New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Co. v. Bozeman
| Decision Date | 01 March 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 19870.,19870. |
| Citation | 312 F.2d 264 |
| Parties | NEW ORLEANS AND NORTHEASTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. J. U. BOZEMAN et al., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Andrew P. Carter, Walter J. Suthon, Jr., New Orleans, La., James I. Hardy, Washington, D. C., O. Winston Cameron, Meridian, Miss., Malcolm L. Monroe, New Orleans, La., R. Allan Wimbish, Washington, D. C., Floyd, Cameron & Deen, Meridian, Miss., of counsel, for appellant.
Thomas D. Bourdeaux, Meridian, Miss., James L. Highsaw, Jr., Wm. G. Mahoney, Washington, D. C., Ethridge, Minniece & Bourdeaux, Meridian, Miss., Mulholland, Robie & Hickey, Washington, D. C., of counsel, for appellees.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing En Banc March 1, 1963.
This appeal requires the construction of a section of the conditions imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission by an order by which it authorized the purchase by appellant of the Meridian Mississippi Terminal Company, the said conditions being generally known as the "Oklahoma conditions" for the protection of railroad employees who may be adversely affected by a merger or acquisition. The case comes here by an appeal from an order of the District Court dismissing the petition of the appellant seeking declaratory judgment as to the meaning of this condition, and granting the affirmative relief sought by appellees as counter-claimants demanding that appellant "perform specifically paragraph 8 of the `Oklahoma conditions,'" and proceed with the arbitration provisions of paragraph 8, the section in question.
The underlying facts are that appellant sought permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission to acquire Meridian Terminal Company. The relevant provisions of the statute dealing with such acquisitions provide that the Commission, as a condition of any approval granting such acquisition, to provide "a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interest of the railroad employees affected." 49 U.S.C.A. § 5(2) (f).
The Commission authorized the acquisition upon the finding that it would be in the public interest, and it prescribed certain conditions for the payment of monetary allowances to employees if their employment was "adversely affected" as a result of the transaction.
Section 8 of the conditions provided as follows:
"In the event that any dispute or controversy arises with respect to the protection afforded by the foregoing conditions Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 which cannot be settled by the carriers and the employee, or his authorized representatives, within 30 days after the controversy arises, it may be referred, by either party, to an arbitration committee for consideration and determination, the formation of which committee, its duties, procedure, expenses, et cetera, shall be agreed upon by the carriers and the employee, or his duly authorized representatives."
Several months after the acquisition was completed appellant dropped several employees whose duties they said had been made unnecessary by improvements in the operation of the yards, thus giving rise to the claim by the employees that they were entitled to protection under the provisions of the I.C.C. order. Their contention in this respect was rejected by the Company, which took the position that terminations in question did not result from the acquisition. Thereafter, desultory negotiations took place between representatives of the employees, the appellees here, and the railroad company. An impasse having been reached, the appellant filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission requesting clarification of the arbitration clause. The Commission refused to reopen the proceedings, stating in an order of December 31, 1959, that: "Disputes as to the application of the conditions to employees are properly for settlement in the manner set forth in the aforementioned conditions arbitration or by the courts."
Subsequently, appellees wrote again to appellant on May 26, 1960, requesting that the appellees be paid the balances under the employee conditions prescribed in the Commission's initial order. Appellant replied, declining the request. Thereupon appellees wrote on June 2nd stating:
"Unless you are willing to reconsider this matter and settle it in line with the stipulations here referred to, you are requested to set a date for conference at which time all necessary action may be taken to submit this matter to arbitration, pursuant to Section 8 of I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 14221."
To this a reply was received on June 10th stating why the Company would not settle the dispute, and stating that the writer was "not agreeable to submitting this matter to arbitration." Thereafter, while counsel for the two parties were conferring, the appellant, on July 5, 1960, filed the complaint for declaratory judgment.
The trial court overruled appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint. This Court denied permission to take an interlocutory appeal from such order; thereafter the appellees filed their answer to the complaint, in which they insisted upon their right to have arbitration of the dispute under paragraph 8. The case then proceeded to trial on the complaint, the answer, the counterclaim and the reply of appellant thereto. The District Court originally issued a letter opinion in which it stated that the provision for arbitration was not mandatory and was not exclusive. The Court also proceeded to find on the basis of the pleadings before it that "there was no direct or proximate causal connection between the sale and the abolishment of these jobs." However, before issuing a formal judgment in the matter the Court notified the parties that it was giving further consideration to the case. Thereafter, the Court while adhering to its view that on the merits it did not appear that the loss of jobs by the appellees was a result of the acquisition, it reversed its position on the arbitration issue and made the following judgment:
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