New Century Found. v. Robertson
| Decision Date | 03 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-00839 |
| Parties | NEW CENTURY FOUNDATION and SAMUEL JARED TAYLOR, Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL ROBERTSON, in his official capacity as director of Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Before the court is the plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, seeking fees and certain costs in the total amount of $56,414.30. (Doc. No. 76.) The defendant does not oppose the motion in its entirety, but he has filed a Response (Doc. No. 77), arguing that the amount of fees requested by the plaintiffs is excessive. The plaintiffs' Reply (Doc. No. 78) concedes that a small amount of the total requested should be deducted but otherwise defends the originally requested amount.
For the reasons set forth herein, the court will grant the motion in part, disallowing the costs requested and awarding fees in the amount of $46,370.30.
The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Michael Robertson in his official capacity as the director of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, alleging violations of their rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In their original Complaint, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). (Doc. No. 1.) The plaintiffs sought and were granted a preliminary injunction in 2018. (Doc. No. 29.)
In early 2019, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint that, among other things, added claims for damages against Robertson in his individual capacity. (Doc. No. 39.) In September 2019, the court entered a Memorandum and Order ruling upon the summary judgment motions filed by both the defendant and the plaintiffs. (Doc. Nos. 73, 74.) More specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs had established that they were entitled to the permanent injunctive and declaratory relief that they sought against the defendant in his official capacity but that the defendant, insofar as he was sued in his individual capacity for damages, was entitled to qualified immunity. The claim against the defendant in his individual capacity was dismissed, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims against the defendant in his official capacity. In addition, while noting that the plaintiffs were "clearly the prevailing party," the court denied the plaintiffs' vague request that the court schedule a hearing to determine the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the defendant (Doc. No. 73, at 32; see also Doc. No. 59, at 25) and, instead, directed the plaintiffs to file a properly supported motion for attorney's fees in accordance with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 54.01(b) of the Local Rules of this court.
The plaintiffs thereafter filed their timely Motion for Attorney's Fees.
"Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his own litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, regardless whether he wins or loses." Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832, (2011). Thus, courts do not award "fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (citation omitted). In 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), Congress "explicitly empowered the courts to grant fees to parties who win § 1983 actions." Id. Under § 1988(b), the "prevailing party" in an action to enforce civil rights under § 1983 may recover "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" of litigation. Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 767 F.3d 533, 552 (6th Cir. 2014). To be considered a prevailing party, a litigant must have "receive[d] at least some relief on the merits of his claim" amounting to "a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 532 U.S. at 603-04 (internal quotation marks and alterations in original omitted).
A civil rights plaintiff need not succeed on every claim in order to recover attorney's fees. Success on a single claim is sufficient to render him a prevailing party. McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 603 (6th Cir. 2010). However, if a plaintiff's unmeritorious claims are "based on different facts and different legal theories" than his meritorious claims, then the court must treat them "as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim[s]." Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). On the other hand, if both the meritorious and unmeritorious claims "arise out of a common core of facts, and involve related legal theories," a court should not exempt from its fee award the hours spent on the claims that did not succeed. Id. at 789. Instead, the court should consider "the degree of success obtained." Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). The Sixth Circuit has indicated that, for a district court tasked with determining whether two claims are related, it may be helpful to consider "whether relief sought on the unsuccessful claim is intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from" that which gave rise to the plaintiff's successful claim. Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 603 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An attorney who achieves "excellent results" is entitled to a full fee, regardless of whether she succeeds on every related claim raised. Waldo v. Consumers Energy, Co., 726 F.3d 802, 822 (6th Cir. 2013). However, when the plaintiff's success is "limited," the court may "exercise [its] equitable discretion . . . to arrive at a reasonable fee award" in light of the hours expended. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 789. In no case should a court reduce a full fee award "simply by using a ratio of successful claims to claims raised." Waldo, 726 F.3d at 822.
The plaintiffs request a total fee award in the amount of $56,414.30. This total is derived from the work of three different attorneys: Van R. Irion, Kyle J. Bristow, and Charles H. Kennedy.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that a request for attorney's fees "should not result in a second major litigation." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 433. This two-step calculation, known as the lodestar amount, provides an "initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services." Id. However, "[t]he product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry." Id. at 434. After determining the lodestar amount, the court may adjust the fee upward or downward "to reflect relevant considerations peculiar to the subject litigation." Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000). However, "trial courts need not, and should not, become green-eyeshade accountants." Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. "The essential goal in shifting fees is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection." Id. Therefore, "trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's time." Id.
Kyle Bristow is not plaintiffs' lead counsel, but he drafted most of the court filings and performed most of the legal research involved in the case. He charged the plaintiffs $200 per hour for his work and spent a total of 133.3 hours on the case between September 2, 2018 and September 20, 2019, for which the plaintiffs paid him $26,660. (See Doc. Nos. 76-6 (Attorney-Client Legal Servs. Agreement), 76-7 (billing records), 76-8 (Bristow Declaration).) He entered an appearance in this court by filing a Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice on January 25, 2019 (Doc. No. 50), but his billing records reflect that he billed the plaintiffs for approximately 66 hours of work performed prior to January 25, 2019. (Doc. No. 76-7.)
Van Irion is lead counsel for the plaintiffs. He charged an hourly rate of $300 per hour and $50 per hour "for administrative work performed by his staff." (Doc. No. 76, at 5; Doc. No. 76-3 (Engagement Letter), 76-4 (invoices), 76-5 (Irion Declaration).) According to the billing records and invoices attached to the plaintiff's motion, the plaintiffs paid Irion $25,749.30 for his legal services, which equates to approximately 85 hours of work.
Attorney Charles Kennedy charged the plaintiffs $450 per hour for the 7.9 hours he spent in preparing for and attending the depositions of plaintiff Jared Taylor and his colleague Devin Saucier in Washington, D.C., for a total fee of $3,555. (See Doc. No. 76-1.) The plaintiffs also paid his law firm an additional $450 to reserve a conference room in which the depositions took place. (Id.)
While there is no question here that the plaintiffs are the prevailing party, the defendant submits that the amount of fees requested is excessive and should be reduced.1 The defendant argues, primarily, that some of the hours of time billed by plaintiffs' counsel should be excluded from the lodestar calculation and, secondarily, that, once the court calculates a basic lodestaramount equal to the number of compensable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, the court should make a downward adjustment of that figure to reflect the plaintiffs' partial win in this case.
More particularly, the defendant submits that the fee amount should be reduced for one or more of the following reasons: (1) attorney Charles Kennedy is a trustee of plaintiff New Century Foundation ("NCF") and, as such, technically a party to the lawsuit, and pro se litigants are not entitled to recover fees; (2...
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