Neumann v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC
| Decision Date | 31 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15 C 10507,15 C 10507 |
| Parties | DORIS JANE NEUMANN, Plaintiff, v. BORG-WARNER MORSE TEC LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Marvin E. Aspen
Plaintiff Doris Jane Neumann filed this negligence action in Illinois state court against several manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-laden products. In this "take-home" or "secondary" asbestos lawsuit, Neumann alleges that she contracted malignant mesothelioma through her exposure to asbestos fibers unwittingly brought home by her son, who utilized Defendants' products at work.
Defendant MW Custom Papers, LLC, as successor-in-interest to the Mead Corporation ("MW Custom Papers"), filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which we granted on March 10, 2016. As discussed in detail in that opinion ("Opinion"), we concluded that MW Custom Papers did not owe a duty to Neumann under the law governing negligence claims in Illinois. (3/10/16 Op. (Dkt. No. 88) at 8-13.) We therefore dismissed the claims against MW Custom Papers.
Neumann has now filed a motion for reconsideration, asking that we reverse our holding. (Dkt. No. 106.) In addition, the remaining six defendants—Honeywell International Inc., Borg-Warner TEC LLC, Dana Companies LLC, Federal-Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust, Hollingsworth & Vose Company and Union Carbide Corporation—filed their own Rule 12 motions, seeking dismissal of Neumann's claims for the reasons set forth in the Opinion. (Dkt. Nos. 89 (Honeywell), 92 (Union Carbide), 97 (Borg-Warner), 100 (Federal-Mogul), 104 (Dana Companies), & 107 (Hollingsworth & Vose).) We hereby deny Neumann's motion for reconsideration and grant Defendants' motions.
We previously summarized Neumann's allegations in the Opinion and assume familiarity with the relevant background. By way of brief description, Neumann's son, Greg, worked as a gas station attendant and mechanic from approximately 1970 through 1974. In that position, he handled asbestos-containing products made and/or distributed by each of the Defendants. Neumann alleges that she was exposed to asbestos through contact with Greg and through laundering his clothes. She contends that this exposure caused her to contract mesothelioma. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-4, 8-11, 13-15; see also 3/10/16 Op. at 1-2.)
In its motion to dismiss, MW Custom Papers argued that it could not be liable to Neumann for her alleged injuries under a negligence theory because it did not owe her a duty. In the Opinion, we summarized governing Illinois precedent concerning negligence and duty. (3/10/16 Op. at 4-5.) Contrary to MW Custom Papers' argument, we held that Neumann adequately pled that her illness was reasonably foreseeable to Defendants. (Id. at 5-8.) We then considered the remaining factors relevant to duty under Illinois law, particularly the two factors evaluating "the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury" and "the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant."1 Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 358 Ill. Dec. 613, 618, 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (Ill. 2012); Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 238 Ill.2d 215, 226, 938 N.E.2d440, 447 (Ill. 2010); Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 435, 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1056-57 (Ill. 2006).
When we focused on these factors, we found that the motion posed a dispositive yet previously unanswered question: does (or should) Illinois recognize a duty running to family members in take-home asbestos cases? (3/10/16 Op. at 9-10.) To explore that question, we reviewed split authority from the Illinois appellate courts, as well as the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Simpkins. (3/10/16 Op. at 10-11.) Having thoroughly evaluated the Simpkins opinion, we held that the Illinois Supreme Court simply did not reach, and did not answer, the pending duty question. (Id. & n.3.) In the absence of direction from the Illinois courts, we examined holdings from other jurisdictions, which we found unhelpful. (Id. at 11-12.) Because we found no authorities convincing us how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule on the novel duty question, we concluded that we could not answer this open legal question in Neumann's favor. (Id. at 12-13.) We followed the Seventh Circuit's instruction that "[w]hen we are faced with two opposing and equally plausible interpretations of state law, we generally choose the narrower interpretation which restricts liability, rather than the more expansive interpretation which creates substantially more liability." Home Valu, Inc. v. Pep Boys, 213 F.3d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 2000); Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2007); S. Ill. Riverboat Casino Cruises, Inc. v. Triangle Insulation & Sheet Metal Co., 302 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 2002); see Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 607 (7th Cir. 2000) (). We thus found that MW Custom Papers did not owe a duty to Neumann and granted its motion to dismiss. (3/10/16 Op. at 13.)
Neumann now asks us to reverse our conclusion, while the remaining Defendants ask us to extend it to cover all of them. We briefly address these related arguments in turn, beginning with Neumann's motion.
Because Neumann has asked us to reconsider a non-final order, our analysis is guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), as well as our inherent authority. See Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990); Caine v. Burge, 897 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082-83 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S. Ct. 927, 935 (1983) (). Rule 54(b) provides that a non-final order "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Reconsideration is appropriate only "where a court has misunderstood a party, where the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, where the court has made an error of apprehension (not of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has occurred, or where significant new facts have been discovered." Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191; Caine, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
"[A] motion for reconsideration does not allow a party to revisit strategic decisions that prove to be improvident, to reargue the evidence, to make new arguments, or to introduce new evidence that could have been presented earlier." HCP of Ill., Inc. v. Farbman Group I, Inc.,991 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Caine, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 717; see Janusz v. City of Chi., 03 C 4402, 2015 WL 269934, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2015). Rule 54 motions thus serve a limited function and are granted only in exceptional circumstances. Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191; HCP of Ill., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1000; Caine, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 717; see Patrick v. City of Chi., 14 C 3658, 2015 WL 1880389, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2015).
In her motion, Neumann argues that we misinterpreted Illinois law, particularly the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Simpkins. (Neumann Mem. at 2.) She further contends that we failed to account for the fact that Defendants are product manufacturers and thus owe a duty to all persons, including innocent bystanders, who foreseeably might be injured by their defective products. (Id. at 6-8.) Finally, she argues that Illinois public policy disapproves of the "no duty" rule we announced because "the law presumes the existence of a duty" where the risk of harm is foreseeable. (Id. at 8-9.) She also asks that we grant her leave to amend her complaint, so that she may allege additional facts supporting imposition of a duty.
There are several flaws with Neumann's position. First, her arguments are not based on the criteria warranting reconsideration as described by Rule 54(b). That is, she has not substantively argued that we misunderstood her, "made a decision outside the adversarial issues," or "made an error of apprehension (not of reasoning)." Broaddus, 665 F.3d at 860. Nor does she claim that there has been "a significant change in the law" or that "significant new facts have been discovered." Id. Her disagreement with our ruling is not grounds for reconsideration.
Second, Neumann either raised—or could have raised—each of these arguments earlier. She is not entitled to reargue theories that we have already considered and rejected or to articulate new arguments that were available to her when briefing MW Custom Papers' motion. Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191; HCP of Ill., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1000. For example,Neumann now addresses the public policy issues inherent in the duty analysis, but she neglected to address those factors when opposing the motion to dismiss. (See Neumann Mem. at 8-10.) Moreover, none of the cases cited in her Rule 54 motion represent a change in the law, and all of them could have been included in her response to the motion to dismiss. (See id. at 6-10.) And while Neumann finds error in our reading of Simpkins, we again decline to adopt her more expansive interpretation, particularly in the absence of clear direction from the Illinois courts. (Id. at 2-6; see 3/10/16 Op. at 10-11 & n.3 ().)
Third, to the extent that Neumann claims we misapprehended the nature of her claims or Defendants' roles as product manufacturers, she is mistaken. (Neumann Mem. at 1-3.) We plainly understood her...
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