New Orleans, M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Cole

• Decision Date: 26 February 1912
• Docket Number: 15386
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW ORLEANS, MOBILE AND CHICAGO R. R. CO. v. ANN COLE

57 So. 556

101 Miss. 173

NEW ORLEANS, MOBILE AND CHICAGO R. R. CO. v. ANN COLE

No. 15386

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 26, 1912

APPEAL from the circuit court of Newton county, HON.C. L. DOBBS Judge.

Suit by Ann Cole et al. against the New Orleans, Mobile & Chicago Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals and plaintiff prosecutes a cross-appeal.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Judgment affirmed.

Flowers Alexander & Whitfield for appellant.

J. D Jones, R. N. & H. B. Miller for appellees.

No brief of counsel on either side found in the record.

OPINION

SMITH, J.

Joe Cole having been struck and killed, as it is alleged, by one of appellant's trains, this suit was instituted by his widow and daughter to recover damages therefor. Neither side being satisfied with the verdict and judgment for one thousand dollars, rendered against appellant in the court below, each filed a motion for a new trial, both of which were overruled, and the case comes to us on direct appeal by appellant and on cross-appeal by appellees.

The evidence introduced in behalf of appellees was to the effect that on the night of the accident, between 8 and 9 o'clock, Cole was seen walking down the track a short distance ahead of one of appellant's trains, and that just after it had passed him he was found lying near the track with both feet, which had been cut off, lying between the rails, as was also a sack of watermelons which he had with him at the time. The evidence introduced in behalf of appellant was to the effect that Cole was under the effect of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident; that the train was running slowly, and was carefully handled; that the bell was ringing, and that the whistle had been blown several times for a railroad crossing just a few moments before the accident occurred; that the engine was equipped with an electric headlight, then burning brightly; that the engineer and fireman were each keeping a proper lookout; and that neither of them saw Cole on the track. Other witnesses also testified that they were watching the train as it passed, and that no one was on the track at the place where the accident occurred just before or at the time the engine passed it; that the pilot of the engine was of standard form, and was elevated only four inches above the track; and that there were no bruises on Cole's body, his only injury being the amputation of his feet. From these two last facts it is argued that Cole was not struck by the pilot of the engine, and, consequently, could not have been on the track in front of the train, but fell under the wheels of the cars thereof after the engine had passed. There was also evidence for appellees in contradiction of appellant's evidence relative to the blowing of the whistle and the ringing of the bell.

Appellant complains of the action of the court below in refusing to grant it a peremptory instruction, on the theory that, although the evidence does not show how the accident in fact occurred, it does show that appellant's train was properly equipped that its servants were guilty of no negligence in handling it, and that, consequently, the accident, however it occurred, was not caused by any default on the part of appellant or its servants. In Railroad Company v. Brooks, 85 Miss. 269, 38 So. 40, this court laid down the rule governing cases of this character in plain and unmistakable language; this language being as follows: "There is yet another principle of law, well settled in this state, which required the submission of the case to the jury. It was shown beyond peradventure that the injury was inflicted by the running of the train. This was prima facie proof of negligence, authorizing a recovery by plaintiff. To overcome this statutory presumption, it devolved upon the appellant to exculpate itself by establishing to the satisfaction of the jury such circumstances of excuse as would relieve it from liability. But this statutory presumption cannot be overthrown by conjecture. The circumstances of the accident must be clearly shown, and the facts so proven must exonerate the company from blame. If the facts be not proven, and the attendant circumstances of the accident remain doubtful, the company is not relieved from liability, and the presumption controls." Since this language has several times been quoted with approval by this court (Yazoo Railroad Co. v. Landrum, 89 Miss. 399, 42 So. 675; Easley v. Railroad Co., 96 Miss. 396, 50 So. 491; Railroad Co. v. Hunnicutt, 98 Miss. 272, 53 So. 617; Fuller v. Railroad Co., 100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 783), it would seem that argument relative thereto should now be closed; but, out of deference to counsel, we have again taken the matter up for consideration.

Negligence, as defined by Judge Cooley, is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." 29 Cyc. p. 415. Under section 1985 of the Code, when proof is made of injury inflicted by the running of locomotive or cars of a railroad company, the presumption arises that such company had failed to observe for the protection of the interest of the...