New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Singleton

• Citation: 190 N.E. 761,207 Ind. 449
• Decision Date: 14 June 1934
• Docket Number: 26010
• Parties: NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO. v. SINGLETON et al
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

190 N.E. 761

207 Ind. 449

NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO. v. SINGLETON et al

No. 26010

Supreme Court of Indiana

June 14, 1934

[Rehearing denied January 9, 1935.]

1. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION---Orders of Commission---Review by Courts---Trial De Novo.---Court proceeding for the review of an order of the Public Service Commission is tried de novo as distinguished from an appeal, but not in the sense that the court hears and determines on its merits the cause that was heard by the Commission, the order of the Commission being an administrative function rather than judicial, and the function of the court being to determine whether the order is reasonable and within the Commission's power to make. p 454.

John B. Cockrum and Joseph T. Markey, both of Indianapolis, and Parr & Parr and Elza Rogers, all of Lebanon, for appellant.

Cloe Campbell, Cloe & Cloe, of Noblesville, James M. Ogden, Atty Gen., Connor Ross, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Meade Vestal and Thomas E. Kane, both of Noblesville, for appellees.

OPINION

TREANOR, Judge.

Appellant commenced this action by filing its complaint in the superior court of Marion county to set aside and declare null and void and to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Public Service Commission directing appellant to reconstruct and widen its subway underneath its tracks near the city of Noblesville and to submit plans and specifications to the commission for approval or modification. ^[1]

The order of the Public Service Commission was made after the commission had held a hearing at which evidence was introduced on behalf of appellant and on behalf of citizens and taxpayers of Hamilton county who had petitioned the Commission to 'eliminate the obstruction to said subway crossing.'

The cause was venued to the Boone circuit court, where trial was held. The only evidence offered, or considered by the trial court, consisted of the transcript of the proceedings before, and evidence heard by, the Public Service Commission. Judgment was rendered for the appellees, and that the appellant should take nothing by its complaint. This appeal presents the following alleged errors:

(1) The trial court erred in refusing to try the case de novo, in that it compelled the appellant to present its evidence first to the court.

(2) The decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.

Appellant contends that the determination of the issue raised by its complaint and appellees' general denial required a trial de novo by the Boone circuit court of the case which was before the commission. In support of its contention, it relies upon the case of Public Service Commission v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (1918) 188 Ind. 197, 121 N.E. 116, 117. In that case the Public Service Commission, after a hearing, entered an order classifying a certain railway company as a common carrier and directed it and the appellee company to establish joint rates. The latter succeeded in an action to have the order set aside, and on appeal the commission urged that the decision was contrary to law and not sustained by sufficient evidence. The following excerpt is from the opinion in that case:

'In support of the reasons thus assigned it is asserted by appellant that the findings of fact made by the Public Service Commission, upon which an order is based, are conclusive on the court if there is substantial evidence to sustain such findings. It seeks to invoke the same rule in favor of findings of the commission which obtains in courts of appeal and error in favor of the findings of trial courts. This contention cannot be sustained as it is out of harmony with the entire spirit of the act under which such proceedings are conducted. By section 6 of the Railroad Commission Act ([Acts 1913, p. 820] section 5536, Burns' 1914), it is provided that any carrier or other party, dissatisfied with any final order made by the commission, may, after its ruling on petition for rehearing and within 20 days from the date of such ruling, begin an action against the commission in any court of competent jurisdiction in any county of this state into or through which any carrier operates to suspend or set aside any such order. It is evident that the court in which an action is brought does not sit as a court of review to correct errors of the commission; but, on the contrary, it is clear that the court in such action shall hear the case de novo and determine it from the evidence adduced at the trial. The same section of the act provides that, in all actions in the courts of this state authorized by this act, the rules of evidence shall be the same as in the trial of civil cases as now provided by law, excepting as otherwise provided in this act. Under similar statutes, it has been decided that the court in an action brought to set aside an order of the commission was not bound by the findings of the commission, but that it was the duty of the court to determine the case from a consideration of the evidence adduced. * * *

'It has been frequently decided that the functions vested by the Legislature in commissions, such as our Public Service Commission, are not judicial in their nature, but that they are administrative in character. * * * This being true, it follows that the proceedings before such body are not judicial proceedings, and that their orders are not judgments, but are administrative orders. Under the statute a party aggrieved by an order of the commission may file an action in court to have the order annulled and set aside. This affords him his first opportunity to have the facts on which the order rests judicially determined. In reaching a judicial determination as to the reasonableness or justness of an order the court could not be bound and controlled by the findings of an administrative body as to the facts on which such order was based. * * *

'The fact that there may have been some evidence before the commission to sustain every material fact upon which the order was based could not prevent the court from making such findings as seemed right and just to it after considering and weighing the evidence adduced at the trial; and a decision by the court on a question of fact contrary to that arrived at by the commission would not be contrary to law, even though there may have been substantial evidence to support the finding of the commission.'

It is clear from the foregoing that a proceeding in a trial court to review an order of the Public Service Commission is an action de novo, as distinguished from an appeal; but it does not follow that such proceeding is de novo in the sense that the trial court hears and determines on its merits the case which was heard and determined by the Public Service Commission. The language quoted above from Public Service Commission v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., is clarified by later statements of this court respecting the effect to be given to administrative determinations of the Public Service Commission. We quote with approval the following declarations of this court in Re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. (1930) 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65, 67:

'The courts, in reviewing the work of the commission, must keep in mind that they only have to do with questions calling for judicial interpretation as distinguished from matters administrative. So long as the commission keeps within the field of regulative powers over the persons or entities over which it has jurisdiction, its orders and action with reference to such matters must be respected by the court. The presumption of good faith and valid orders by the commission must obtain until the contrary is made clearly to appear. * * *

'The theory of the law creating the commission is that it shall be conscientiously and impartially administered by a body composed of a personnel especially qualified by knowledge, training, and experience pertaining to the subject-matter committed to it for award consonant with reasonable fairness and substantial justice according to legislative mandate, and the circumstances shown relative to its effect in the future on the utility's ability to serve the interest and convenience of the public; the cost and expense to the parties interested being an element for consideration. * * *

'So that, whether an appeal was taken by the utilities (petitioners) or by others authorized so to do, the case was triable de novo and summarily in the court to which the appeal was taken. Acts 1927, supra. The circuit or superior court, on appeal, in the chancery sense, is substituted for the commission in the examination of evidence certified to it and in the hearing of additional evidence and the finding of facts. The ultimate question for determination is whether the order of the commission is reasonable or within its power to make. * * *

'Regulation and legislative are not synonymous terms. As applied to the statute in question, regulation means a reasonable supervision by a legislative authorized agency over the owner of property devoted to a public use, or in case the police power of the state may be invoked.'

The effect to be given an order made by the Railroad Commission prior to the creation of the Public Service Commission, was considered by this court in the case of Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1908) 171 Ind. 189, 86 N.E. 328, 334, which was an appeal from a judgment adverse to appellant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the commission: 'While it is evident from the framework of the act that it was not the legislative purpose to make the order of the commission conclusive in any given case, where seasonably attacked, yet it is to be remembered that the commission is the chosen agent of the General Assembly for the carrying out of its will, and that as the...