New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County

• Decision Date: 21 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-10043-Civ.,87-10043-Civ.
• Parties: NEW PORT LARGO, INC., etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONROE COUNTY, etc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

706 F. Supp. 1507

NEW PORT LARGO, INC., etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONROE COUNTY, etc., et al., Defendants.

No. 87-10043-Civ.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

November 21, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ferraro, Seward & Stanton, P.A., Miami, Fla. by Michael R. Seward, Coan, Couture, Lyons & Moorehead, Washington, D.C. by Andrew P. Murphy, Joseph B. Allen, III, Key West, Fla. by Joseph B. Allen, III, Maurice Jay Kutner, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Morgan & Hendrick, P.A., Key West, Fla. by James T. Hendrick, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey by Franklin G. Burt, Floyd Pearson Richman Greer Weil, Zack & Brumbaugh, P.A., Miami, Fla. by Robert L. Floyd, Alan G. Greer, Robert J. Fiore, for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO DISMISS

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, Chief Judge.

After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed several original defendants, the remaining defendants Monroe County, the County Commissioners (Donald Schloesser, Alison Fahrer, Curt Blair, George Dolezal), the members of the Monroe County Planning and Zoning Board (Nat Funke, William Keefer, Robert Curry and David Richards, Jr.) (hereinafter referred to as "Planners") and Joseph Sharit moved to dismiss.¹ Collectively, these defendants raise many of the same arguments for dismissal, as well as a few that depend solely upon their individual status. The court has carefully considered the oral argument of counsel and the record in this case.

The complaint alleges a lengthy and intriguing rezoning procedure of the property here involved. The plaintiffs' factual scenario begins in October of 1967 when an individual named Sheley (acting as Trustee for prospective purchasers) applied to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund (TIIF) to purchase submerged lands that eventually became the property in question. In August of 1968, the TIIF sold the subject property to Sheley. The plaintiffs contend that Sheley orally agreed to permit Monroe County to use the subject property as an airstrip.

In 1970 Sheley's trusteeship expired and an individual by the name of Bassett became the Trustee. Sheley, however, continued to manage the property under the power of attorney executed by Bassett.

The plaintiffs contend that the first zoning of this property occurred in December, 1972, when the county platted the subject property into residential lots zoned for RU-2 duplexes.

The actual named plaintiffs begin to appear in 1979. An individual named Lance and the plaintiff Netter formed New Port Largo, Inc. for the purpose of purchasing the subject property for development into residential duplexes. Lance subsequently sold his interests to the plaintiff Marr. In September, 1979, New Port Largo purchased the property from Bassett.

The plaintiffs allege that at this point in time a massive conspiracy commenced involving homeowners in the adjacent community of Port Largo. The purpose of the alleged conspiracy, as set forth in the complaint, was to acquire plaintiffs' land without compensation and convert it to the benefit of the adjacent homeowners and the county.

At this time, the plaintiffs contend, the county decided to rezone the property to achieve its wrongful goals. They state that on November 27, 1979, the county filed an application to rezone the subject property from residential RU-2 to PA, public airport use. The county's rezoning application was approved by the County Planning and Zoning Department in January, 1980. In September, 1980, the county commissioners upheld that decision and a series of lawsuits ensued. In October, 1980, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari in state Circuit Court alleging that the rezoning was in violation of Florida law. This case was entitled New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, et al., Case No. 80-1164-17. In April, 1982, Monroe County filed a constructive trust suit in state Circuit Court, claiming that as a result of an alleged oral agreement between the County and Sheley, the equitable ownership of the subject property vested in the county. This case was entitled Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc., Case No. 82-432-17. The county filed a second case in state Circuit Court in December, 1982. This suit for unjust enrichment alleged that New Port Largo purchased the property even though it knew the County and not the seller Sheley owned the subject property. This action was entitled Monroe County v. New Port Largo, et. al., Case No. 82-1606-17.

In April, 1983, State Circuit Judge Knuck granted summary judgment against the county's constructive trust suit. Circuit Judge Lester dismissed the county's unjust enrichment suit with leave to amend the complaint. In May of 1983, the county filed an amended unjust enrichment suit, but in September of that year, stipulated in open court to dismiss the suit. In November of 1983, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment entered against the county. 441 So.2d 173. In March of 1984, Judge Knuck conducted a non-jury trial on the merits and found for the defendant New Port Largo. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed final judgment on the merits in April, 1985. 467 So.2d 757. Subsequently, in January of 1986, Judge Lester granted New Port Largo a final summary judgment on its petition for certiorari.

On July 7, 1987, the plaintiffs filed this complaint in the United States District Court. The plaintiffs seek a variety of relief in eleven counts. The first three counts are for violations of the Federal Civil Rights Acts, with Count I alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count II alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and Count III alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. The remaining counts are pendant state law claims, with Count IV alleging an unjust taking, Count V asserting an abuse of process claim, Count VI a malicious prosecution claim, Count VII a disparagement of title claim, Count VIII a tortious interference claim, Count IX an intentional infliction of emotional stress claim, Count X a negligent infliction of emotional stress claim, and Count XI a broad-based conspiracy claim.

On March 11, 1988, the court approved a stipulation wherein the parties agreed that certain of these claims would be dismissed. Pursuant to this order, Counts I through VIII, and paragraphs 193(a) through (f) of Count XI were dismissed as they related to the individual plaintiff shareholders.² Counts V-XI were dismissed as they related to Monroe County. The plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages was dismissed only as it related to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

The defendants have now moved to dismiss the remaining counts of the complaint asserting several arguments. These defendants make three arguments for dismissal of the federal claims: the claims are barred under res judicata; the statute of limitations completely bars this action, and the plaintiffs have failed to state a § 1985 claim. The Commissioners and Planners also seek dismissal of the federal claims based upon alleged absolute immunities. All these defendants also assert several arguments for the dismissal of the pendant claims based on Florida law. Because the resolution of the federal issues here render as moot many of the arguments based on Florida law, the court will first address the res judicata, statute of limitations, and § 1985 arguments, then decide the absolute immunity questions, and end its analysis with a discussion of the remaining, relevant Florida law arguments.

I. THE RES JUDICATA, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND § 1985 REASONS FOR DISMISSAL.

Upon consideration of the record, the motions to dismiss and oral argument of counsel, the court denies the motions to dismiss based on the res judicata and statute of limitations grounds. The motions to dismiss the § 1986 claim (Count III) as time-barred, and the § 1985 claim for failing to state a cause of action, are granted.

a. The res judicata argument.

The defendants³ argue that two state court judgments bar the plaintiffs from asserting these federal claims. First, they submit that these plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their counterclaim in the constructive trust suit, and that they, therefore, are barred from now raising any claims arising out of facts similar to those supporting the counterclaim. The defendants also make an alternative argument. They contend that the final judgment in the constructive trust suit bars all claims based on the same or similar facts even if the dismissal of the counterclaim has no preclusive effect. This argument is premised upon the compulsory counterclaim rule. These arguments, however, do not square with the principles of res judicata, and, therefore, the court rejects them.

The court beings its analysis by addressing the question of whether a final state court judgment can preclude subsequent federal constitutional claims. The Eleventh Circuit has answered the issue. An action under § 1983 in federal court is precluded if the issues involved in the action could have been raised in a prior state court proceeding. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 808 F.2d 1435, 1444 (11th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Migra v. Warren City School District Bd. of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 80-85, 104 S.Ct. 892, 895-98, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984)); see also Webber v. Mills, 595 F.Supp. 514, 515-516 (S.D.Fla.1984). To determine the preclusive effect of such a state court proceeding, a federal court must apply the law of the state that rendered the judgment. See McDonald v. Hillsborough County School Board, 821 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir.1987). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires the federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as the state court would give. See also Magra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 77, n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). Accordingly, the Florida law of res judicata applies.

Under Florida law, a final judgment is absolute. The...