New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Huckins

• Decision Date: 24 March 1937
• Citation: 127 Fla. 540,173 So. 696
• Parties: NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HUCKINS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

173 So. 696

127 Fla. 540

NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HUCKINS.

Florida Supreme Court

March 24, 1937

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1937.

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis, Judge.

Action by Alden D. Muckins against the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company. Judgment of the civil court of record for the plaintiff which was rendered upon a directed verdict was affirmed by the circuit court on appeal, and the defendant brings certiorari.

Writ of certiorari quashed.

COUNSEL

Knight, Adair, Cooper & Osborne, H. P. Adair, and J Henson Markham, all of Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Fred B Noble and S. S. Blondheim, both of Jacksonville, for respondent.

OPINION

WHITFIELD Presiding Justice.

In an action brought by Alden D. Huckins in the civil court of record for Duval county, Fla., against the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, to recover $100 disability insurance payments for two months under an insurance policy agreeing to make such payments upon due proofs of the disability being made, the policy contains the following:

'If the insured * * * becomes physically or mentally incapacitated to such an extent as to be wholly and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or profession or to perform any work for compensation, gain or profit; * * * and after such disability has existed for ninety days, shall furnish due proof thereof to the Company, at its Home Office, the Company will waive the payment of any premium thereafter due upon this Policy during the continuance of such disability. Upon acceptance of such proof, and during the continuance of such disability, the Company will also pay to the Insured, An Income of Fifty Dollars a Month.'

The declaration contains the following:

'That during the life of said policy, on to-wit, October 16th A. D. 1931, the plaintiff was injured and, as a result thereof, became physically incapacitated to such an extent as to be wholly and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or profession, or to perform any work for compensation, gain or profit, which said disability existed for ninety (90) days and existed continuously from said date up to and including the date of the filing of this suit, whereby defendant was rendered liable under the terms and conditions of said insurance contract to pay the plaintiff the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per month; * * *.'

Pleas of the defendant in effect aver that the plaintiff was not during the dates or at the times stated in the declaration physically incapacitated to such an extent as to be wholly and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or profession or to perform any work for compensation, gain, or profit.

At the close of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor.

'The court: * * *

'I think there is sufficient testimony to take the case to the jury on the question of the plaintiff being totally and permanently disabled. I don't thing there is any indication so far that he has recovered so as to bring the case within that clause of the policy; and I shall deny the motion and note the exception of the defendant. * * *

'Thereupon the defendant, by its attorney, announced that it rested its case and renewed its motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the testimony.

'Thereupon the Court made its order on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict renewed at the conclusion of all the testimony and denied said motion, and exception to which ruling of the Court' was taken.

'Thereupon plaintiff by his attorneys, moved the Court for a directed verdict, * * * upon the following separate and several groungs:

'(1) That it affirmatively appears from the evidence that the plaintiff is permanently disabled so as to entitle him to the monthly payment provided for by the contract of the insurance sued upon.

'(2) That it affirmatively appears from the evidence that the plaintiff is disabled to such an extent as to be wholly and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or profession, or to perform any work for compensation, gain or profit, which he knows how to do, or from a consideration of his education, experience, age and natural ability, he is able to do.

'(3) On the ground that it affirmatively appears from the plaintiff's evidence that he is disabled to such an extent as to be wholly and permanently unable to substantially engage in any occupation or profession, or to perform any work for compensation, gain or profit which he knows how to do, or from a consideration of his education, experience, age and natural ability, he is able to do.

'(4) On the ground that it affirmatively appears from the plaintiff's evidence that the plaintiff before attaning the age of sixty-five years, and while the policy of insurance sued upon remained in full force and effect, became physically incapacitated to such an extent as to be wholly and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or profession, or to perform any work for compensation, gain or profit.

'And thereupon the Court announced that it would direct a verdict for the plaintiff and note exception of the defendant.'

A motion for new trial was denied and judgment for the plaintiff was rendered upon the verdict directed by the court. The judgment was on appeal affirmed by the circuit court. A writ of certiorari was issued by this court.

The evidence for the plaintiff was in accordance with the declaration and did not tend to prove the defense or to negative the case made by the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence. The defendant offered no evidence.

If the evidence adduced for the plaintiff, being consistent, uncontradicted, and unimpeached, is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff, hten the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, instead of submitting the cause to the jury and granting a new trial if the jury had found for the defendant, is not such a departure from the essential requirements of the law as to require this court to quash on certiorari the judgment that was rendered on the directed verdict and affirmed by the circuit court. The circuit court had, on the appeal taken to it, authority to review the evidence and to adjudicate its probative force, as the circuit court presumably did in affirming the judgment rendered by the civil court of record upon an express consideration of the evidence as adduced. See section 4637(2918), C.G.L.

Chapter 2096, Acts 1877, contains the following:

'Upon the trial of all common law and criminal cases in the several Circuit Courts of this State, it shall be the duty of the Judge presiding on such trial to charge the jury only upon the law of the case; that is, upon some point or points of law or exceptions to evidence arising in the trial of said cause.'

This provision in an amended form became the first paragraph of section 1088 of the Revised Statutes of 1892. The following new matter was enacted as a separate paragraph of section 1088, Revised Statutes of 1892:

'If, however, upon the conclusion of the argument of counsel in any civil case after all the evidence shall have been submitted, it be apparent to the judge of the circuit court, or county court, that no evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully find a verdict for one party, the judge may direct the jury to find a verdict for the opposite party.'

The above-mentioned two paragraphs of section 1088, Revised Statutes of 1892, became section 1496(1088) of the General Statutes of 1906.

Chapter 6220, Acts 1911, amended section 1496 of the General Statutes of 1906 so as to read:

'Section 1496. Duty of Judge to Charge Jury.--Upon the trial of all cases at law in the several courts of this State, the Judge presiding on such trial shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case; that is upon some point or points of law arising in the trial of said cause. If, however, after all the evidence shall have been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff in any civil case, it be apparent to the Judge of the Circuit Court, County Court or Court of Record that no evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully find a verdict for the plaintiff, the Judge may then direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant; and if, after all the evidence of all the parties shall have been submitted, it be apparent to the Judge of the Circuit Court or County Court or Court of Record that no sufficient evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could legally find a verdict for one party, the Judge may direct the jury to find a verdict for the opposite party.'

The last-quoted provision became section 2696(1496) of the Revised General Statutes of 1920.

Chapter 9364, Acts 1923, amended section 2696(1496) of the Revised General Statutes of 1920 so as to read:

'2696. (1496) Judge to Charge Jury on Law Case: Direction of Verdict.--Upon the trial of all cases at law in the several courts of this State, the judge presiding on such trial shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case; that is, upon some point or points of law arising in the trial of said cause. If, however, after all the evidence shall have been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff in any civil case, or upon behalf of the State in any criminal case, it be apparent to the Judge of the Circuit Court, Criminal Court, County Court of Record that no evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully find a verdict for the plaintiff in such civil case, or a verdict against the defendant in any criminal case, the judge shall upon motion of the defendant direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant; and if, after all the evidence of the parties shall have been submitted, it be apparent to the ...