New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. State Federation of Dist. Boards of Ed.

Decision Date10 November 1966
Docket NumberAFL--CIO,No. C--789,C--789
Citation224 A.2d 519,93 N.J.Super. 31
PartiesNEW JERSEY STATE, an unincorporated association, Vincent J. Murphy, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE FEDERATION OF DISTRICT BOARDS OF EDUCATION of New Jersey, Defendant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

Thomas L. Parsonnet, Newark, for plaintiffs (Parsonnet & Parsonnet, Newark, attorneys).

Thomas P. Cook, Princeton, for defendant.

MINTZ, J.S.C.

Plaintiffs seek an adjudication that N.J.S.A. 18:9--1 et seq., the legislation creating the State Federation of District Boards of Education (State Federation) and prescribing its functions, is unconstitutional. Alternatively, they urge that if the legislation is constitutional, the State Federation be enjoined from engaging in activities deemed Ultra vires. Defendant has moved for summary judgment. Although plaintiffs filed no such cross-motion, it was stipulated that the matter be considered before the court as on cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agree that there are no factual issues.

The State Federation is a creature of the Legislature, N.J.S.A. 18:9--1 et seq. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18:9--2 each district board of education selects annually one of its members as a delegate to the State Federation. N.J.S.A. 18:9--3 provides that the State Federation

'* * * may investigate such subjects relating to education in its various branches as It may think proper, and It shall encourage and aid all movements for the improvement of the educational affairs of this state.' (Emphasis supplied)

I

Plaintiffs contend that the statute is unconstitutional as being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is urged that the organization of the State Federation violates the one man-one vote principle enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 537, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), and in Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713 (1964). Plaintiffs argue that since each district board of education is entitled to only one delegate to the State Federation, the citizens of the larger municipalities are being deprived of equal protection of the laws since the voice of the delegates from smaller communities is equal to that of the delegates from the larger communities.

Although plaintiffs' standing to sue was not raised as an issue in this case, the court notes that they lack such standing. The decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), to the effect that members of the electorate have standing to challenge the constitutionality of legislative apportionment, is not apposite in the instant case, basically for two reasons. Firstly, the court in Baker was concerned with the apportionment of a legislative body and specifically held, Inter alia, that a voter in a more populated voting district had standing to challenge legislation malapportioning the state legislature since his vote was diluted, thereby denying him equal protection of the laws. As hereinafter observed, the instant case does not at all concern the apportionment of a legislative body.

Secondly, the court in Baker determined that plaintiffs had suffered a direct and substantial harm. Such a finding is absent in the present case. It is axiomatic that one who challenges the constitutional validity of a statute must suffer or be threatened with direct and substantial injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the statute. Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 146 A.2d 111 (1958); Koons v. Board of Comm'rs of Atlantic City, 134 N.J.L. 329, 338, 47 A.2d 589 (Sup.Ct.1946), affirmed 135 N.J.L. 204, 50 A.2d 869 (E.&A.1947); Bd. of Education of Mountain Lakes v. Maas, 56 N.J.Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (App.Div.1959), affirmed 31 N.J. 537, 158 A.2d 330 (1960), certiorari denied 363 U.S. 843, 80 S.Ct. 1613, 4 L.Ed.2d 1727 (1960). The individual plaintiffs' basis of direct and substantial harm lies in the allegation in his complaint that he is a New Jersey taxpayer residing in the City of Newark. The contention is that since the State Federation is supported by public tax moneys, said moneys being derived from annual dues which defendant has the power to assess upon all of the district boards of education, the individual plaintiffs are harmed by the purported unconstitutional composition of the State Federation. Plaintiffs' theory is untenable. Reference is made to the decision in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952). There plaintiffs were taxpayers seeking to invalidate, as a violation of the First Amendment, a New Jersey statute which provided for Bible reading in public schools. They urged that they had standing because of their status as taxpayers, alleging that the schools were maintained by public funds. The United States Supreme Court decided that plaintiffs' status as taxpayers was not sufficient to give them standing to sue. The court stated:

'* * * There is no allegation that this activity is supported by any separate tax or paid from any particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the school. No information is given as to what kind of taxes are paid by appellants and there is no averment that Bible reading increases any tax they do pay, or that as taxpayers they are, will or probably can be out of pocket because of it.

The taxpayer's action can meet this test, but only when it is a good-faith pocketbook action. It is apparent that the grievance which it is sought to litigate here is not a direct dollars and cents injury, but is a religious difference. If appellants established the requisite special injury necessary to a taxpayer's case or controversy, it would not matter that their dominant inducement to action was more religious than mercenary. It is not a question of motivation, but of possession of the requisite financial interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct. * * * ' (at p. 433,) 72 S.Ct. at pp. 397--398.

Like Doremus, there is no allegation that the purported unconstitutional composition of the State Federation or its alleged Ultra vires activities are supported by any separate tax or paid from any particular appropriation. There is also no averment that the alleged unconstitutional composition of defendant increases any tax paid by plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs will or could be out of pocket because of it.

Plaintiffs' action is not basically a pocketbook action alleging a dollars and cents injury. They are not attacking defendant's power to assess dues. Rather, the gravamen of the constitutional argument is predicated upon the composition of the State Federation. In order to have standing upon such a complaint, a plaintiff must be a voter whose representation in a legislative body is other than proportional. Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, supra. I do not find that prerequisite in the instant case. The State Federation, aside from not being a legislative body, does not purport to act as the representative of the electorate. Rather, it stands as the representative of education in its various facets, and also as the representative of the agencies which are concerned with the improvement of educational affairs of this State. As such, the individual plaintiffs have no standing to assert denial of equal protection, for it is not their individual interests which are being represented by defendant. See also Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3 Cir. 1965), rehearing 250 F.Supp. 81 (D.N.J.1966); Ahto v. Weaver, 39 N.J. 418, 189 A.2d 27 (1963).

There is additional basis for concluding that plaintiff labor union also lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the cited statute. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not deny to Any person within the jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Though this clause has been interpreted to include private corporations within the ambit of 'persons' protected, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S.Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 929, 85 A.L.R. 699 (1933), there has been no determination positing an unincorporated association, such as a labor union, as within the classification of 'persons' entitled to such constitutional protection. The Federal District Court in Nebraska has specifically held that the AFL-CIO has no standing to assert denial of equal protection and thereby challenge the apportionment of the state legislature. Only a citizen who is a legal voter in a legislative district and whose rights are impinged by the failure to reapportion can maintain such an action. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F.Supp. 189 (D.C.Neb. 1962).

Since defendant did not urge plaintiffs' lack of standing this court will decide the substantive issues raised on the cross-motions. Plaintiffs' contentions of unconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 18:9--1 et seq. are unsustainable. Plaintiffs rely upon Reynolds v. Sims and Jackman v. Bodine, supra; Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 N.J.Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150 (App.Div.1965), and other related cases. The concern of the respective courts in those decisions was the integrity of the citizens' vote in determining who would perform governmental functions on both the state and local levels. The one man-one vote principle, as specifically designated in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, has applicability only to voting by individuals at elections of public officials or on propositions submitted to referendum. The instant case does not present a situation where the voting rights of the citizens are being diluted by unequal representation in public government.

As already observed, the State Federation is not a legislative body. It purports to aid all movements for the improvement of the educational affairs in this State. Among its varied activities it sponsors or opposes legislation dealing with the...

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