New Jersey & N.Y.R. Co. v. Young

• Decision Date: 18 January 1892
• Citation: 49 F. 723
• Parties: NEW JERSEY & N.Y.R. CO. v. YOUNG.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

49 F. 723

NEW JERSEY & N.Y.R. CO. v. YOUNG.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 18, 1892

Robert W. De Forest, for plaintiff in error.

Charles C. Suffren, (Irving Brown, of counsel,) for defendant in error.

Before WALLACE and LACOMBE, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE Circuit Judge.

This is a writ of error by the defendant in the original suit to review a judgment for the plaintiff rendered upon a verdict of the jury. The plaintiff, a fireman in the employ of the defendant, while firing the locomotive of an express train on the defendant's railway on a trip from Jersey City to Haverstraw, was injured by a collision between his train and some cars upon a side track of the railway. The side track was not disconnected from the main track at the time, and this fact was indicated by a danger signal of a red light indicating that the switch was open. A white light would have indicated that it was closed. The track was straight for a considerable distance ahead of the switch. The side track was at a station where there is a junction between the tracks of the defendant's railway and those of another railway. Among the regulations of the defendant, furnished to its engineers, were the following:

'All trains must approach * * * junctions * * * prepared to stop; and must not proceed until the switch or signals are seen to be right, or the track is plainly seen to be clear. * * * He (the engineer) must always run upon the supposition that at any station he may find a switch out of place, and he must have his train well in hand, on approaching a switch or station.' As the train was approaching the switch, at the rate of 25 miles an hour, and when several hundred feet distant, the plaintiff noticed the signal was a red light, and the engineer immediately reversed his engine and applied the air-brake. The testimony upon the trial authorized the jury to find that the air-brake was out of repair; that if it had been in proper order the train could have been stopped between the place where it was applied by the engineer and the switch; that both the plaintiff and the engineer knew the brake as out of order; that within the previous week the engineer, in the presence of the plaintiff, had notified the defendant's superintendent that the brake was out of order; and that the superintendent, through the engineer, had directed the defendant's repairer to put it in order, but the repairer had neglected to do so. The testimony also authorized the jury to find that, owing to the fog at the time, the color of the signal was not distinguishable further away than the place at which the brake was applied. At the close of the testimony the defendant's counsel requested the judge to instruct the jury to render a verdict for the defendant on the grounds (1) that no negligence on the part of the defendant was shown; (2) that the accident was caused by the negligence either of the plaintiff or the engineer, his fellow-servant; and (3) that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the engineer or fireman with reference to the danger signal, irrespective of any defect in the brake. The court refused these instructions, and the defendant took an exception. The defendant assigns error because of the refusal of the trial judge to give these instructions. We think the instructions were properly refused.

It is not fairly open to discussion that the facts in evidence would authorize a recovery by the plaintiff if he had not been aware of the defective condition of the air-brake, or if the engineer had not been guilty of negligence in running his train in violation of the regulation; especially so when he knew that the brake was out of order. A fireman has no authority to interfere with the engineer in the management of a train, and therefore negligence...