New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Aldridge

Decision Date04 October 1892
Citation32 N.E. 50,135 N.Y. 83
PartiesNEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO. v. ALDRIDGE, (four cases.)
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Four cases in ejectment brought by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company against Thomas Aldridge. From a judgment of the general term, (16 N. Y. Supp. 674,) affirming a judgment entered for defendant at special term, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wilkinson & Cossum, (Robert. F. Wilkinson, of counsel,) for appellant.

H. H. Hustis, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

The plaintiff has brought these actions to recover the possession of certain lands in the town of Fishkill and county of Dutchess of which it ciaims to be the owner, and it alleges the defendant wrongfully withholds the same from it. The cases were tried at Poughkeepsie before one of the justices of the supreme court without a jury, and the court found that the plaintiff was not the owner of the lands, but that the defendant was, and thereupon judgments were entered in favor of defendant as owner and against the plaintiff for costs. These judgments were upon appeal affirmed by the general term of the second department, and from that affirmance the plaintiff has appealed to this court. The land was, prior to the year 1846, under the waters of the Hudson river, and on the east side thereof. The title to one portion of the adjacent upland was at that time in the executors of the will of John Van Vliet, deceased, and the title to the other portion was in one Isaac Brinkerhoff. The Hudson River Railroad Company was incorporated by virtue of chapter 216, Laws 1846, for the purpose of constructing a railroad along the east side of the Hudson river from New York to Albany. Pursuant to the provisions of law the New York Central Railroad Company and the Hudson River Railroad Company were duly consolidated in 1869, under the name as given in the title of this action, and such corporation has succeeded to all the rights, powers, and privileges which the Hudson River Railroad Company was possessed of. Pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of the act of 1846, above cited, examinations, surveys, and maps were made in order to provide for the most advantageous line for the location of the road, and, after such examinations and surveys were made, the directors of the company duly designated the line for the road as it passed along through the town of Fishkill, in the county of Dutchess, and the proper certificate thereof was duly filed in the office of the clerk of Dutchess county, as provided for by law. The statute provided, further, that this course so selected and certified should be the line on which the corporation should construct its road. The land in question after the course of the road had been duly selected and adopted, lay outside and west of the west line of such course, and under the waters of the Hudson river. The railroad company obtained the strip of land along and upon which it finally built its road by a conveyance from the executors of John Van Vliet, deceased, and from Isaac Brinkerhoff and wife, the executors owning the north and Brinkerhoff and wife the south portion of such strip. By chapter 30, Laws 1848, the legislature amended the act of 1846, and by section 5 of such amendment it gave power to the directors to adopt a new and altered location for the road if at any time they thought it best to adopt one in place and as a substitute for the old location, and a map of the course as altered was to be filed in accordance with the provisions of that section. The railroad company built and operated its road on the land conveyed to it by the executors of Van Vliet and by Brinkerhoff and wife, and so continued for about 20 years without alteration or amendment of its line. After the expiration of that time, and on the 30th of September, 1868, the company assumed under the amendment of 1848 to modify its location and alter its line, and filed a map thereof as provided by law. The modification and alteration consisted simply in carrying or pushing its original westerly exterior line some distance further to the west. Subsequently, and on the 10th of November, 1868, an additional alteration and modification of its westerly line was made by the company, and a map thereof filed, by which that line was carried still further to the west. These so-called ‘modifications' and ‘alterations' of the westerly line of the location, course, or route of the railroad would include the land in question, and the plaintiff claims title thereto under the provisions of the charter and its amendments, and also by virtue of a conveyance from the commissioners of the land office. Prior to this time the title to the lands was in the state.

We think the plaintiff acquired no title to the lands in question by reason of these alleged alterations. By the original act of 1846 the railroad company was to adopt a certain line, course, or way for the railroad, and such as the directors should declare most advantageous, and this course, so selected, the statute said should be the line on which the road should be built. The state, however, did not in any of the statutes relating to the railroad convey any land to the company which belonged to the state, either above or under water. The act of 1846 gave no such title. Neither did section 1 or 5 of the amendment of 1848. The most that could be urged was perhaps a mere implied license to the company to build along the course selected, even though lands of the state were included therein. This gave no title to the land embraced in such course. The land was to be acquired subsequently. As to lands belonging to individuals, the company secured no title by selecting and adopting a course and filing a map. It still had to purchase such lands, or else obtain them by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. There is no provision in the law which makes a different result where the lands belong to the state. Under the general railroad act of 1850, the commissioners of the land office are empowered, by section 25, to grant to any railroad company formed under that act any land belonging to the people of the state which may be required for the purpose of the road, upon such terms as may be agreed on by them. And by section 49 of the same act all railroad companies within the state are granted all the powers and privileges contained in the act, so that plaintiff had the right thereunder to apply for a grant of land under water, belonging to the state, if the same was required for the purposes of its road, and upon terms to be agreed on between the company and the commissioners of the land office. The fifteenth section of the act of 1846, incorporating the railroad company, contemplates the building of a bridge over the Spuyten Duyvel creek by the company, and also bridges over other creeks and navigable streams and inlets, and the act also assumes that the company will cross the bays along the river. But there is no grant by the state of any land under the water of these bays or inlets, and no title is conveyed by any statute that I have seen. The state has permitted the buildingof the road across these waters, and probably, through its commissioners of the land office, it has granted in most instances the title to such lands under water as were used by the company. There is nothing, however, in the statutes themselves which operates as a transfer of the title. When the alterations made under the act of 1848 called for lands belonging to the state, the title thereto was not conveyed by the making of such alterations, or by the filing of a map thereof. In addition to this view it would seem that the act of 1848 applies only to what is in reality an alteration of, and not to that which is a mere addition to, the original location or course. The part added is not a new course, and is in no sense a substitute for the old one, as the statute unquestionably contemplates it should be. There are thus two difficulties with the plaintiff's contention as to the effect of the alleged alteration. The statute, in the first place, does not contemplate a mere addition, where there is to be no alteration and substitution. In the next place, if the alteration claimed was within the purview of the statute, the company would thereby be clothed with a power to so locate its route, and the necessity would still remain of acquiring the land contained in the proposed alteration, either by purchase or condemnation if from private individuals, or by grant if from the state. It is too clear for more extended argument that the company acquired no title to the lands in question by reason of any assumed modification or alteration of its original course, and the filing of a map indicating such alteration.

The plaintiff, however, does not rely alone upon these alterations. On the 26th of December, 1873, the commissioners of the land office, pursuant, as is stated, to section 25 of the general railroad act already referred to, granted to the plaintiff all the land under water embraced within the boundaries of its amended locations of 1868. The plaintiff now claims that by virtue of the locations made by the railroad company in 1868, and of the grant from the commissioners of the land office in 1873, it has acquired title by legislative grant to the land in question, and that such title is paramount to that of the defendant. The decision of this question requires a statement of some additional facts. The conveyances from the executors of Van Vliet and from Brinkerhoff and wife to the railroad company embrace a strip of land wide enough for its tracks to be laid on, and the eastern boundary of this strip was above high-water mark, and ran along the front of the farm as it had been bounded by the river, thus taking in the front of the farm so bounded, and thereby, as is claimed, wholly divesting the grantors of their character of riparian or adjacent owners. It is...

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