Neunz v. Summit County Children Services Bd.
| Decision Date | 10 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-864,77-864 |
| Citation | 54 Ohio St.2d 218,375 N.E.2d 798 |
| Parties | , 8 O.O.3d 193 NEUNZ, guardian, Appellee, v. SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
When a county children services board finds that a child is in need of public care or protective services it shall enter into an agreement with the parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of the child with respect to the custody, care or placement of such child; all necessary care shall be provided by the county children services board, through its own means, unless or until it is determined that the child, parent, guardian or other responsible person is able to pay for the cost of care to be rendered prospectively. (R.C. 5153.16 and 5153.19 construed.)
Justine Marie Neunz, daughter of appellee, Steven P. Neunz, was born on August 1, 1971. The child suffered severe brain damage at birth, and by reason thereof, will be incompetent for the remainder of her life. On July 17, 1972, the child was placed in the custody of appellant, Summit County Children Services Board, and thereafter was admitted to the Hattie Larlham Foundation in Mantua, Ohio, where she presently resides.
Appellee was appointed guardian of his daughter's estate on February 11, 1974, following which, on February 26, 1974, the Summit County Probate Court approved the settlement of a personal injury action which had been instituted against the doctor who delivered the child. After an allotment was granted to the parents and expenses and attorney fees paid, the guardian's inventory was filed, on March 12, 1974, showing assets of $46,655.12.
Subsequently appellant sought to recover from appellee, in his capacity as guardian of his daughter's estate, the costs incurred by appellant in maintaining Justine Marie Neunz at the Hattie Larlham Foundation during the time preceding the establishment of her guardianship estate. Although appellee, in his individual capacity, had entered into a contract with appellant for the care of his daughter, that obligation was based upon appellee's ability to pay so that it was necessary for appellant to provide an additional $5,969.05 towards the cost of the child's sustenance. It is this amount which is the subject of the instant litigation.
On May 20, 1974, appellee filed an action in declaratory judgment in the Summit County Probate Court, seeking a determination as to whether appellant could compel the guardianship estate to repay the sums appellant had previously expended for the care of Justine Marie Neunz. The referee in the Probate Court concluded that the disputed sum should be paid from the guardianship assets.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Probate Court in an opinion filed on June 15, 1977. The appellate court held that the disbursement of government aid is controlled by statute and that no statute existed which specifically allowed appellant to recover the cost of such aid.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Michael A. Malyuk, Akron, for appellee.
Stephan M. Gabalac, Pros. Atty., and Mary Ann Kovach, Akron, for appellant.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether appellant can recover, from the estate of appellee's incompetent daughter, the cost of the support appellant provided for the child prior to the creation of her guardianship estate. 1
R.C. Chapter 5153 serves as the statutory authority for the establishment and operation of county children services boards. In particular, R.C. 5153.16 delimits the powers and duties of county children services boards and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(D) Provide care of all kinds which the board deems for the best interest of any child the board finds in need of public care or service; provided that such care shall be provided by the board by its own means or through other available resources, in such child's own home, in the home of a relative, or in a certified foster home, receiving home, school, hospital, convalescent home, or other institution, public or private, within or outside the county or state."
Appellant contends that the phrase "other available resources" in subsection (D) above, leads to the "inescapable conclusion" that the recipient of county children services is primarily liable therefor. We disagree.
Subsection (B) of R.C. 5153.16 empowers the county children services board to enter into an agreement with the parent, guardian, or other person or entity having legal custody of the needy child, "with respect to the custody, care or placement of" such child. Pursuant to R.C. 5153.19, 2 this agreement shall include a determination as to the ability of the child, parent or guardian to pay for the cost of such care, and this determination shall be made before the county children services board obligates itself with respect to the care of the child. Upon consideration of R.C. 5153.16(D), it thus appears that while appellant shall "(p)rovide care of all kinds which * * * (it) deems for the best interests of * * * (appellee's daughter)," this care shall be provided by the appellant board, through its own means, unless other resources (e. g., funds obtained through acceptance of a determination as to ability to pay, under R.C. 5153.19) are currently available.
In the instant cause appellant made a determination as to appellee's ability, as an individual, to contribute towards the care and support of his daughter, and appellant has not alleged that appellee failed to comply with the terms of the agreement which he entered into at the time of his daughter's commitment. Because R.C. 5153.16 and 5153.19 contemplate agreements to pay for services to be rendered prospectively, appellant's first argument must be rejected.
Appellant contends further that liability of the guardianship estate for past services can be based upon certain provisions of R.C. 5153.20, which read, in pertinent part, as follows:
We are not persuaded that the statutory language cited above is supportive of appellant's position. Rather, it appears that the primary purpose of this section is to specify which of two counties bears the cost of care where a child resides in one county but receives benefits in another county. Certainly the reference to "(a)ny moneys received * * * from persons liable * * * by agreement or otherwise * * *," for the cost of care furnished to a child, cannot by itself be construed as evidence of a legislative intention to sanction the imposition, upon a guardianship estate, of retrospective liability for county children services. Although the statute is rather vague, it may be so phrased in order to allow for the situation where a father or mother who is "otherwise" liable for the care of their child, e. g. pursuant to R.C. 3113.06, 3 but who has not accepted a determination as to ability to pay for the care of the child, pursuant to R.C. 5153.19, nevertheless makes payment to another county's children services board.
As its second proposition of law appellant argues that if this court should find that the cited statutes 4 do not establish a right to reimbursement from the guardianship estate such liability may be imposed under "the common law principle of implied contract for necessaries furnished."
In rejecting this contention on the Court of Appeals below relied upon a determination made in the case of Division of Aid for the Aged v. Hogan (1944), 143...
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