New Haven Young Men's Inst. v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 05 January 1891
• Citation: 22 A. 447,60 Conn. 32
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW HAVEN YOUNG MEN'S INSTITUTE v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

22 A. 447

60 Conn. 32

NEW HAVEN YOUNG MEN'S INSTITUTE

v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 5, 1891.

Case reserved from superior court, New Haven county.

Action by New Haven Young Men's Institute against the city of New Haven to compel the execution of a trust. Case reserved. Judgment for defendant.

C. R. Iugersoll and E. P. Arvine, for plaintiff.

W. K. Townsend and B. Mansfield, for defendant.

LOOMIS, J. The complainant seeks to ascertain its rights in a trust fund created by the will of Philip Marett, dated August 30, 1867. Marett died in New Haven, March 20, 1869. By his will the bulk of his estate was given to trustees of his appointment, to hold for the benefit of his wife and daughter during their lives, and upon the survivor's death (in the words of the will) "to be appropriated distributed, and disposed of as follows, namely: One-fifth part to the Connecticut Hospital Society, in trust, the income to be applied to the support of free beds for the benefit of poor patients in said institution, giving preference to those incurably afflicted, if such are admissible. One-fifth part to the city of New Haven, to be held in trust by the proper authorities, and the income to be applied, through such agencies as they see fit, for the supply of fuel and other necessaries to deserving indigent persons, not paupers, preferring such as are aged or infirm. One-fifth to the president and fellows of Yale College, in trust, the income to be applied to the support of scholarships, or such other purposes in the academical department as they may judge expedient. One-tenth part to the New Haven Orphan Asylum, to be held in trust, and the income applied to the support of poor inmates therein. One-tenth part to the St. Francis (Catholic) Orphan Asylum in New Haven, to be held in trust, and the income to be applied to the support of poor inmates therein. One-tenth part to the city of New Haven, in trust, the income to be applied by the proper authorities for the purchase of books for the Young Men's Institute, or any public library which may from time to time exist in said city. One-tenth part to the state of Connecticut, in trust, the income to be applied towards the maintenance of any institution for the cure or relief of idiots, imbeciles, and feeble-minded persons." The contention of the parties relates to the question whether the intention of the testator was to make the New Haven Young Men's Institute the primary object of his bounty, or to vest in the city of New Haven a discretion to exclude the plaintiff altogether, and to bestow the legacy upon another public library in the same city. In arriving at a just conclusion upon this subject both parties concede that force and effect must be given to all the language employed by the testator to express his intention in the premises. But in applying the principle the parties reach very different results. The language to be construed is: "One-tenth part to the city of New Haven, in trust, the income to be applied by the proper authorities for the purchase of books for the Young Men's Institute, or any public library which may from time to time exist in said city." The plaintiff contends that the defendant's construction would erase the Young Men's Institute as a beneficiary, while the defendant contends, on the other hand, that the plaintiff's construction practically erases the alternative provision for the benefit of any public library which may from time to time exist. There is some color of truth in both these claims, and yet both cannot he equally correct. Such different conclusions can only be reached by attaching a different meaning to the same words, or by reading something between the lines that the testator did not express. The plaintiff has the advantage of being a named beneficiary, but to dispose of the alternative clause requires, not only that the fact just named should be specially emphasized, but that there should be also inserted a contingency upon which alone the alternative beneficiary may take, namely, that the institute shall have ceased to exist prior to the testator's death. The defendant says: "The words 'The Young Men's Institute' were placed in the will for a purpose. It was not then a public library. It could not, therefore, be a beneficiary under the clause 'any public library.' But it might agree to throw open its doors to the public, provided the trustees saw fit in their discretion to purchase books for it. Or the public library might not accommodate the public to the satisfaction of the trustees. In these events the testator was willing that, although the institute was a private library, the trustees should purchase books for it." We will not stop to discuss whether or not there is adequate foundation for this statement. We prefer to adhere very closely to the language and provisions actually contained in the will, and to such natural and necessary inferences as may fairly be deduced therefrom, when considered in connection with all the surrounding circumstances.

Does the provision, then, that requires the city to purchase books for the institute, or any public library that may from time to time exist, menu that it shall purchase the books exclusively for the institute, provided it continues in existence? The question cannot even be stated without implying a negative answer, for it requires the use of important additional words and provisions, of which no hint is given in the will. Had it been in the mind of the testator to make the institute the sole beneficiary, except upon the remote and improbable contingency of its non-existence, it would have been most natural to have made a direct and absolute gift to it, with at most a proviso for some other ulterior disposition of it founded upon such contingency. It seems unnatural that the testator should have anticipated the non-existence of a corporation which in law never dies, and which the testator personally had known for 20 years as existing in New Haven; and, had this been a controlling consideration, as the plaintiff assumes, it would most naturally have found expression in the will, as we have before suggested. But we have been referred to decided cases where an alternative provision following the word "or" has been given a secondary and substitutional meaning. We think the cases are distinguishable from this. In I Redfield on Wills, 487, it is said that the question has arisen most commonly in cases of devises to A. "or his heirs," where it has been held that the word "or" being interposed between the name of the first devisee or legatee and his heirs, indicated the intention of substituting the latter in place of the ancestor. It seems to us that all these cases may well rest upon the implication, derived from the phrase "or heirs," that the first-named donee is dead; otherwise, in contemplation of the law, he could have no heirs.

Since the argument of this case our attention has been called to the case of O'Rourke v. Beard, 151 Mass. 9, 23 N. E. Rep. 576, (decided in January, 1800.) We find this case to be of the class above referred to. An estate was given to trustees for the benefit of the testator's three children, who were named, adding the words "or their heirs." The court holds that in such case "'or' makes a substituted gift, as is provided by Pub. St. c. 127, § 23, in...