New York, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Meek
| Decision Date | 01 May 1936 |
| Docket Number | 26414. |
| Citation | 1 N.E.2d 611,210 Ind. 322 |
| Parties | NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO. v. MEEK. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Proceeding by the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company against Lena C. Meek, individually and as administratrix of the estate of James C. Meek, deceased. From an adverse judgment and an order refusing a new trial plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Clinton Circuit Court; Paul E. Laymon Judge.
Harker & Irwin, of Frankfort, and W. J. Stevenson, of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant.
Noel, Hickam, Boyd & Armstrong, of Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment rendered upon a finding that the defendant was guilty of civil contempt for having violated an injunction decree and judgment theretofore rendered against her and that by such violation plaintiff had suffered nominal damages of $1, in which amount defendant was fined for the benefit of plaintiff.
The only error properly assigned is that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for new trial. The statutory grounds for new trial urged in such motion and relied upon under ‘ Propositions and Authorities' of appellant's brief are as follows:
(1) The decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
(2) The decision of the court is contrary to law.
(3) The court erred in the assessment of the amount of recovery, said assessment being too small.
Appellee says that the Supreme Court has no jurisdicton of this appeal and that it should be transferred to the Appellate Court, contending that a civil contempt proceeding does not belong to the class of cases designated by statute as ‘ prosecutions for contempt of the lower courts,’ a class of appealable cases which ‘ shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court.’ [1]It is appellee's contention that since this was a civil proceeding maintained by the injunction plaintiff, and not prosecuted by the state, it is not a prosecution ‘ for contempt’ within the meaning of section 4-214, cl. 9, Burns' Ind.St.Ann.1933, section 1356, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934.
The Constitution of Indiana provides that ‘ the judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts and such other courts as the General Assembly may establish'[2] and that ‘ the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, co-extensive with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error, under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law.'[3]The General Assembly has provided that all appeals in fourteen classes of ‘ appealable cases * * * shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court’ ; the second and ninth classes consisting of ‘ all criminal prosecutions' and ‘ prosecutions for contempt of the lower courts,’ respectively, and that ‘ all appealable cases other than those herein mentioned shall be taken to the Appellate Court.'[4]This Court has assumed jurisdiction of appeals from judgments rendered in civil as well as criminal contempt proceedings.[5] By both legislative and judicial usage the term ‘ prosecution’ is applicable to either criminal or civil actions; and usage also justifies, though less accurately, the use of ‘ contempt of court’ to designate the violation of a court order which has been made for the benefit of a litigant in a civil action when the violation results in legal injury to the litigant. We hold that the class of cases designated by ‘ prosecutions for contempt of the lower courts' includes actions to enforce claims for civil damages resulting from disobedience of orders of lower courts.
On April 28, 1930, appellant secured the injunction decree, the violation of which afforded the basis of this prosecution for contempt. By the terms of the decree appellee was ‘ permanently enjoined from in any manner assisting, aiding, participating or engaging, directly or indirectly, in the prosecution, conduct, or trial of a case heretofore filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, wherein Lena C. Meek, administratrix of the estate of James C. Meek, deceased, is plaintiff, and the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company is defendant, and in any action or suit in any court in the State of Missouri, brought by or for the benefit of said Lena C. Meek, individually, or as such administratrix, against said The New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company for damages by reason of the death of James C. Meek, deceased, or in any other action of any kind whatever to recover damages by reason of the death of said decedent.’ Appellee does not dispute that she did aid and participate in the trial of the cause in the Missouri court in violation of the injunction of the Clinton circuit court. In the instant proceedings the Clinton circuit court found for the appellant that the defendant (appellee here) had violated ‘ the injunction decree heretofore entered in this cause’ and that the plaintiff (appellant here) had suffered ‘ nominal damages by reason thereof, in the sum of $1.00 and that she pay and satisfy the costs herein taxed’ and that ‘ said fine inure to the plaintiff herein.’
The substance of appellant's contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to ‘ require appellee to pay a substantial fine or to give bond to protect apppellant from damage by being required to pay the St. Louis judgment.’
The appeal turns upon the measure of damages; and to decide this we must determine what right of appellant was...
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