New York Cent. R. Co. v. Lefkowitz

Decision Date08 April 1965
Citation259 N.Y.S.2d 76,46 Misc.2d 68
Parties, 59 P.U.R.3d 228 The NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the Long Island Railroad Company, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the New York, New Haven and Harford Railroad Company, Debtor, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Boston and Maine Railroad, the Delaware and Hudson Railroad Corporation, and the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, Plaintiffs, v. Louis J. LEFKOWITZ, as Attorney General of the State of New York, the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, and Leonard Rubenfeld, as District Attorney of Westchester County, Defendants, and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, Defendants-Intervenors.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Royall, Koegel & Rogers, New York City, Gerald E. Dwyer, New York City, for plaintiffs (William F. Rogers, Caesar L. Pitassy, Robert M. Lane and David F. Dobbins, of counsel).

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, pro se (Joseph A. Romano, Albany, of counsel).

Gordon Miller, County Atty., of Westchester County, White Plains, (Irving L. Libenson, Mount Vernon, of counsel), for defendant Leonard Rubenfeld, Dist. Atty., of Westchester county.

Kent H. Brown, Albany, for defendant Public Service Commission.

Breed Abbott & Morgan, New York City, (John R. Brook, Thomas A. Shaw, Jr., and Stephen Estroff, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-intervenors.

GERALD NOLAN, Justice.

The plaintiffs, ten Class 1 railroads, all engaged in the business of transporting freight, or freight and passengers, in interstate commerce, in the State of New York, have brought this action for a judgment declaring Sections 54-a, 54-b, and 54-c of the Railroad Law of the State of New York, commonly known as the 'Railroad Full Crew Laws', unconstitutional, and enjoining the defendants from enforcing them. The defendants are public officers, charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, and the Intervenors-Defendants are labor organizations which represent operating employees of the Railroads.

Section 54-a (Laws 1913, c. 146, as amended Laws 1921, c. 290) provides as follows:

'No person, corporation, trustee, receiver, or other court officer, shall run or operate, or cause to be run or operated, outside of the yard limits, on any railroad of more than fifty miles in length within state, a freight train of more than twenty-five cars, unless said train shall be manned with a crew of not less than one engineer, one fireman, one conductor and three brakemen; nor any train other than a freight train of five cars or more, without a crew of not less than one engineer, one fireman, one conductor and two brakemen, and if the train is a baggage train or a passenger train actually carrying baggage, without a baggageman in addition to said crew; nor any freight train of twenty-five cars or less without a crew of not less than one engineer, one fireman, one conductor and two brakemen; nor any light engine without a car or cars, without a crew of not less than one engineer, one fireman and one conductor or brakeman. * * *'

Section 54-b (Laws 1936, ch. 777) provides that:

'No person, corporation, trustee, receiver or other court officer shall run or operate, or cause to be run or operated, on any railroad within this state any fuel-electric engine, unless said engine shall be manned with a crew of not less than one engineer and one fireman or helper. * * *'

and it is provided by Section 54-c (Laws 1937, ch. 903) that:

'No person, corporation, trustee, receiver, or other court officer, shall run or operate, or cause to be run or operated, on any railroad of more than fifty miles in length within this state any locomotive, engine, motor or self-propelled unit operated by any form of energy, except a multiple-unit car or cars, while engaged in switching car or cars, or transferring, as a switching movement, a car or cars from one railroad to another or from one railroad yard to another railroad yard, without a crew consisting of not less than one engineer, one fireman or helper, one conductor or foreman and two trainmen or two helpers. * * *'

Violations of these statutes are misdemeanors.

Plaintiffs assert that the full crew laws have no reasonable relationship to the safety of the operation of their railroads or to the safety of the public or plaintiffs' employees, and that their effect is to compel them to employ unnecessary firemen, brakemen, trainmen and baggagemen without regard to operating conditions, safety or efficiency, at a total cost of over $12,000,000.00 annually. The imposition of this burden, they claim, constitutes, in the absence of reasonable justification therefor, a confiscation of their property without due process of law, in violation of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of New York, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs further allege that by the enactment of these statutes the Legislature singled out the railroad industry and imposed on it alone, the requirements of the laws with respect to the minimum number of employees which must be assigned in the operation of its business, and that by so doing, and by providing by Sections 54-a and 54-c that these statutes apply only to railroads of more than fifty miles in length, the Legislature has denied to plaintiffs equal protection of the laws, contrary to Article I, Section 11, of the Constitution of the State of New York, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It is further claimed that the statutes under attack constitute a direct interference with and burden on interstate and foreign commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution of the United States, and that because of the enactment in 1963 of United States Public Law 88-108, 77 Stat. 132; see footnote to U.S.Code [1964 ed.], tit. 45, § 157) establishing an Arbitration Board charged with the duty of making a binding award with respect to the use of firemen on other than steam powered locomotives, and with respect to freight train and yard crew consists, and by virtue of the fact that an award has been made by the Board, the full crew laws, insofar as the crew consists thereby provided for differ from the consists determined by the award, are void as repugnant to the second clause of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, commonly known as the 'Supremacy' clause.

In support of their claim that the full crew laws are unreasonable and arbitrary, plaintiffs, although they did not concede that the laws were valid when enacted, took the position on trial that they had made, and were continuing to make, technological improvements upon their railroads which had promoted their safety and reduced the hazards of their operation to such extent that no matter what validity the statutes might have had, their application to plaintiffs' operations is so unreasonable and burdensome under present conditions as to constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law.

The answers of the defendants deny certain of the material allegations of the complaint, and that of the defendant Public Service Commission demands no relief but submits the issues to the court for determination. The defendants-intervenors have denied material allegations of the complaint, and have asserted several affirmative defenses which do not require discussion at this point.

Controversy concerning full crew laws and rules is not of recent origin. The first New York State full crew law entitled, 'An Act to Better Protect the Lives of Railroad Employees', was passed by the legislature in 1907. The statute required on freight trains of more than twenty cars a minimum crew of six, consisting of an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and three brakemen. It was disapproved by Governor Hughes because it took no account of differences between different roads and parts of roads in trackage and switching facilities, and of the fact that what might be necessary in the case of some railroads might be wholly unnecessary in others. It was the Governor's opinion that to require the expenditure of a very large amount of money without necessity for the outlay, was simply arbitrary exaction and a taking of property without due process of law. Nevertheless, a few years later the Supreme Court of the United States held that a statute of the State of Arkansas, also enacted in 1907, which prohibited the operation of freight trains with a crew of less than an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and three brakemen, regardless of any modern equipment of automatic couplers and air brakes, was constitutional, as against claims that the employment of a third brakeman was unnecessary, because there were no duties for him to perform, and that the plaintiff railroad was thereby required to expend a large amount of money for a useless purpose, and was deprived of its property without due process of law (Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. State of Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 31 S.Ct. 275, 55 L.Ed. 290).

Again, in 1912, a law similar to the 1907 statute passed the New York State legislature and was vetoed by Governor Dix for reasons, except that of unconstitutionality, similar to those which had been previously stated by Governor Hughes.

Section 54-a of the Railroad Law was enacted in 1913. It was approved by Governor Sulzer. In his memorandum of approval, the Governor stated:

'The State for its own welfare has the right to demand the employment upon the railroads of every safety appliance, whether mechanical or human, in the interest of life and limb and greater safety standards.

* * *

* * *

'Every safeguard it seems to me should be employed by the railroads to prevent wrecks, to protect the property of shippers, and to conserve human life and limb--not only of the employees but...

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