New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 082818 FED8, 16-4440
|Opinion Judge:||GRUENDER, CIRCUIT JUDGE.|
|Party Name:||New Doe Child #1; New Doe Child #2; New Doe Child #3; New Doe Parent; New Roe Child; New Roe Parent; New Boe Child; New Boe Parent; New Poe Child; New Poe Parent; New Coe Child #1; New Coe Child #2; New Coe Child #3; New Coe Parent; Gary Lee Berger; Marie Alena Castle; Charles Daniel Christopher; Patrick Ethen; Betty Gogan; Thomas Gogan; Roger ...|
|Judge Panel:||Before GRUENDER, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part|
|Case Date:||August 28, 2018|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit|
Submitted: March 13, 2018
Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
Before GRUENDER, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
GRUENDER, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
This case presents a challenge to the inscription of the national motto, "In God We Trust," on United States coins and currency. The Plaintiffs are twenty-seven individuals who are atheists or children of atheists and two atheist organizations who "definitely do not trust in God." They brought this action against the United States and officials from the United States Mint, Treasury, and Bureau of Engraving and Printing (collectively "the Government"), raising various constitutional and statutory challenges. In the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the statutes requiring the inscription of the national motto on U.S. coins and currency, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1) & 5114(b), violate the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"); and the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. They seek declaratory relief and a permanent injunction barring the Government from minting coins or printing currency with the phrase "In God We Trust." The Government filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
Having satisfied ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear each challenge, see Nolles v. State Comm. for Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2008), we now review de novo the district court's grant of the motion to dismiss, see Wong v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 2016). We address each challenge in turn, and we affirm.
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const. amend. I. Plaintiffs argue that placing the motto "In God We Trust" on coins and currency violates the Establishment Clause because "the text is purely religious." In their view, the motto is an explicit endorsement of Christianity and monotheism, with the purpose and effect of spreading that faith and coercing non-believers to participate in religious acts. Thus, the Plaintiffs claim, the motto's continued use on U.S. money constitutes "an actual establishment of religion" under "every test enunciated by the Supreme Court."
We note at the outset that each of our sister circuits to have considered the question has found that placing "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins and currency does not violate the Establishment Clause. See Mayle v. United States, 891 F.3d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2018); Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2010); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217-18 (10th Cir. 1996); O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144, 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Kidd v. Obama, 387 Fed.Appx. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). In dicta, the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested the same.4 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989). Thus, we are not writing on a blank slate.
We do, however, address this issue for the first time today under the guidance of new Supreme Court precedent, not yet considered in this circuit. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014). Over the last half century, the Supreme Court has adopted numerous tests to interpret the Establishment Clause, without committing to any one. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678-79; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). Its most recent direction came in Town of Greece v. Galloway. As we have noted, in particularly complex and changing areas of the law, the "prudent course for an inferior court . . . is to hew closely to the Court's specific, contemporary guidance." S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 809 (8th Cir. 2013). Thus, we analyze Galloway with particular care.
In Galloway, the Supreme Court offered an unequivocal directive: "[T]he Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings." 134 S.Ct. at 1819 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Court adopted the principle that the "line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers."6 Id. (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Galloway involved a challenge to a town's practice of opening its board meetings with a prayer that often contained sectarian language. See id. at 1815-17. In upholding the practice, the Court first looked to historical practices as evidence that the town's prayer was permitted by the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1818-24. A majority of the Court then considered whether the prayer at issue was unduly coercive, again tying the prohibition against Government coercion of religion to history. See id. at 1825 (plurality opinion) (conducting a coercion analysis "against the backdrop of historical practice"); id. at 1837 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (looking at the kind of coercion that was "a hallmark of historical establishments of religion"). This two-fold analysis is complementary: historical practices often reveal what the Establishment Clause was originally understood to permit, while attention to coercion highlights what it has long been understood to prohibit.
Some have read Galloway as "a major doctrinal shift" in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 788 F.3d 580, 602 (6th Cir. 2015) (Batchelder, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); see also Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2017) (Kelly, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Given (1) Galloway's unqualified directive that the Establishment Clause "must" be interpreted according to historical practices and understandings, 134 S.Ct. at 1819; (2) its emphasis that this historical approach is not limited to a particular factual context, id. at 1818-19; and (3) the absence of any reference to other tests in the Court's opinion, we agree.7
To be sure, the precise implications of this shift are not yet clear.8 What is clear, however, is that Galloway provides the framework for analyzing this case. In the past, this court's approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to analyze the case before us under the most analogous Supreme Court decision.9 See, e.g., ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778 n.8 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying one test to the exclusion of others when analyzing the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments monument); Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541-42 (8th Cir. 2014) (same when analyzing a prison policy that conditioned benefits on attendance at a nonsecular substance abuse treatment program); Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556, 563 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2009) (same when analyzing the distribution of religious literature to school children). Here, Galloway is best suited to the challenge before us because both the prayer at issue in that case and the inscription of the national motto at issue here represent Government acknowledgments of religion that "strive for the idea that people of many faiths may be united in a community of tolerance and devotion." See Galloway, 134 S.Ct. at 1823. Factually, this case falls within Galloway's ambit.
We will therefore analyze the Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim under Galloway and ask two questions. First, what do historical practices indicate about the constitutionality of placing the national motto on money? Second, is the motto impermissibly coercive?
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