New Jerseyco v. Brockett

• Decision Date: 02 May 1887
• Docket Number: STEAM-BOAT
• Citation: 7 S.Ct. 1039,30 L.Ed. 1049,121 U.S. 637
• Parties: NEW JERSEYCO. v. BROCKETT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

121 U.S. 637

7 S.Ct. 1039

30 L.Ed. 1049

NEW JERSEY STEAM-BOAT CO. v. BROCKETT.

May 2, 1887.

This action was brought to recover damages sustained by the defendant in error, the plaintiff below, in consequence of personal injuries inflicted upon him by the employes of the plaintiff in error, a carrier of freight and passengers between the cities of Albany and New York, in the state of New York. A verdict and judgment having been rendered for the sum of $5,500 the case is brought here for review, upon the ground that the court below committed errors of law in the conduct of the trial.

The plaintiff avers that he was received by the defendant as a deck passenger upon its boat the Dean Richmond, at Albany, and that, in consideration of his having paid the price established for passengers of that class, it undertook to carry him safely to the city of New York, and thereby became bound that its servants and employes on said boat should not needlessly injure him while engaged in the discharge of their duties; that the defendant did not keep its contract, but broke the same, in that, by its servants on said boat, it needlessly and severely wounded him in his person during the voyage and whereby, also, incurable injuries were inflicted upon him. These allegations are accompanied by a statement of the circumsatnces under which the plaintiff insists the alleged wrongs were commited.

The answer denies generally that the company's agents or servants were guilty of negligence or improper conduct, and states 'that the plaintiff paid for a deck passage, and it received him on its boat as a deck passenger for passage to New York on a certain part of the boat allotted to deck passengers, as well known to the plaintiff, and subject to long-established rules and regulations of the defendant, including that mentioned in the complaint, of which the plaintiff had due and full notice; that the said rules and regulations were reasonable, and the defendant's officers and employes on the said boat were charged with the duty of enforcing them in a reasonable and proper way, without unnecessary force or violence, and the said rules and regulations, and the officers and employes of the boat in uniform, were well known to the plaintiff; that the plaintiff did not remain on the part of the boat allotted to deck passengers, and did not obey the said reasonable rules and regulations of defendant, but refused so to do, and, contrary to the peace, quiet, good order, and safety of the said boat and its passengers, made a disturbance on the said boat, and the defendant neither used nor authorized any undue or unnecessary force or violence in the enforcement of the aforesaid rule and regulation, but the contrary thereof, and the plaintiff was not injured by any of the defendant's officers, employes, or agents, as alleged in the complaint.'

[ W. P. Prentice and James Lowndes, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 639-643 intentionally omitted] E. E. Sheldon, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

We will not extend this opinion by a recital of all the facts and circumstances established by the proof. It is sufficient to say that there was evidence tending to sustain both the allegations of the complaint and the averments in the answer. In view of the serious conflict in the statements of witnesses, the case was one peculiarly for the determination of a jury, under appropriate instructions as to the law. The court, therefore, rightfully refused to direct a verdict for the company, unless, as claimed, the plaintiff, according to his complaint and the evidence, had no cause of action.

It appears from the complaint that the company had a regulation restricting deck passengr § to a particular part of the boat; but of the existence of that rule the plaintiff averred he did not, at the time, have notice. It also appears by uncontradicted evidence that upon the ticket purchased by the plaintiff were printed the words, 'Deck passengers not allowed abaft the shaft,' and that placards, in different parts of the boat, indicated the place on it which such passengers were prohibited from occupying. As the plaintiff was 'abaft the shaft' when injured, no case, it is insisted, was made that would sustain an action upon the contract of transportation; consequently it is contended the request to instruct the jury to find for the defendant should have been granted. This argument assumes that the plaintiff could not claim protection, under the contract for safe transportation, in respect to an injury done him by the company's servants while he was upon a part of the boat other than that to which he was restricted by the rule or regulation printed on his ticket. This position cannot be sustained. We shall not stop to inquire whether the regulation in question is shown to be a part of the contract for transportation; and we assume for the purposes of this case, that the plaintiff stipulated that, during the voyage, he would remain upon the part of the boat to which deck passengers were assigned; still it would not follow that his violation of that stipulation deprived him of the benefit of his contract. Such violation only gave the carrier the right to compel him to conform to its regulation, or, upon his refusing to do so, to require him to leave the boat, using in either case, only such force as the circumstances reasonably justified. If the injurfes necessarily arose from his violation of the regulation established for deck passengers, the carrier would not be responsible therefor; but if they were the misconduct or negligence of the carrier's at the time, on a part of the boat where he had no right to be, and were directly caused by the improper conduct of the carrier's servants, either while acting within the scope of their general employment, or when in the discharge of special duties imposed upon them, he is not precluded from claiming the benefit of the contract for safe transportation.

The plaintiff was entitled, in virtue of that contract, to protection against the musconduct or negligence of the carrier's servants. Their misconduct or negligence while transacting the company's business, and when acting within the general scope of their employment, is of necessity to be imputed to the corporation, which constituted them agents for the performance of its contract with the passenger. Whether the act of the servant be one of omission or commission, whether negligent or fraudulent, 'if,' as was adjudged in Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 486, 'it be done in the course of his employment, the master is liable; and it makes no difference that the master did not authorize or even know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved or forbade it, he is equally liable if the act be done in the course of his servant's employment.' See, also, Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 210. 'This rule,' the court of appeals of New York well says, 'is founded upon public policy and convenience. Every person is bound to use due care in the conduct of his business. If his business is committed to an agent or servant, the obligation is not changed.' Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike Co., 46 N. Y. 27. The principle is peculiarly applicable as between carriers and passengers; for, as held by the same court in Stewart v. Brooklyn & C. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 591, a common carrier is bound, as far as practicable, to...