New Haven Sand Blast Co. v. Dreisbach

• Decision Date: 08 April 1926
• Citation: 133 A. 99,104 Conn. 322
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW HAVEN SAND BLAST CO. v. DREISBACH.

133 A. 99

104 Conn. 322

NEW HAVEN SAND BLAST CO. v. DREISBACH.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 8, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Motion by the New Haven Sand Blast Company for an order directing Charles A. Dreisbach to assign certain British and Canadian patent rights. On an oral demurrer as to the sufficiency of the allegations of the motion, the court found that the motion was insufficient and rendered judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals. Error; judgment dismissing motion ordered.

Frederick H. Wiggin and Edmond Bartholow, both of New Haven for appellant.

Walter J. Walsh, and George E. Hall, both of New Haven, for appellee.

WHEELER, C.J.

The present action arises upon a motion based upon the judgment heretofore rendered against the defendant in an action between the same parties praying that the court issue an order directing the defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiff assignments covering the British and Canadian patent rights to the so-called Washburn and Sheldon invention. The former action (reported in 128 A. 320, 102 Conn. 169), was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, who had been its president, general manager, and director, and pursued as to the first and second counts of the complaint.

The first count alleged that plaintiff's business was the manufacture of sand blast barrels under a patent issued to the defendant and assigned by him to the plaintiff so far as concerned the territory of the United States; that the defendant occupied a confidential relation to the plaintiff in the conduct of this business and manufactured these barrels which the plaintiff sold to the public; that in violation of his trust the defendant made secret preparations to engage in a competing business; that he designed secretly a competing barrel and engaged in its construction and sale while holding such confidential relation.

The second count contained the allegations of the first count, and, in addition, the allegations that defendant had agreed to convey all patents or patent rights which may be issued to him by the United States of America covering any improvement on sand blast barrels of a similar nature which may be patented by him hereafter, and that he acquired rights in the Washburn and Sheldon invention while he held such confidential relation, that this invention was an improvement upon the patent conveyed to plaintiff by defendant, and that defendant is a trustee ex maleficio for plaintiff, and, in consequence, all such rights should be assigned to plaintiff.

The court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the judgment recites, in paragraph 2, that the defendant, his agents, etc., " be and hereby are ordered, directed, and enjoined to do forthwith what is necessary to fully transfer and insure to the plaintiff all rights in the so-called Washburn and Sheldon invention" ; in paragraph 3, that " the defendant be and hereby is directed and commanded to execute forthwith to the plaintiff a proper instrument of assignment transferring all of his right, title, and interest in and to the Fred Washburn and John R. Sheldon invention" ; in paragraph 5, " that the defendant be and hereby is ordered and directed to do forthwith what is necessary to fully transfer and insure to the plaintiff all rights in the Washburn and Sheldon invention."

The motion alleges these several orders of the judgment; and, further, that a British patent covering this invention had been issued to an agent of defendant; that defendant is the owner of a Canadian patent covering this invention; and that plaintiff has made demand upon defendant to execute and deliver to plaintiff proper assignments covering the British and Canadian patent rights to this invention. The motion concludes with a prayer that the court issue an order directing the defendant to execute and deliver to plaintiff assignments covering the British and Canadian patent rights to the Washburn and Sheldon invention. No answer or other pleading was filed to this motion. The judgment upon the motion recites:

" The parties stipulated in open court that the matter might be heard by oral argument, as on demurrer, admitting for the purpose of argument the allegations of fact contained in the motion and amendment, but questioning the legal sufficiency of the facts so alleged, and the parties were thus at issue. The court, having heard the parties, finds the issues for the defendant, and that said motion and amendment thereto are insufficient. Thereupon it is adjudged that said motion as amended be denied."

The court refused to make the order as prayed for by plaintiff, upon the ground that plaintiff's patent rights acquired by assignment from defendant did not cover any foreign rights in or under the Dreisbach patent or any improvement thereon, and hence there were no equities to which the plaintiff was entitled to have the court enforce except such as arise under Exhibit A, the assignment by defendant to plaintiff; hence the plaintiff was not entitled to an order directing defendant to assign the British and Canadian patents issued to him or his agent.

Assuming that the court had jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the motion, we are unwilling in this proceeding to consider that question either upon the ground upon which the court placed it, or that upon which, under the allegations of its second count, the plaintiff relied--that the defendant, while occupying towards it the confidential relation as found by the court, could not acquire the Washburn and Sheldon invention for his own benefit, but only as trustee for plaintiff. If that question be hereafter presented to the superior court in a proper procedure, it will be necessary for the court to resolve that question, which we find discussed at length under point 1 of the plaintiff's brief.

The procedure adopted by the plaintiff in bringing this matter before the court upon a motion is unknown to our practice and should not be countenanced. The purpose of the motion is to secure an order requiring the transfer of the British and Canadian patents upon the Washburn and Sheldon invention to the plaintiff. That involved allegations of fact in the motion which must be proved, and a prayer for relief based upon proof of the allegations. Upon proof of the facts in the motion the court was required to construe the judgment in the former case in order to determine whether the orders of the judgment related to the Washburn and Sheldon invention. A matter of so serious import, requiring proof of facts extraneous to the record and a prayer for relief founded thereon, ought not to be disposed of by so summary a proceeding as a motion. The motion would have been a proper procedure for the settlement of the scope of a former judgment had it involved merely the construction of the judgment in the light of the facts already of record. But where it is necessary to go outside the record for facts, and to have independent relief granted based upon those facts, the matter should be brought to the attention of the court in the method provided by our law for the institution of all civil actions. A practice such as this, once permitted, will lead to a general practice of attempting to restrict or extend the terms of a judgment by the simple and somewhat informal method of a motion. A final judgment ought not to be assailed or subjected to construction in this method, otherwise the...