New York Colorado Min Syndicate Co v. Fraser
Decision Date | 15 April 1889 |
Citation | 32 L.Ed. 1031,9 S.Ct. 665,130 U.S. 611 |
Parties | NEW YORK & COLORADO MIN. SYNDICATE & CO. v. FRASER et al |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This writ of error is brought to review a judgment entered upon a verdict for $10,500 in favor of the defendants in error. The case originated in five different suits, brought by them against the plaintiff in error in the circuit court of the United States for the District of Colorado,—the first on a promissory note made by it for $1,000, and also for $2,531.78 for the price of goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered by them to it. The other four were suits on promissory notes given by the defendant to the plaintiffs for $1,500, $2,000, $1,500, and $4,000, respectively. Afterwards, upon motion of the defendant, these several suits, by order of the court, were consolidated into one. In obedience to this order, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint setting forth these causes of action, the first five being the promissory notes just mentioned, and the sixth being for the goods, wares, and merchandise stated as the second cause of action in the first of the afore-mentioned suits. The defendant, in its answers, original and amended, denied the alleged sale and delivery of the goods as set forth in the sixth cause of action, admitted that it had made the promissory notes sued on, and that they were unpaid, but denied its liability thereon. The other defense consisted in the allegation of a special contract between the parties plaintiffs and defendant previous to the execution of the notes, and as consideration therefor, whereby the former agreed to manufacture and to sell to the defendant for and at the price agreed a roasting cylinder and the necessary apparatus connected therewith, described in the plea, and also to manufacture for and deliver to the defendant a 20-stamp dry-crushing silver-mill and its connected apparatus, and to erect and put the same in their places so as to be run and operated at the mine owned by the defendant in the county of _____, state of Colorado, known as the _____ mine; all of which (cylinder, mill, and connections) the plaintiffs warranted, when put in their proper places, under the directions of one Angus McKay, would properly and satisfactorily and in all ways subserve the purposes for which they were purchased by the defendant. The plea further alleged that the cylinder, mill, and apparatus, when erected and put in their places, were defective in many particulars, so as to be unfit for the uses for which they were designed, and that by reason of these defects the consideration of the notes failed; and that to remedy the same and make the mill operate with efficiency the company was put to large expense for material and new machinery, and was subjected to great loss and damage by the long period of delay in the operations of the mill. The expenses and the special damage thus sustained were pleaded as a failure of consideration, set-off, counter-claim, and recoupment.
On the trial the plaintiffs introduced as a witness William J. Chalmers, who testified as to the execution by the defendant of the promissory notes sued on, and further testified in answer to questions asked as follows: To which question counsel for defendant objected on the ground that the items could not be proved wholesale by the list; but the objection was overruled by the court, to which ruling of the court defendant then and there excepted, and thereupon the witness proceeded: The witness then proceeded to read the paper handed him, showing an itemized statement of account aggregating $2,531.78. Said witness further testified as follows: ' To which question and answer the defendant objected on the ground that it was immaterial, but the objection was overruled by the court, to which ruling defendant then and there excepted.
The defendant introduced as a witness one George K. Sabin, who testified that his occupation for the past 20 years had been mining, and that he was in the employ of the defendant as superintendent at the time of the erection of the mill in controversy, and so continued until the mill was shut down. He further testified, inter alia, as follows: To this question counsel for plaintiffs objected on the ground that it was not the proper measure of damages; and further, because the witness had not shown himself competent to speak on the subject; and the objection was sustained on the last-mentioned ground by the court; to which ruling and decision of the court the defendant then and there excepted. To this question counsel for plaintiffs objected on the ground that the witness had not shown himself competent, and the objection was sustained by the court; to which ruling the defendant then and there excepted. The said witness further testified that the defendant company operated a mine near this mill, from which the ore was procured to run through said mill. 'Q. Was there sufficient quantity of ore in this mine accessible to employ the mill and keep it running to its full capacity? A. Yes, sir. [615]
Q. How long have you been mining and been acquainted with ores? A. I have been mining since 1860. Q. Have you, during the same time, been acquainted with the milling of ores? A. Yes, sir. This mill at Columbus was the first silver-mill I had been with; had been engaged in gold ores. Q. You have been acquainted to some extent with silver ores and silver-mills. A. Yes, sir. Q. What was the value of these ores delivered at the Columbus mill in this raw state, as taken from the mine ready to be melted; what was the value for milling purposes?' To this question counsel for plaintiffs objected, and the objection was sustained by the court, to which ruling the defendant then and there at the time duly excepted.
The defendant also introduced as a witness A. E. Smith, who, being duly sworn, testified that for 12 years he had been running stamp-mill works and quartz-mills, and manufacturing assayers' supplies; that he had been in the employ of defendant as foreman of the mill at Columbus, Colo., from March, 1882, to December, 1883; and that he had aided in the erection of the mill in controversy. He also testified in answer to questions as to the capacity and work of said mill, as follows to-wit: To this question counsel for plaintiffs objected on the ground that it was immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, and the objection was sustained by the court, to which ruling and decision defendant excepted. To this question counsel for plaintiffs objected on the ground last above given, and the court sustained the objection, to which ruling and decision of the court the defendant then and there excepted. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this question on the ground that it was immaterial, and not the proper measure of damages. By the court (to the witness:) The witness further testified as to the expense of operating the mill, the number and wages of the men, and cost of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Stassi v. United States
...Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 7 S. Ct. 500 30 L. Ed. 644, and cases cited in the opinion; N. Y. & Colorado Mining Syndicate & Co. v. Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 9 S. Ct. 665 32 L. Ed. 1031; Anthony v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 132 U. S. 172, 10 S. Ct. 53 33 L. Ed. The rule derivable ......
-
United States v. Oil Co Oil Co v. United States
...But here the grand jury testimony was used simply to refresh the recollection on material facts, New York & Colorado Mining Syndicate & Co. v. Fraser, 130 U.S. 611, 9 S.Ct. 665, 32 L.Ed. 1031, not as independent affirmative evidence. Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149, 14 S.Ct. 277, 38 L.Ed. 106......
-
Farewell v. State
...But here the grand jury testimony was used simply to refresh the recollection on material facts, New York & Colorado Mining Syndicate & Co. v. Fraser, 130 U.S. 611, 9 S.Ct. 665, 32 L.Ed. 1031, not as independent affirmative evidence. Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149, 14 S.Ct. 277, 38 L.Ed. 106......
- Biddle v. Riley
-
First Impressions and Last Resorts: the Plenary Power Doctrine, the Convention Against Torture, and Credibility Determinations in Removal Proceedings
...bar on entry became law during his return voyage. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604. 84. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 611.85. Id. at 604.86. See id. at 606 ("To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest ......