leon NEUFELD v. The CITY OF BALTIMORE, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
William Seekford, Baltimore, MD, for plaintiff.
Michael G. Raimondi, Sandra R. Gutman, Baltimore, MD, for defendants.
In order to receive a wider variety of television stations, the plaintiff, Leon Neufeld, installed a solid, ten-foot-wide, receive-only satellite dish in the front yard of his home in the city of Baltimore, Maryland ("the City"). The following month, Neufeld received notice that his satellite dish violated then-existing zoning ordinances. Eleven criminal convictions later, Neufeld removed the dish and instituted this suit. Presently before this Court are the motion of the defendants to dismiss and the motion of the plaintiff for partial summary judgment.
On March 31, 1984, Neufeld installed his satellite dish on a pole in the front yard of his home. However, Neufeld failed to obtain a permit from the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals ("the Board") for the dish, see Baltimore City, Md., Code art. 30, § 4.1-1c (1983), and also failed to position his dish outside of the required thirty-foot setback for his residential (R-1) area. See id. § 4.1-2b (). After the City notified him of these violations of the applicable zoning ordinances, Neufeld appealed to the Board and asked the Board for a conditional use permit for the dish. The Board denied that request and upheld the notice of violation. Neufeld appealed again on September 17, 1984, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the Board's decision on March 5, 1985, per Judge Thomas Ward.1
On January 23, 1985, apparently in connection with the sale of a cable television franchise to United Cable of Baltimore, the City passed Ordinance 266, which imposed stricter limitations on the placement and size of satellite dishes within the City. In particular, Ordinance 266 requires that satellite dishes must be less than six feet wide whether mounted on buildings or free-standing, as Neufeld's was. See Baltimore City, Md., Code art. 30, § 4.1-1b.1a, .1b (1985). Under Ordinance 266, other radio and television antennae, not including satellite dishes, could extend as much as twelve feet above the buildings on which they are mounted. Id. § 4.1-1. Finally, Ordinance 266 permits some entities, including schools, museums, churches, hotels, and taverns, to erect free-standing satellite dishes up to twelve feet wide. Id. § 4.1-1c.
On October 8, 1985, the City filed criminal charges against Neufeld for violating the ordinances. Neufeld was convicted and fined $100. On appeal of that conviction before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Neufeld argued that the provisions of Ordinance 266 relating to satellite dishes were preempted by regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), and alternatively, that the provisions were prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On September 22, 1986, the circuit court affirmed Neufeld's conviction, per Judge Mary Arabian. Several days later, Neufeld was convicted for ten more violations of the zoning ordinances, per Judge Theodore Oshrine. Finally, Neufeld dismantled the dish and filed this action. In addition to a constitutional attack on the ordinances, Neufeld asserted claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 in connection with the prosecutions and the compelled dismantling of his dish.
After the filing of the present motions, this Court raised sua sponte the issue of abstention under the doctrine of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), and subsequently dismissed the case on that ground. A panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed that dismissal, Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, 964 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1992), and remanded the case "for consideration of Neufeld's claim on its merits." Id. at 351.
Neufeld argues that the remand order indicates that the Fourth Circuit must have considered the arguments presented in the defendants' motion to dismiss and found them wanting. This Court agrees, but justice requires a more detailed explanation, so that the defendants will know exactly where their arguments went off the tracks. Accordingly, before reaching the merits of the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, this Court briefly will address the defendants' motion to dismiss.
In his complaint, Neufeld named the following parties as defendants:
Complaint at 1. The defendants argue that the plaintiff should have named "The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City" as the defendant with the capacity to sue and be sued, instead of "The City of Baltimore." Clearly, the plaintiff named both entities, and the defendant does not allege failure of notice or any other prejudice resulting from the arguably improper inclusion of "The City of Baltimore" in the complaint. Therefore, the defendants' hypertechnical pleading defense must fail based on the principle, embodied in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).2
Arguing that the state court decided the issues raised in this case during the 1986 criminal proceedings, the defendants maintain that Neufeld is barred in this case by doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata, or `claim preclusion,' holds that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Meekins v. United Transportation Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir.1991). The rule promotes judicial efficiency by lending the stamp of finality to claims once litigated. United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 381 (4th Cir.1991). However, in this case, the parties to the state criminal proceedings included only Neufeld and the State of Maryland, and the only claim litigated in those proceedings involved Neufeld's guilt of the charged zoning violations. Res judicata therefore does not apply in this case. Meekins, 946 F.2d at 1057-58.
The defendants might have intended to assert the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, or `issue preclusion,' which applies to narrower portions of an action than does res judicata. Tatum, 943 F.2d at 382. Under that doctrine, the decision of a court on an issue of fact or law necessary to a judgment will preclude relitigation of the same issue in a subsequent action involving one of the parties to the first suit. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. at 414. Thus, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an issue necessarily decided in a criminal conviction can have preclusive effect in later civil proceedings. Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353, 355 (4th Cir.1966). The defendants bear the burden of proof on the issue of estoppel. E.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350, 110 S.Ct. 668, 673, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). In this case, the plaintiff denies that any of the state judges ever directly addressed the issues raised in this case, and the defendants have failed to submit any evidence to support their arguments to the contrary. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar this case.
The defendants argue that Neufeld cannot attack the validity of Ordinance 266 or the other amended ordinances because he never sought a variance under the provisions of those ordinances. Of course, in order to maintain his § 1983 action, Neufeld does not have to exhaust his administrative remedies. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).
Moreover, with regard to his constitutional attack of the zoning ordinances, Maryland law does not require exhaustion when a plaintiff brings "a direct attack upon the power or authority (including whether it was validly enacted) of the legislative body to adopt the legislation from which relief is sought." Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 308, 407 A.2d 738 (1979). In this case, Neufeld maintains that FCC regulations preempt the zoning ordinances; accordingly, he need not seek a variance as a prerequisite to this lawsuit.
As noted above, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Comprehensive in scope, the motion seeks a declaratory judgment that the satellite dish zoning ordinance at issue in this case is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to the plaintiff, because (1) it represents (a) a prior restraint, (b) an overbroad restriction, and (c) an unreasonable prohibition of speech-related activity, all in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) it represents arbitrary and discriminatory class legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) it is preempted by regulations promulgated by the FCC; Neufeld also seeks a declaratory judgment that the defendants deprived him of his rights under the laws and Constitution of the United States, and lastly, that he once again may install his satellite dish in his front yard. Further, the plaintiff requests an injunction (1) enjoining the defendants from enforcing the...
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