New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville
| Citation | 661 A.2d 778,139 N.J. 582 |
| Parties | NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOROUGH OF SOMERVILLE, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 19 April 1995 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Joseph L. Yannotti, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause, for appellant (Deborah T. Poritz, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey, attorney).
Michael D. Sullivan, Cedar Grove, argued the cause, for amicus curiae N.J. State League of Municipalities (Stickel, Koenig & Sullivan, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
New Jersey Transit Corporation (Transit) contests the local real property tax assessments levied against it by the Borough of Somerville (Somerville). At issue is what limitation period applies to the filing of a petition by the State or one of its political subdivisions contesting real-property tax assessments--the filing time limitations imposed under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 or the ten-year period imposed under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2.
Transit was created by the Public Transportation Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 27:25-1 to -24. Transit is a department of the executive branch of the State, within, but independent of, the Department of Transportation (DOT). N.J.S.A. 27:25-4(a). Transit is the State's primary public transportation agency, and is authorized to and actually does operate commuter rail service on various rail lines throughout the State. N.J.S.A. 27:25-5. By virtue of N.J.S.A. 27:25-21, Transit was vested with certain properties previously belonging to other railways, including the property in Somerville that is the subject matter of this appeal.
The subject property is identified on the Borough of Somerville's Tax Map as Block 123, Lot 1-E (now 1.05), and consists of an embankment supporting the elevated Raritan Valley commuter line. That line was previously owned by the bankrupt Central Railroad of New Jersey (CNJ), and was part of the property transferred by CNJ to the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) in 1976. The State acquired this property from Conrail in 1978. By letter dated January 9, 1979, the DOT notified the clerk of every municipality in which it had acquired railroad property pursuant to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C.A §§ 701 to 797m, of its acquisition and claimed exemption from local property taxation.
Transit became the owner of the property in 1979. However, there was confusion about the ownership of the parcel. In January 1982, Transit notified Somerville's tax assessor of its acquisition of the property and sent the assessor a copy of certain railroad-valuation maps, asking that the assessor mark the block and lot numbers from the borough's tax maps. Two years later, in May 1984, Transit wrote to Somerville's Tax Collector, returning various 1983 property tax bills that had been addressed to "CRR of NJ (N.J. Department of Transportation)." In the accompanying letter, Transit attempted to identify ownership of the various parcels involved, noting that several parcels "appear to be owned by Conrail," including Block 123, Lot 1.05. Somerville's tax assessor apparently agreed, writing a short time later to Transit that he had determined that Block 123, Lot 1.05 had not been conveyed to Transit, but actually belonged to Conrail.
That understanding remained until the summer of 1990. In the course of resolving other property-tax matters with Somerville, the borough's attorney forwarded to Transit's counsel a list of properties that the parties had been discussing, along with a list of other properties on the Somerville tax rolls that the borough believed were "still owned" by Transit. Included on the latter list was Block 123, Lot 1.05, that the Borough indicated had been assessed to "CRR of NJ, N.J. Department of Transportation" and had many years of back taxes outstanding. Somerville then sent Transit a tax bill for this property, for the tax years 1981 to 1990.
On or about August 15, 1991, Transit filed petitions with the Somerset County Tax Board contesting the assessments. (Transit also filed petitions contesting the 1991 and 1992 tax assessments, but the Tax Court found those appeals timely and set aside those assessments; consequently, we do not address them further.) Each petition sought exemption from the 1981 to 1990 tax assessments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 27:25-16 (Transit tax exemption), N.J.S.A. 54:29A-1 () and 45 U.S.C.A. § 581(c)(5) ().
The Somerset County Board of Taxation found the appeals untimely and affirmed the assessments. Transit then appealed to the Tax Court. Somerville determined not to oppose Transit's challenge to those assessments. The Tax Court dismissed Transit's appeals sua sponte, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear them, as they had not been timely filed within the statutory limitations period imposed by N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. 13 N.J.Tax 339 (1993).
Transit appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, the statutory nullum tempus provision, allowed Transit to file an appeal at any time within the ten-year limitations period contained therein. The Appellate Division affirmed the Tax Court's determination that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 did not apply to real-property tax appeals. However, the Appellate Division did find that Transit was entitled, under federal preemption doctrine, to the retroactive tax exemption granted by 45 U.S.C.A. § 581(c)(5). Consequently, Transit was relieved of liability for those assessments asserted against it after the operational date of the federal tax exemption provision, October 1, 1981. We granted Transit's petition for certification. 137 N.J. 314, 645 A.2d 142 (1994), and now affirm the Appellate Division.
In a trio of 1991 decisions--Holloway v. State, 125 N.J. 386, 593 A.2d 716 (1991); New Jersey Educational Facilities Auth. v. The Gruzen Partnership, 125 N.J. 66, 592 A.2d 559 (1991) (Gruzen ); and Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 124 N.J. 570, 592 A.2d 199 (1991)--we abolished the long-recognized, oft-quoted, and anachronistic doctrine of the common law, "nullum tempus occurrit regi "--"no time runs against the king." We declared the nullum tempus doctrine "abrogated with respect to the State or its agencies insofar as it would preclude the application of general statutes of limitations to the State." Gruzen, supra, 125 N.J. at 76, 592 A.2d 559. Our ruling was prospective from December 31, 1991, "subject in all aspects to any action of the Legislature." 1 Ibid.
In response to the Court's general abrogation of the common-law nullum tempus doctrine, the Legislature passed N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2. That statute, in pertinent part, provides a uniform ten-year limitations period applicable to actions commenced by the State or its subdivisions:
Except where a limitations provision expressly and specifically applies to actions commenced by the State or where a longer limitations period would otherwise apply, and subject to any statutory provisions or common law rules extending limitations periods, any civil action commenced by the State shall be commenced within ten years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.
[ N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2(a).]
Transit asserts that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 permits it to contest its tax assessments because N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 does not "expressly and specifically" refer to the State and its political subdivisions. The Senate Judiciary Committee statement makes it clear that the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 to apply to cases where "under the common law doctrine of nullum tempus, the State and its agencies [had been] exempt from statutes of limitations generally applicable in civil actions." Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 3741 (Dec. 12, 1991). That the Legislature, in enacting N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, was concerned only with establishing a uniform ten-year statute of limitations for actions commenced by governmental entities where no such limitation had previously existed under the doctrine of nullum tempus also comports with common sense. In State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 134 N.J. 393, 418, 634 A.2d 478 (1993), we stated:
Our conclusion is reinforced by Judge Learned Hand's classic admonition that '[t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.' Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.1944). As we observed in Schierstead v. Brigantine, supra, [29 N.J. 220, 148 A.2d 591 (1959) ] "statutes are to [be] read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative intent is to be presumed as 'consonant to reason and good discretion.' " 29 N.J. at 230 (quoting Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Central R.R. Co., 16 N.J.Eq. 419, 428 (Ch.1863)).
The common-law doctrine of nullum tempus has not been applied to the State or its instrumentalities in real-property tax appeals. The filing deadline imposed under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 in contesting property tax assessments has been applied to governmental entities as well as private litigants. The Legislature could not have intended N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 to give governmental entities a longer statute of limitations than they previously had enjoyed.
N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 provides in pertinent part:
A taxpayer feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of his property, or feeling that he is discriminated against by the assessed valuation of other property in the county, or a taxing district which may feel discriminated against by the assessed valuation of property in the taxing district, or by the assessed valuation of property in another taxing district in the county, may, on or before April 1 [August 15 for years prior to 1992] appeal to the county board of taxation by filing with it a petition of appeal....
It is undisputed that Transit's appeals for tax years 1981 to 1990, filed on or about August 15, 1991, were untimely under that statute.
We have previously interpreted "taxpayer feeling...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Oches v. Township of Middletown Police Dept.
...and that because N.J.S.A. 40A:14-155 is the more specific statute it therefore controls. See New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 591, 661 A.2d 778 (1995). In our view, however, the statutes are not necessarily in conflict. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-155 does not purport to......
-
Raubar v. Raubar
...1992) The court should also consider the entire legislative scheme of which the statutes are a part. N.J. Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 661 A.2d 778 (1995). Statutes that share common purpose should be harmonized, not read in conflict. F. & W. Associates v. County of......
-
Capital Bonding Corp. v. New Jersey Supreme Court, Civil No. 00-4134(JBS).
...affected party appropriate notice. See Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 696 A.2d 556 (1997); New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 661 A.2d 778 (1995). The Rule provided for a 45-day waiting period between notice of intent to order forfeiture and the actu......
-
State v. Gomes
...we bear in mind is that a more specific statutory provision usually controls over a more general one. N.J. Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 591, 661 A.2d 778 (1995) ; accord 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51:2. In this instance, CREAMMA is targeted at marijuana-......
-
Drop shipments, destination sales, and the multi-factor apportionment statute: a critical review of Stryker Corporation v. Director, Division of Taxation.
...18:7-8.12(a). (16) Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co., 55 N.J. 336,262 A.2d 193 (1970); New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 661 A.2d 778 (1995); 296 N.J. Super. 501, 687 A.2d 309 (App. Div. 1997); Everest Reinsurance Co. v. Newark Division of Tax Abatement, 18 N.J. Ta......