New Jersey Dyfs v. M.M.

Decision Date08 February 2007
Citation914 A.2d 1265,189 N.J. 261
PartiesNEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.M., Defendant-Respondent. In the Matter of the Guardianship of M.A.M. New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, Plaintiff, v. C.B., Defendant. In the Matter of the Guardianship of M.A.M.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Lauren F. Carlton, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (Stuart J. Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Carlton and Patricia J. O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). Jane M. Personette, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant Law Guardian for M.A.M. (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).

Beatrix W. Shear, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Shear, Ted Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender and Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Mary M. McManus, Long Branch, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney; Ms. McManus and Mr. Miller, on the brief).

Justice ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights in respect of his son. The son is now four years old and has been in his foster parents' custody since a few days after his birth. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother and the father and awarded guardianship to the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or Division). Among other findings, the court concluded that the son was at risk because of the mother's destabilizing influence on the home, a negative influence that must be considered when evaluating the father's rights. The Appellate Division reinstated the father's parental rights but affirmed the termination of the mother's rights. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 382 N.J.Super. 264, 283-84, 888 A.2d 512 (App.Div.2006). We granted certification to review the termination of the father's rights only. 186 N.J. 606, 897 A.2d 1060 (2006).

The record contains clear and convincing evidence that the father did not establish a safe and stable environment for his son. Although the father does not pose a direct threat to his son, the evidence demonstrates that he did not provide for the son's special needs or mitigate the effects of the harmful environment in which he intends to raise the son. Additionally, since the son's placement in foster care a few days after his birth, he has developed strong emotional bonds with his foster parents and, with their assistance, is overcoming various muscular and neurological disorders. Conversely, the father has had ample opportunity to improve the circumstances, but his efforts are both untimely and inadequate.

The standard for the determination of this appeal is the best-interests-of-the-child. In the tapestry of facts that we now detail, one common thread emerges — it is not in the son's best interests to remove him from a home where he has flourished and place him in an environment that is, at best, destabilizing. Because we defer to, and agree with, the trial court's holding that termination of the father's rights is in the son's best interests in this unique case, we reverse.

I.
A.

Respondent, M.M., is the biological father of M.A.M., the child at issue. M.M. resides in Dover, New Jersey with C.B., M.A.M.'s biological mother.1 The mother is thirty-two years old, and the father is sixty-years old. The mother and father have been together for more than fifteen years and are not married. They have one other biological child together, a daughter born in 1993, who also lives in the home. The father's parental rights concerning the daughter are not at issue in this appeal.

Within days of the son's birth in 2003, DYFS became involved. The initial DYFS referral noted that the mother had poor hygiene, appeared overwhelmed caring for the newborn, and needed constant direction. The son was hypoglycemic at birth and required regular feedings every three hours because a drop in his glucose levels could result in seizures. A nurse observed that the mother was unable to calculate the son's feeding times. Additionally, the son has a variety of developmental disorders that were likely caused by overexposure to alcohol in utero and that require special therapy.

Concerned about the mother's ability to care for her son, the Division questioned the father regarding his plans for the son once the baby was released from the hospital. The father stated that he intended to bring the mother and his son to work with him every day at his drycleaning job. When DYFS informed him that his plan was unacceptable, he offered a list of relatives that could provide daycare. The Division found, however, that all the listed caregivers were also under investigation by DYFS or were unwilling to provide the needed assistance. Accordingly, sixteen days after the son's birth, the Division placed him with his foster parents. Since then, the foster parents have cared for the son, who is now four years old. The Division filed a complaint in 2004, petitioning the court for guardianship of the son for the purpose of adoption.

The Mother

At trial, several witnesses expressed concerns about returning the son to his father's care because of the mother's presence in the home. All the psychological experts agreed that the mother posed a risk to the son. Dr. Frank Dyer, a psychologist testifying for DYFS, stated that the mother was "much too cognitively limited and much too immature emotionally . . . to be considered a viable caretaker" for the son. In his report, Dr. Dyer noted that the mother's intellectual functioning was "well within the mildly retarded range" and her performance was comparable to that of an average seven-year-old child. The implications of the mother's psychological profile for parenting were also negative. In Dr. Dyer's view:

[The mother] is much too limited intellectually to be able to appreciate the physical and emotional needs of a young child. She lacks the vigilance, judgment, and common sense to be able to provide adequate physical protection, nurturance, intellectual stimulation, and emotional security for a young child. It is noteworthy that [the mother] agonizes over the fact that she has caused her daughter so much suffering by her pattern of running away from the home to go on alcoholic binges; however, this pattern has persisted until as recently as two months before the present examination. To a reasonable degree of certainty, a preschool child in [the mother]'s care would be at very great risk of harm.

[(Emphasis added).]

The mother's limited mental capacity and erratic tendencies led Dr. Dyer to observe that, at times, the father "experiences the [] relationship [with the mother] almost as though he had another child in the home." Dr. Dyer concluded that "the overall behavior impression was that of a mentally retarded woman with poor judgment and poor impulse control." When asked about the mother's prognosis for change, Dr. Dyer stated:

She did not display any particular insight into her problems. She displayed what I consider to be a rather crude denial system in regard to the possibility of working out her problems, or her own responsibility for the problems involving the family and involving her. She tended not to give any evidence of either an intellectual potential or some kind of motivation to achieve genuine change.

Dr. Ronald Silikovitz, the mother's psychological expert, corroborated Dr. Dyer's findings. Dr. Silikovitz conceded that it was accurate to describe the mother as "mentally retarded" and it would not be in the son's best interests to place him in her physical care. Dr. Paul Fulford, the father's psychological expert, did not evaluate the mother personally but offered an opinion regarding her fitness to parent, stating:

[The mother] represents a threat of potential [harm] only if allowed sole parenting responsibility, and this must be seen in the light of her mental age, which is child like [sic]. In other words, she would be seen as more of an elder sister to [the son], rather than birth mother, and, as such does not represent a danger in his presence, but only a risk if allowed to assume an exclusive parental role, much the same as a young child would be a risk to an infant sibling, if left in their sole care.

Caseworkers testified that the mother abuses alcohol and often runs away from home to binge drink. The mother's history of running away extends back to her childhood. Since 2003, the Division received numerous referrals regarding that behavior. She ran away on twelve occasions between 2002 and 2005, including at least three specific instances in the months preceding the trial. On one such occasion, she took all the money that the couple had saved to move into a larger home and spent it on alcohol. On another occasion, when pregnant with the son, she admits to running away to visit a man with whom she maintained an illicit affair because she thought he might be the son's father. Although she received treatment for her substance abuse, witnesses testified that her problems are cyclical and that she needs vigilant assistance from others to overcome her addiction. A caseworker at the Family Enrichment Program, a community service organization that provides services to needy families, testified that the family had made no progress towards the goal of family stability. The caseworker recommended that DYFS not return the son to his parents because of the instability created by the mother.

Additionally, experts and caseworkers expressed concern about the mother's tendency to make unsubstantiated allegations of domestic violence against the father. Indeed, she was...

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