New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890 of Intern. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers

• Decision Date: 12 June 1952
• Docket Number: No. 5467,5467
• Citation: 1952 NMSC 62,245 P.2d 156,56 N.M. 447
• Parties: NEW JERSEY ZINC CO. v. LOCAL 890 OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 156

245 P.2d 156

56 N.M. 447

NEW JERSEY ZINC CO. v. LOCAL 890 OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, et al.

No. 5467.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 12, 1952.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1952.

Edison C. Serna, Silver City, Nathan Witt, New York City, for appellants.

Woodbury, Shantz & Woodbury, Silver City, Garland & Sanders, Las Cruces, for appellee.

COORS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of Grant County adjudging the defendants in contempt of court for violating a temporary restraining order issued by the court on June 12, 1951. This civil contempt proceeding arose out of an injunction suit filed in the District Court by plaintiff (appellee) against the defendants (appellants) wherein the plaintiff prayed in its complaint for a permanent injunction and also a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining defendants and each of them from trespassing upon plaintiff's property and blocking the roads and other entrances to property of plaintiff in such manner as to restrain or coerce the employees of plaintiff from returning to work, or from illegally attempting to keep said employees from continuing in their employment. On June 12, upon evidence presented to and considered by the court, an interlocutory order in the nature of a temporary restraining order was issued, the material parts of which, so far as this appeal is concerned, read as follows:

'It is, therefore, by the Court Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that defendants and each of them be, and they are hereby enjoined and restrained, until the further order of this Court, from trespassing upon said plaintiff's property and blocking the roads and other entrances to the property of plaintiff in such manner as to restrain or coerce the employees of plaintiff from returning to work.'

The injunction suit came on regularly for final hearing before the court on June 21 and this hearing continued to and through June 26. The defendants at said hearing were represented by their attorneys. On June 30 the trial judge informally advised counsel for all parties by letter, which letter was filed as a part of the record in the case, of his decision and conclusions reached which he intended to carry into the judgment in the nature of a permanent injunction. At said time the trial judge advised that he would make permanent on or before July 9 the temporary restraining order theretofore issued. On July 9 the court entered and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the hearing for the permanent injunction. These are quite lengthy and unnecessary to relate here except to state that Conclusion No. 4 by the court so filed read as follows:

'That the temporary restraining order should be made permanent.'

On the same day, July 9, the district judge issued and filed his final decree in the nature of a permanent injunction, which contained the following provisions which are material in the present appeal:

'And the Court having heretofore made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

'It is, therefore, by the Court, ordered, adjudged and decreed:

'1. That defendants and each of them, and their wives, mothers, sisters and children as their agents, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from trespassing upon plaintiff's property and blocking the roads and other entrances to the property of plaintiff in such manner as to restrain, coerce or prevent the employees of plaintiff from returning to work, or from illegally attempting to keep said employees from continuing in their employment with plaintiff.

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'4. That the Court retain jurisdiction of this cause for such rulings or orders as may be necessary.'

On July 11, two days after the court issued the permanent injunction and made the temporary restraining order permanent, the plaintiff by its attorneys filed in the cause a motion for an order to show cause why the defendants, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 890 of International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, and six individual defendants, officers and agents of the union defendants, should not be held guilty of contempt. Such motion alleged various violations by the defendants of the said temporary restraining order of June 12 committed prior to the issuance of the permanent injunction and prayed that the court issue its order directing the defendant unions and the individual defendants specifically named to show cause 'why they should not be held in contempt of said temporary restraining order of June 12, 1951'. At the same time the plaintiff filed an affidavit of Clarence C. Snell reciting numerous facts with reference to acts of the defendants in support of its motion. On the same day the court issued an order to show cause as sought by said motion, the portion of which now relevant reads as follows:

'It is, therefore, by the Court, ordered:

'1. That defendants International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 890 of International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Clinton E. Jencks, Cipriano Montoya, Ernest Velasquez, Vicente Becerra, Pablo Montoya, and Fred Berreras shall, on the 20th day of July, 1951, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock in the forenoon at Chambers of said Court in Silver City, Grant County, New Mexico, show cause, if any they have, why they should not be held in contempt for violation of said temporary restraining order.'

The defendants named in plaintiff's motion to show cause why they should not be held guilty of contempt were legally served and the contempt proceeding came on for hearing before the court on July 21. Upon the opening of the hearing defendants' attorney asked the court for a ruling declaring whether the proceeding was one in civil contempt or criminal contempt. Plaintiff's attorney requested the court to rule that it was a proceeding in civil contempt, to which defendants' attorney agreed. The court announced that it was a civil contempt proceeding. The attorney for the defendants then orally moved the court to dismiss the order to show cause. The record shows the following with reference to such motion:

'Mr. Witt: Your honor, in view of the fact that you have ruled that this is a proceeding in civil contempt we now move to dismiss the Order to Show Cause issued by Your Honor and dated July 11th. This motion is based on the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico in the case of Canavan v. Canavan, which appears in 18 N.M. 640 and 139 P. 154 . (cites law).

'The Court: I am going to overrule the motion.

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'Mr. Witt: In view of this fact that Your Honor has denied our motion to dismiss the Order to Show Cause, the defendants will not participate any further in the proceedings and will rest their legal rights on Your Honors ruling denying the motion for which we have taken an exception.'

The hearing on the contempt charges continued with the consideration of evidence offered by plaintiff, and was concluded on the same day. On July 23 the court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the contempt proceeding. It found as a fact that the defendants had violated the temporary restraining order of June 12 and made findings showing specifically the acts done in violation of such temporary restraining order prior to the date of the permanent injunction, July 9, 1951. After making specific findings of violations of the temporary restraining order the court also found as follows:

'7. That all of the aforesaid violations of said temporary restraining order have continued subsequent to the 9th day of July, 1951, the date of the Court's permanent injunction herein, and said defendants and each of them have violated the provisions of said permanent injunction by the acts hereinabove set forth.'

The court also in its conclusions of law included the following:

'4. That the defendants specifically named in plaintiff's motion for order to show cause are guilty of civil contempt for violation of the temporary restraining order herein, and the permanent injunction of July 9, 1951.'

On the same date, July 23, the court signed the decree, in which it ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants named:

'have violated the terms of the temporary restraining order of June 12, 1951; that therefore they should be and they are hereby held to be in contempt of this court for violating the terms of the temporary restraining order issued by the court on June 12, 1951.'

It should be pointed out here that this final decree or judgment ignored that part of the findings or conclusions of law heretofore mentioned and quoted, wherein the court found or concluded that the defendants violated not only the temporary restraining order but also the permanent injunction. In its final decree the court adjudged the defendants guilty of violating the temporary restraining order of June 12 only and provided punishment of the defendants therefor. The decree does not in any way adjudge the defendants guilty of any contempt for violating the permanent injunction or prescribe any punishment therefor.

There are no issues of fact involved in this appeal but only two issues of law presented by the appellants as their Points A and B. Appellants' Point A reads as follows:

'The District Court had no power to hold defendants in contempt of the temporary restraining order after the permanent injunction had been issued.'

The appellants cite and rely upon Canavan v. Canavan, 18 N.M. 640, 139 P. 154, 155, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 972, as being the leading case supporting their contention. They cite, quote from or discuss six other cases as authority supporting their proposition, all of which will be discussed.

While a single sentence might be taken out of the opinions in some of the cases cited by appellants which would seem to support their contention if all of the remaining parts of the opinions were ignored, a thorough examination of the whole opinion in each of the cases relied...