New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long
| Decision Date | 15 December 1976 |
| Parties | NEW JERSEY GUILD OF HEARING AID DISPENSERS, a non-profit corporation of the State of New Jersey, et al., Appellants, v. Virginia LONG, Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Deborah W. Babcox, Newark, for appellants (Kirsten, Solomon, Friedman & Cherin, Newark, attorneys; Jack B. Kirsten, Newark, of counsel).
Steven I. Kern, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents (William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., attorney; Bertram P. Goltz, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel).
Before Judges HALPERN, ALLCORN and BOTTER.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BOTTER, J.A.D.
The Guild (New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers) and two of its officers have filed this appeal to challenge rules and regulations (hereafter 'rules') promulgated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:9A--7 by the Hearing Aid Dispensers Examining Committee (Committee), with the approval of the State Board of Medical Examiners (Board). The Rules were filed with the Secretary of State on July 27, 1976 but a temporary stay was issued on appellants' motion pending disposition of this appeal on an accelerated basis.
The Hearing Aid Dispensers Act, N.J.S.A. 45:9A--1 Et seq., became effective on January 31, 1973. Ths purpose was to regulate the practice of hearing aid dispensing in order to protect the health, safety and welfare of our citizens. N.J.S.A. 45:9A-1. The Committee was authorized to inquire into the 'dispensing and sale of hearing aids,' and to make rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. N.J.S.A. 45:9A--7. The seven-member Committee is composed of three hearing aid dispensers, one certified clinical audiologist, one physician who is a diplomate of the American Board of Otolaryngology, one public member and, Ex officio, the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs or a representative of the Director. N.J.S.A. 45:9A-3. Proposed rules were filed on April 9, 1976, with approval of the Board, and a public hearing was held before the Board on May 21, 1976. Numerous witnesses testified at the hearing, including Virginia Long, Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs. Cheanges were made in the proposed rules prior to their adoption by the Committee in June 1976 and approval by the Board in July 1976.
Appellants contend that the Legislature did not intend to authorize the regulation of business aspects of selling hearing aids and that the Committee exceeded its delegated authority. We disagree.
The Legislature found that the 'practice of hearing aid dispensing' should be regulated. N.J.S.A. 45:9A-1. It defined the practice of dispensing and fitting hearing aids to mean the evaluation or measurement of human hearing ability and the 'selection * * * adaptation Or sale of hearing aids intended to compensate for hearing loss * * *.' N.J.S.A. 45:9A-2(d) (emphasis supplied). A hearing aid dispenser is a person engaged in the 'fitting and selling' of hearing aids to persons with impaired hearing. N.J.S.A. 45:9A-2(e). N.J.S.A. 45:9A-17 gives the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs power to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew for unethical conduct any license issued pursuant to the act. Such conduct includes the inducement of sales by fraud or misrepresentation, the use of misleading or untruthful advertising, and the use of 'bait and switch' advertising methods. N.J.S.A. 45:9A-17(c)(1), (3) and (4). Other indicia of the Legislature's interest in regulating the business practices of hearing aid dispensers are found in N.J.S.A. 45:9A-23. This section requires a dispenser to advise a prospective hearing aid user that the examination is not that of a medical practitioner or a certified audiologist. This section also provides that, upon the consummation of a sale, the dispenser must deliver to the purchaser a written receipt detailing certain aspects of the sale, including the terms of any guarantee or express warranty. We note, also, that N.J.S.A. 45:9A-26 requires hearing aid dispensers to maintain certain business records for a period of seven years. Thus, there is ample evidence of the legislative intention to regulate the business practices of hearing aid dispensers.
On the erroneous premise that no regulation of such business activity was contemplated, appellants contend that certain provisions in Chapter III of the rules are invalid and serve no legitimate public purpose. These are: §§ 6(a) and 11(A) and (B), which require the itemization of all charges involved in the dispensing and sale of a hearing aid and disclosure to the customer before any services are performed or a purchase agreement signed; § 8, to the extent that it provides that a retail price list of all hearing aids offered for sale should be conspicuously posted in the licensee's office or place of practice; § 11(D), which provides that a retail charge for services and equipment of more than three times the price charged by the hearing aid manufacturer for the hearing aid itself shall be deemed 'evidence of overreaching and fraud in the sale of a hearing aid' (it is further provided that the section shall not be construed as setting a maximum or minimum allowable fee); § 10, which provides that no visit shall be made to the home or place of business of a potential buyer for the purpose of inducing the sale of a hearing aid without the express consent of such potential buyer, and § 6, to the extent that it prohibits the use of the term 'certified hearing aid audiologist' by a person who is merely licensed as a hearing aid dispenser.
We find no merit to appellants' contentions that these regulations exceed the authority delegated by the statute. As noted above, N.J.S.A. 45:9A-23 expressly requires that a prospective hearing aid user be told at the outset that any examination or representation made by the hearing aid dispenser is not an examination or prescription by a person licensed to practice medicine or by a certified audiologist, and cannot be regarded as a medical opinion. The provisions in the act which permit suspension or revocation of a license for making any sale by fraud or misrepresentation are sufficiently broad to encompass implied representations as to the reasonable value of services and equipment furnished, sufficient to justify the establishment of a presumption of overreaching through excessive charges. See Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544, 279 A.2d 640 (1971), where the court held, in connection with the sale of consumer goods such as educational books, that unconscionable pricing may be equated with the concepts of deception, fraud and misrepresentation proscribed by N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 of the Consumer Fraud Act. The court also stated that a sale at an exorbitant price raises a strong inference of imposition. 58 N.J. at 545, 279 A.2d 640. Here we note that the regulation in question does not fix a maximum price but merely establishes a guideline that is not conclusive. While upholding the right to establish such a rule, there is no basis in the record before us to determine the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the particular standard, and we do not pass upon that issue. At this juncture the standard is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.
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