Neumont v. Monroe County, Florida

• Decision Date: 21 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99-10054-CIV-VITUNAC.,No. 99-10054-CIV-PAINE.,99-10054-CIV-PAINE.,99-10054-CIV-VITUNAC.
• Citation: 242 F.Supp.2d 1265
• Parties: Elizabeth J. NEUMONT, et al, Plaintiffs, v. MONROE COUNTY, Florida Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Page 1265

242 F.Supp.2d 1265

Elizabeth J. NEUMONT, et al, Plaintiffs, v. MONROE COUNTY, Florida Defendant.

No. 99-10054-CIV-PAINE.

No. 99-10054-CIV-VITUNAC.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

November 21, 2002.

Harold E. Wolfe, Jr., West Palm Beach, FL, Eric M. Grant, LeBoeuf Lamb Greene & McRae, Hartford, CT, James Herman Hicks, William Hoffman Pincus, Hicks Brams & Scher, West Palm Beach, FL, for plaintiffs.

Karen Kittian Cabanas, Morgan & Hendrick, Key West, FL, David L. Jordan, Fla. Dept. of Community Affairs, Assist. General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, for defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMENDATION

PAINE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on two Reports and Recommendation issued by the Honorable Ann E. Vitunac: an Omnibus Report and Recommendation dated May 18, 2001 (D.E.# 232), and an Amended Omnibus Report and Recommendation dated August 27, 2001 (D.E.# 248). Said reports covered the following motions:

1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count I (D.E.# 94);

2. Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I (D.E.# 99);

3. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgments as to Counts II, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX (D.E.# 124) 4. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count X (D.E.# 171).

The undersigned conducted a limited hearing on the objections to said Reports and Recommendations on February 12, 2002. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge should be adopted in part.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This class action case focuses on a Monroe County Ordinance (Ordinance 004-1997). This ordinance, adopted in 1997 and enforced beginning December 15, 1998, places restrictions on certain uses of properties as vacation rentals. Plaintiffs are mostly property owners in Monroe County subject to the Ordinance, and have brought thirteen claims against defendant Monroe County. These claims are as follows:

Count I: Declaratory Judgment as to whether the Ordinance was prematurely enforced between December 15, 1998 (first day of its enforcement) and March 16, 2000 (when the Florida Supreme Court denied review of the Ordinance)

Count II: Compensation for temporary taking resulting from the premature enforcement (alleged in Count I)

Count III: Violation of Civil Rights under color of state law as a result of the premature enforcement (alleged in Count I)

Count IV: Other damages resulting from the premature enforcement (alleged in Count I)

Count V: Declaratory Judgment as to the existence of a compensable taking by the enactment of the Ordinance

Count VI: Inverse Condemnation based upon a facial violation of the Fifth Amendment

Count VII: Inverse Condemnation based upon as-applied violation of the Fifth Amendment

Count VIII: Inverse Condemnation based upon facial violation of Art.X, § 6(a) of the Florida Constitution

Count IX: Inverse Condemnation based upon as-applied violation of Art.X, § 6(a) of the Florida Constitution

Count X: Declaratory Judgment as to whether Ordinance is void ab initio because enacted in violation of Florida Statutes § 125.66

Count XI: Compensation for Taking of private property without due process of law

Count XII: Violation of Civil Rights under color of state law as a result of violation (Alleged in Count X)

Count XIII: Other damages resulting from wrongful enactment of Ordinance

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The procedure for disposition of a summary judgment motion is well established. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is authorized only when:

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In applying this standard, the Adickes Court explained that when assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Id.

The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment. Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir.1982). The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

UNDISPUTED FACTS

As to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count I (D.E.# 94) and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I (D.E.# 99)

1. Ordinance 004-1997 ("the Ordinance") is a Land Development Regulation ("LDR") within the meaning of Fla Stat. 380.031(8). Under Chapter 380, the Department of Community Affairs (the "Agency") serves as the "State land planning agency." § 380.031(18), Fla. Stat. (1998). Under the statutory scheme, the Agency reviews any LDR and rejects, approves, or approves with modification any LDR.

2. The Agency is an "agency" within the meaning of Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes. As such, the Agency is governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, codified at § 120.52(1)(b), Fla. Stat.

3. Proceedings approving the Ordinance are subject to the provisions of Section 380.05(6) of the Florida Statutes, which states, in pertinent part:

No proposed land development regulation within an area of critical state concern becomes effective under this section until the state land planning agency issues its final order or, if the final order is challenged, until the challenge to the order is resolved pursuant to Chapter 120. Fla. Stat. § 380.05(6).

4. The Ordinance was passed by the Monroe County Commissioners and then submitted to the Agency for review as required by Chapter 380. On December 4, 1998, the Agency entered its Final Order Order No. DCA98-OR-184 (the "Agency's Final Order"), approving the Ordinance as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development.

5. The Agency's Final Order contained a "Notice of Rights," which provided, in pertinent part:

The parties are hereby notified of their right to seek judicial review of the Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68 Florida Statutes, and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(c) and 9.110. To initiate an appeal, a Notice of Appeal must be filed with the Department's Clerk of Agency Proceedings, and with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the filing of this Final Order with the Department's Clerk of Agency Proceedings.

6. Defendant admittedly began enforcing the Ordinance on or about December 15, 1998. See Defendant's Amended Admission at 2(n & o).

7. The first actual citation was issued by Defendant on February 26, 1999. See Affidavit of Tom Simmons; see also Schaffer Citation issued February 26,1999.

8. The Ordinance was enforced against both property owners and vacation rental managers through both civil and criminal sanctions. See Affidavits of Wayne W. Erickson, Lisa M. Poponea, and Wendy J. Sullivan-Glenn.

9. After the Agency's Final Order was issued, certain interested persons (the "Rathkamp Petitioners") filed a Motion for Stay, requesting the Department stay its Final Order pending appeal. See Notice of Administrative Appeal, dated December 23, 1998, filed in Case No. 98-3383/R 982043 (Third District Court of Appeal, Florida). In filing this Motion for Stay, the Rathkamp Petitioners were exercising their legal options pursuant to Chapter 120.

10. On January 22, 1999, the Agency issued an order denying said Motion for Stay, which stated, in pertinent part:

Although the Ordinance was adopted by the Monroe County Commission on February 3, 1997, the Ordinance did not become effective until the Petitioner's chapter 120 challenge was resolved by issuance of the Department's Final Order. See Agency' Order Denying Motion for Stay.

11. On December 23, 1998, the Rathkamp Petitioners timely initiated an Appeal of the Department's Final Order, as provided by the Notice of Rights and Section 120 of the Florida Statutes.

12. The Rathkamp Petitioners filed a Motion for Stay of Enforcement and Request for Emergency Hearing with the District Court of Appeals, Third District on January 27, 1999. This Motion specifically argued to the court that:

[Pursuant to Section 380.05(6), Florida Statutes]... a stay of the Department's [Agency's] Final Order approving Monroe County Ordinance 004-1997 will prevent the Ordinance from becoming effective or from being enforced or implemented by Monroe County. See Motion for Stay, filed January 27, 1999, at 3.

13. On January 28,...