New Hampshire Mun. Trust Workers' Compensation Fund v. Flynn

• Decision Date: 11 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-069,89-069
• Citation: 133 N.H. 17,573 A.2d 439
• Parties: NEW HAMPSHIRE MUNICIPAL TRUST WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND, et al. v. Richard M. FLYNN, Commissioner of New Hampshire Department of Labor.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 439

573 A.2d 439

133 N.H. 17

NEW HAMPSHIRE MUNICIPAL TRUST WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND, et al. v.Richard M. FLYNN, Commissioner of New Hampshire Department of Labor.

No. 89-069.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

April 11, 1990.

Devine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch P.A., Manchester (Richard E. Galway, orally, and Stephen J. Schulthess on the brief), for plaintiffs.

John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Emily Gray Rice, orally, and David S. Peck, Asst. Attys.Gen., on the brief), for defendant.

H. Bernard Waugh, Jr., Concord, by brief for the New Hampshire Mun. Ass'n, as amicus curiae.

BATCHELDER, Justice.

The defendant, the Commissioner of the State Department of Labor, appeals from a ruling by the Superior Court(Morrill, J.) on the plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment that found RSA 281:2, V-b (Supp.1988) unconstitutional under part I, article 28-a of the New Hampshire Constitution.On appeal, the defendant claims that RSA 281:2, V-b (Supp.1988)(hereinafter referred to in its current form at RSA 281-A:17, II (Supp.1989)) is constitutional because it neither mandates nor assigns a new, expanded or modified program or responsibility.For the following reasons, we affirm.

On May 17, 1984, Resolution 105 was introduced to New Hampshire's Seventeenth Constitutional Convention.This resolution was referred to the Committee on County and Local Government, which recommended by a vote of 25 to 1 that the resolution be adopted.This resolution stated:

"Art. 28-a.Mandated Programs.The state shall not mandate or assign any new, expanded or modified programs or responsibilities to any political subdivision in such a way as to necessitate additional local expenditures by the political subdivision unless such programs or responsibilities are fully funded by the state or unless such programs or responsibilities are approved for funding by a vote of the local legislative body of the political subdivision."

On June 26, 1984, Resolution 105 was placed before the full convention, and it was subsequently adopted by a vote of 272 to 62.Thereupon, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Form and Style so that the amendment could be rewritten in the form of a question that would appear on the voters' ballot.To help the voters understand the proposed amendment, a Voters' Guide was prepared that contained not only the questions being considered, but also a brief synopsis of their intended effect.The following excerpt came from the Voters' Guide:

"2.Are you in favor of amending the Constitution to prohibit the state from mandating or assigning any new, expanded, or modified programs or responsibilities which require additional local expenditures to any political subdivision, unless such programs or responsibilities are either fully funded by the state or approved for funding by a vote of the local legislative body of the political subdivision?

. . . . .

IF THE AMENDMENT IS ADOPTED:

The state will be prohibited from requiring localities to expend funds for any new or expanded portion of a program or responsibility unless the state provides the necessary funds for the localities to spend or unless the local legislative body agrees to provide its own funding for the new or expanded program or responsibility."

On November 6, 1984, the citizens of the State ratified article 28-a by a vote of 237,045 to 99,172, a margin that exceeded the two-thirds majority required by part II, article 100 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

In 1947the legislature enacted RSA chapter 281, relative to workers' compensation.This legislation, as well as its predecessor, envisioned a no-fault system whereby workers were to be compensated for injuries solely on the basis of the relationship that exists between employer and employee, without regard to negligence.Mulhall v. Nashua Manufacturing Company, 80 N.H. 194, 197-98, 115 A. 449, 452(1921).The consensus has been that without such legislation remedies for workers would be "uncertain, slow and inadequate."Id. at 196, 115 A. at 452.However, RSA chapter 281, as originally enacted, was not all-encompassing.Since its enactment, RSA chapter 281 has been frequently amended.One such amendment is RSA 281-A:17, II (Supp.1989), which provides as follows:

"II.Notwithstanding the provisions of RSA 281-A:2, XI and XIII, 16 and 27, there shall exist a prima facie presumption that cancer disease in a firefighter, whether a regular, call, volunteer, or retired member of a fire department, is occupationally related.In order to receive this occupational cancer disability benefit, the type of cancer involved must be a type which may be caused by exposure to heat, radiation, or a known or suspected carcinogen as defined by the International Agency for Research on Cancer.However:

(a) A call or volunteer firefighter shall have the benefit of this prima facie presumption only if there is on record reasonable medical evidence that such firefighter was free of such disease at the beginning of his or her employment.It shall be the duty of the employer of call or volunteer firefighters to provide the required reasonable medical evidence.If the employer fails to do so, the call or volunteer firefighter shall have the benefit of the prima facie presumption regardless of the absence of said reasonable medical evidence.

(b) A retired firefighter who agrees to submit to any physical examination requested by his city, town, or precinct shall have the benefit of the prima facie presumption for a period of 20 years from the effective date of such firefighter's retirement."

On appeal the defendant claims that the superior court erred in finding RSA 281-A:17, II (Supp.1989) unconstitutional.The defendant argues (1) that RSA 281-A:17, II (Supp.1989) does not mandate or assign a new, expanded or modified program or responsibility within the meaning of part I, article 28-a of the New Hampshire Constitution because it merely requires a procedural change in establishing eligibility for benefits under pre-existing workers' compensation laws, and (2) that, because the State does not mandate that local government provide fire fighting services, any increase in the cost of providing workers' compensation coverage is voluntarily incurred.

As we have stated on numerous occasions, this court will not disturb the trial court's findings or rulings unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law.In re Estate of Hebert, 130 N.H. 548, 552, 543 A.2d 422, 424(1988).When our inquiry requires us to interpret a provision of the constitution, we view the language used in light of the circumstances surrounding its formulation.Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 490, 495, 494 A.2d 261, 266(1985)."We will look to its purpose and intent, bearing in mind that we will give the words in question the meaning they must be presumed to have had to the electorate when the vote was cast."Id. at 495, 494 A.2d at 267.The statements made by the delegates to the constitutional convention are not always significant in determining the meaning of a particular amendment.To be entitled to consideration, the delegates' statements must interpret the amendment's language in accordance with its plain and common meaning while being reflective of its known purpose or object.SeeMaxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602, 20 S.Ct. 448, 456-57, 44 L.Ed. 597(1900).After all, we will not redraft the constitution in an attempt "to make it conform to an intention not fairly expressed in it."Concrete Company v. Rheaume Builders, 101 N.H. 59, 61, 132 A.2d 133, 135(1957).This rule of constitutional interpretation was followed in Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 9 S.Ct. 651, 32 L.Ed. 1060(1888), where the United States Supreme Court stated:

"To get at the thought or meaning expressed in a statute, a contract or a constitution, the first resort, in all cases, is to the natural signification of the words, in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them.If the words convey a definite meaning which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be accepted, and neither the courts nor the legislature have the right to add to it or take from it.So, also, where the law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, whether those terms are general or limited, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction.

There is even a stronger reason for adhering to this rule in the case of the constitution than in that of a statute, since the latter is passed by a deliberate body of small numbers, a large proportion of whose members are more or less conversant with the niceties of construction and discrimination and fuller opportunity exists for attention and revision of such a character, while constitutions, although framed by conventions, are yet created by the votes of the entire body of electors in the State, the most of whom are little disposed, even if they were able, to engage in such refinements.The simplest and most obvious interpretation of a constitution, if in itself sensible, is most likely to be that meant by the people in its adoption."

Id. at 671-72, 9 S.Ct. at 652(citations omitted).

Thus, in an effort to ascertain the meaning of article 28-a, we now turn to the language of the amendment itself.In particular, we focus on the phrase "any new, expanded or modified program or responsibility."Since the term "responsibility" is susceptible to a more expansive reading than the term "program,"we will first ascertain its meaning within the context of article 28-a.

The term "responsibility" is defined as "the quality or state of being responsible: something for which anyone is responsible or accountable," and "responsible" is defined as "likely to be called upon to answer: creditable or...