New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 September 1947
• Docket Number: Record No. 3224.
• Citation: 186 Va. 726
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: ETHEL NEW v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION AND W. N. SMITH.

Page 726

186 Va. 726

ETHEL NEW v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION AND W. N. SMITH.

Record No. 3224.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 3, 1947.

Present, Hudgins, Gregory, Eggleston, Spratley and Buchanan, JJ.

1. MOTOR VEHICLE CARRIERS — Segregation of Races — Evidence Showing Plaintiff Was Informed of Company's Rule — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for personal injuries allegedly received when plaintiff was forcibly evicted from a bus upon her refusal to occupy a seat assigned to her by the bus driver, plaintiff, a colored woman, objected to the giving of two instructions, on the ground that defendant bus company had shown no rule or regulation requiring the segregation of passengers on account of race, nor informed plaintiff of such rule. Evidence for defendant showed that the driver explained to plaintiff that there was a rule under which colored passengers were required to sit behind the white passengers, and asked her to move back of the white passengers; that she moved to the seat next to the last one in the bus; that later the bus driver asked her to move to the last seat in order that two white passengers standing in the aisle might sit in the seat occupied by her and explained the rule of the company requiring the seating of colored passengers behind white passengers, adding that there was a statute in Virginia to the same effect, and that upon her refusal to move, a police officer was called and explained to plaintiff both the law and the rule of the company.

Held: That the evidence showed that there was no merit in plaintiff's objection.

2. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — When Invalid Portion May Be Eliminated. — An act may be valid in one part and invalid in another, and if the invalid is severable from the remainder, that invalid part may be ignored, if after such elimination the remaining portions are sufficient to accomplish their purpose in accordance with the legislative intent; only if the void portion is the inducement to the passage of the act, or is so interwoven in its texture as to prevent the statute from becoming operative in accordance with the will of the Legislature, is the whole statute invalid.

3. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — Where Statutory Provision Is Single Idea. — Even though the provision is a single idea, a statute partially void because of inapplicability to a portion of the subject matter covered will be treated as operative and enforceable as to the one portion and inoperative as to the other if the subject matter is of such a nature that it may be divided.

4. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — Part Invalid in Relation to Certain Cases. — Where a statute has been passed by the Legislature and, in relation to certain cases which it affects, some part of it is not within the competency of the legislative power or is repugnant to some provision of the Constitution, such part may be adjudged void and of no avail, while all other parts of the act obnoxious to the same objection may be upheld as valid and have the force of law.

5. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — Severability in Sense of Application. — Where a statute has no separate provisions and there is no language to be deleted therefrom, the court must consider it in terms of the severability of its subject matter, that is, its severability in the sense of application or legal operation. In such a consideration, the same principles apply with respect to legislative intent as in cases involving separate provisions. In either case, the tests to by used are connected with and based upon what the Legislature intended, and if, generally, it would be presumed that the Legislature would have enacted the valid portion without the invalid.

6. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — Wisdom or Expediency of Legislation. — In conducting the tests as to the severability of the subject matter of a statute, questions as to the wisdom or expediency of the legislation play no part in the court's consideration. The court must find the intent of the Legislature in the words employed, the considerations underlying the enactment of the statute, and give effect to the purpose of the framers of the law. It is wholly a question of legislative power and not of legislative discretion.

7. CARRIERS — Segregation of Races — Power of State. — A state has power to segregate white and colored passengers in intrastate transportation, provided equal accommodations are provided.

8. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — Partial Invalidity of Single Provision as Applied to One Set of Facts. — A statute may be constitutional as applied to one set of facts and unconstitutional as applied to another, and this is so not only when the unconstitutional operation of the statute is the result of a distinct and grammatically separable provision, but also when it is the result of general prohibitory language contained in a single clause, provided the intent of the Legislature will not be violated by allowing the statute to operate in a limited field.

9. MOTOR VEHICLE CARRIERS — Segregation of Races — Severability of Statute — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for personal injuries allegedly received when plaintiff was forcibly evicted from a bus upon her refusal to occupy a seat assigned to her by the driver, plaintiff, a colored woman, contended that there was no valid statute requiring the separation of white and colored passengers on busses in Virginia. The Supreme Court of the United States had held that the statute which provides for the separation of white and colored passengers in motor busses, sections 4097z, 4097aa, 4097bb, 4097cc and 4097dd of the Code of 1942 (Michie), as applied to interstate passengers, constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce. Plaintiff, who was an intrastate passenger, contended that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States rendered the statute invalid in its entirety, that the general language of the act made its provisions so dependent upon each other as to show that the Legislature intended it to take effect in its entirety, and that its objectionable part was not severable from the rest in such a way that the Legislature could be presumed to have enacted the valid portion without the invalid.

Held: That the several segregation statutes and the consideration underlying their enactment and the settled public policy of the State to separate white and colored passengers, led to the inescapable conclusion that it was the intent and purpose of the Legislature to frame the law so as to make it cover intrastate transportation regardless of its effect upon interstate operation.

10. STATUTES — Validity — Possible Difficulties in Enforcement. — Possible difficulties in the enforcement of a statute do not establish its invalidity.

11. STATUTES — Validity — Partial Invalidity — Severability as to Intrastate Commerce. — There is nothing to prevent a statute from being severable, although its language is broad enough to include both interstate and intrastate transactions, so long as it can be applied to intrastate commerce without burdening interstate commerce.

12. MOTOR VEHICLE CARRIERS — Segregation of Races — Severability of Statute as to Subject Matter — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for personal injuries allegedly received when plaintiff was forcibly evicted from a bus upon her refusal to occupy a seat assigned to her by the driver, plaintiff, a colored woman, contended that there was no valid statute requiring the separation of white and colored passengers on busses in Virginia. The Supreme Court of the United States had held that the statute which provides for the separation of white and colored passengers in motor busses, sections 4097z, 4097aa, 4097bb, 4097cc and 4097dd of the Code of 1942 (Michie), as applied to interstate passengers, constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce. Plaintiff, who was an intrastate passenger, contended that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States rendered the statute invalid in its entirety, that the general language of the act made its provisions so dependent upon each other as to show that the Legislature intended it to take effect in its entirety, and that its objectionable part was not severable from the rest in such a way that the Legislature could be presumed to have enacted the valid portion without the invalid.

Held: That the statute was severable as to its subject matter, that is, the segregation of white and colored passengers in transportation on passenger motor vehicles, and legal effect and application could be given to so much of the act as affects intrastate traffic alone, and the intention of the Legislature satisfied to that extent.

13. CARRIERS — Segregation of Races — Equality of Accommodations. — Segregation statutes must be enforced equally and without discrimination in the quality and convenience of accommodations provided for white and colored passengers.

14. MOTOR VEHICLE CARRIERS — Segregation of Races — Equality of Accommodations in Bus — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for personal injuries allegedly received when plaintiff was forcibly evicted from a bus upon her refusal to occupy a seat assigned to her by the driver, plaintiff, a colored woman, contended that equal accommodations were not offered to her when she was directed by the bus driver to change her seat and that the requested exchange was an unjust discrimination against her solely on account of her race and color. It was shown that the seat in the rear of the bus to which plaintiff was asked to remove, while lacking an adjustable back, had the same kind of springs, padding and covering as the seat she occupied. It had ventilation overhead rather than immediately at its side and, as to location in the bus, one seat was directly behind the other. The court instructed the jury that if the...