New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. New Jersey
| Decision Date | 12 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 11-5024 |
| Parties | NEW JERSEY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al. Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter has come before the Court on the Defendants New Jersey Senate and New Jersey General Assembly's (the "Legislative Defendants") Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 18]. The Plaintiffs in this matter jointly oppose this motion [19]. The Court has decided this motion after considering all of the parties' submissions and without oral arguments pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons that follow the Legislative Defendants' motion will be granted.
This case arises from the enactment of Chapter 78 of Public Law 2011 ("Chapter 78"), which made changes to the New Jersey State retirement system for public employees. Plaintiffs allege that these changes are unconstitutional because, inter alia, the enactment of Chapter 78 impairs pre-existing contracts, violates the Due Process Clause, and violates the Takings Clause. The Plaintiffs bring suit for these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that these changes violate provisions of the New Jersey State Constitution and that Defendantsare liable on a theory of promissory estoppel. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages.
The Legislative Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them on the basis of legislative and sovereign immunity. They argue that the federal claims against them must be dismissed based on federal-common-law legislative immunity, and that the state-law claims against them must be dismissed for a litany of reasons also related to absolute immunity. Plaintiffs argue that federal-common-law legislative immunity, state-common-law legislative immunity, and the New Jersey Speech and Debate Clause all apply only to legislators in their personal capacities and not to legislative bodies as a whole.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a "defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented." Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a three-part analysis. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "First, the court must 'take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). But, the court should disregard any conclusory allegations proffered in the complaint. Id. Finally, once the well-pleaded facts have been identified and the conclusory allegations ignored, a court must next determine whether the "facts are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). This requires more than a mere allegation of an entitlement to relief. Id. "A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlementwith its facts." Id. A claim is only plausible if the facts pleaded allow a court reasonably to infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948). Facts suggesting the "mere possibility of misconduct" fail to show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 194).
The issues of state sovereign immunity and absolute legislative immunity are both properly considered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1999) (); Brown v. City of Camden (In re Camden Police Cases), Nos. 11-1315, 10-4757, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92314, (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (same); Hillburn v. Bayonne Parking Auth., No. 07-5211, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6762, *16-17 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2009) ().
The claims in this case raised against the Legislative Defendants appear only to challenge the passing of Chapter 78, not its enforcement. Therefore, for the following reasons, all claims against the Legislative Defendants must be dismissed.
The federal claims raised against the Legislative Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this case must be dismissed. It is a long-established tenant of federal practice that state legislators are immune from liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). This is because "a private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces [legislators] to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation." Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). Plaintiffs argue that this immunity does not extend to legislative bodies as a whole,but they are mistaken; this case is clearly within the controlling confines of the Supreme Court's decision in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
In Consumers Union the Supreme Court was asked to address the question whether a state appellate court and its individual members were legislatively immune from suit for promulgating and passing the State Bar Code for its attorneys. In addressing this question, the Supreme Court first concluded that passing the State Bar Code was a legislative, and not a judicial, act. Id. at 731. Having concluded this, the Court next held that legislative immunity applies in the same fashion whether equitable or legal relief is sought under § 1983. Id. at 732-33 ( ); see also Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 152 F.3d 240, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1998).
The Court then turned to the issue directly relevant to the parties' arguments in this case. The Court stated, "[T]here is little doubt that if the Virginia Legislature had enacted the State Bar Code and if suit had been brought against the legislature, its committees, or members . . . the defendants in that suit could successfully have sought dismissal on the grounds of absolute legislative immunity." Id. at 733-34 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that this is merely dicta. However, the Supreme Court ultimately held in Consumers Union that "the Virginia Court and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative capacity." Id. at 734 (emphasis added). In other words, the state body acting in a legislative capacity—and not just its individual members—were immune from suit under § 1983. See also Hughes v. Lipscher, 852 F.Supp. 293, 296-97 (D.N.J. 1994) (). Therefore, while Plaintiff's statement that "[t]he Court did not expressly hold that state legislatures enjoy absolute common-law immunity from civil suits and claims[,] [n]or has it ever done so," (Pls.' Br. at 13), is technically correct, this is so only because the Supreme Court has never been presented with this exact question. The Supreme Court has held that state bodies acting in a legislative capacity do enjoy absolute common-law immunity from § 1983 claims, whether or not the relevant state body is actually the state legislature. Therefore, the present case is clearly within the controlling purview of Consumers Union, and the § 1983 claims against the Legislative Defendants must be dismissed.
The state-law claims against the Legislative Defendants present a different question for the Court. The federal-common-law legislative immunity discussed above is inapplicable to Plaintiffs' state-law claims. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 (1979). Plaintiffs argue that state legislative immunity doctrine properly distinguishes between legislators (to whom the doctrine applies) and the legislative body (to which the doctrine does not apply), even if federal law does not.
Plaintiffs have essentially two arguments: first, they argue that this is settled law as shown by several cases in which legislative bodies have been a party to the litigation; and second, if this question is not settled law, the Court should be persuaded by other states' highest courts that have held that the Speech and Debate Clause contained in their state constitution is substantially narrower than the federal counterpart. Defendants, on the other hand, make the following arguments: (1) the Court should be persuaded by federal authority because New Jerseystate courts have consistently relied on federal precedent when interpreting the New Jersey version of the Speech and Debate Clause; (2) even if there was a conflict between federal and state law on this issue, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires application of federal law; (3) the Court should abstain from deciding this unsettled question under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and its progeny, and therefore dismiss the state law claims against the Legislative Defendants; (4) that the Court should refuse to exercise supplement jurisdiction over the state law claims; and (5) the Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal court from requiring a state actor to conform their conduct to state law.
Contrary to the Plaintiffs' contention, the question of state legislative immunity appears to be unsettled in the New Jersey state courts. As such, the Court will not address the...
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