NEW EDUC. DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS, INC. v. Boitano, C 79-2736 SAW
| Decision Date | 26 October 1983 |
| Docket Number | M-80-81-C.,No. C 79-2736 SAW,C 79-2736 SAW |
| Parties | NEW EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS, INC., a California non-profit corporation, Plaintiff, v. James BOITANO, Napa County District Attorney, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Fred H. Altshuler, Altshuler & Berzon, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.
Richard J. Lucas, Robert E. Freitas, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, San Francisco, Cal., Stephen W. Hackett, County Counsel of the County of Napa, Napa, Cal., for defendants.
Plaintiff New Education Development Systems, Inc. (NEDS) is a nonprofit corporation affiliated with the Unification Church. NEDS owns a parcel of real property in northeastern Napa County known as Aetna Springs, historically used as a resort. Since purchasing the property in 1976, NEDS has sought to use Aetna Springs as a year-round educational and recreational retreat facility for up to 250 members of the Unification Church. However, authorities in Napa County, acting pursuant to the local zoning ordinance, have denied NEDS permission to use Aetna Springs in the desired manner.
In November, 1979, NEDS filed suit in this Court, alleging that the county's action in denying the permit violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. This Court, recognizing that a state court decision on the controlling municipal ordinance could render adjudication of the constitutional issues unnecessary, indicated that it would abstain from deciding NEDS's federal claims if the parties could agree upon a suitable interim arrangement to protect the plaintiff's rights. See Railroad Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500-01, 61 S.Ct. 643, 645, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). The parties agreed to a stipulation governing NEDS rights to use Aetna Springs during the interim period, and this Court abstained. The Court retained jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's federal claims should state proceedings fail to render adjudication of those claims unnecessary. See England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22, 84 S.Ct. 461, 467-68, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964).
According to the stipulation, a maximum of 75 (on alternate weekends, 85) participants are permitted to use the Aetna Springs facility for religious and recreational purposes. Such use is allowed on weekends only, between Friday evenings at 10:00 p.m. and Sunday evenings at 8:00 p.m. In addition, NEDS may employ 25 full-time caretakers to restore and maintain the facility. The stipulation carefully defines and limits the transportation methods to be used by NEDS in conjunction with the weekend seminars as well as the specific activities to be conducted during the seminars. The stipulation was approved by the parties and the Court on March 20, 1980.
On March 25, 1980, Napa County filed a complaint in Napa County Superior Court seeking a declaration that Napa County had properly interpreted the applicable zoning ordinance to forbid NEDS's proposed use, and that the ordinance, so interpreted, was consistent with state law. On April 30, 1982, the Superior Court filed an announcement of intended decision in favor of the County. NEDS appealed from this ruling, and the matter is currently pending in the California Court of Appeal.
Napa County has now filed in this Court a motion for "Relief from Stay." Napa requests an order "partially lifting the stay of proceedings in this action for the purpose of dissolving the interim use stipulation." The County argues that such relief is appropriate due to the Superior Court's decision in its favor. NEDS opposes this motion, and has filed a cross-motion of its own seeking modification of the stipulation to allow 100 seminar participants each weekend, 30 caretakers, and use of the facility through 10:00 p.m. on Sunday evenings.
Whether the interim use stipulation should be dissolved depends in the first instance upon the nature of the agreement itself. While the agreement was entered with the Court's encouragement, it does not constitute an order of the Court. Rather, it is a private stipulation of the parties, and must be interpreted and enforced by reference to the rules that govern such stipulations. Under California law, the task in interpreting a compromise agreement is "to ascertain the intention of the parties, which is to be determined from the writing itself, construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding its execution, including the object, nature, and subject matter of the agreement, and the preliminary negotiations between the parties." Shriver v. Kuchel, 113 Cal.App.2d 421, 425, 248 P.2d 35 (1952); see also Wo Co. v. Benjamin Franklin Corp., 562 F.2d 1339, 1344 (1st Cir.1977) (applying New Hampshire law).
From the language of the stipulation and the circumstances leading to its creation, it is apparent that the possibility of modification or termination of the agreement was envisioned by both NEDS and Napa County at the time the agreement was negotiated. Paragraph Three of the stipulation provides that "the parties agree that either party may move this Court at any time to dissolve or modify the stipulation."
Less clear, however, is the standard the parties intended for this Court to use in determining whether modification or dissolution is appropriate. The record shows that the parties rejected suggestions that the agreement automatically expire at some fixed future date, or that it be made subject to unilateral termination by either party at fixed intervals. Instead, the parties agreed that there would be no stated termination date, but that either party could petition the Court for modification or termination at any time. From this history, plus the lack of any explicit standard in the agreement, the Court finds that the parties intended to commit any question of modification or termination to the equitable discretion of the Court.
In exercising this discretion, the Court takes guidance from the standards of equity that would govern issuance of a preliminary injunction in a similar situation.1 In this circuit, a party may obtain a preliminary injunction by demonstrating either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.1980).
In assessing both the relative hardships that would be suffered were the stipulation dissolved and NEDS's likelihood of success on the merits, it is important to distinguish between the full use of Aetna Springs sought by NEDS and the use it is permitted by the stipulation. NEDS seeks to establish at Aetna Springs a full-time educational facility for 250 persons. Under the stipulation, however, NEDS now uses the facility only for religious and recreational purposes, and only on weekends, when it houses but 75 to 85 persons there. Only this more limited use is involved in the decision whether to terminate the interim stipulation.
The present use of Aetna Springs is primarily religious in character. The "Schedule of Weekend Seminar Activities," attached to the stipulation, reveals that each weekend seminar is predominantly devoted to religious lectures, ceremonies, and events. Should the County force NEDS to cease the seminars, NEDS would be unable to practice these religious activities in the desired manner. The allegedly unlawful injury to be suffered by NEDS as a result of such action by the County would constitute a deprivation of a right protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Consequently, the "irreparable injury" prerequisite for preliminary injunctive relief is presumed to be satisfied. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2689, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Community Communications, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001, 102 S.Ct. 2287, 73 L.Ed.2d 1296 (1982). Further, the County's intended action, which would deprive NEDS of any ability to use Aetna Springs for religious purposes, would impose a hardship severe in magnitude as well as irreparable.
Napa County, on the other hand, presently suffers little or no hardship from the use of Aetna Springs allowed by the stipulation. The agreement itself carefully states that NEDS will acquire no vested rights of any kind as a result of its use of the facility pursuant to the stipulation. Napa has cited no environmental, aesthetic, health, traffic, or safety problem created by NEDS's present use of the facility. NEDS's use has apparently alleviated one of Napa's chief previous concerns, that the Aetna Springs buildings failed to meet building and fire codes....
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