New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones
Decision Date | 05 October 1943 |
Docket Number | 4 Div. 787. |
Parties | NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. JONES. |
Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 23, 1943.
Reversed on Mandate May 9, 1944.
Rushton, Weil, Stakely, Johnston & Williams, of Montgomery, for appellant.
Martin & Jackson, of Dothan, for appellee.
Appellee had judgment in the court below against appellant, in her suit brought in four counts against it. Each count--but all for the same cause of action--claimed a sum due her by appellant under the terms of an insurance policy issued by it to her.
As the learned nisi prius judge put it:
Said nisi prius judge likewise charged the jury, orally, as follows, to-wit: In view of the excerpt from the oral charge of the court quoted just next above, we find no error in the action of the court in refusing appellant's motion to strike from any count of the complaint the words: "that the defendant acknowledged liability for the said four years and paid the plaintiff monthly disability benefits provided in said policy above set out until the 1st day of June, 1940."
The trial judge properly stated to the jury--and without objection:
Also, as to what does and does not constitute "total disability" within the terms of the policy sued on, the trial judge charged the jury trying the case, as follows, to-wit:
So far as we can discern the charge of the trial court, last quoted above, was in substantial accordance with the latest and last utterance of our Supreme Court on the subject, as contained in the opinion in the case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Danley, 242 Ala. 80, 5 So.2d 743. It was therefore correct. Code 1940, Title 13, Sec. 95. But if said quoted excerpt from the trial court's oral charge failed to embody accurately our Supreme Court's prevailing definition of "total disability," we think any deficiency in this regard was completely cured by appellant's requested written charge 7, duly given to the jury.
So the only contested issue in the case was submitted to the jury under correct instructions as to the law.
The bill of exceptions sent up here not reciting that it contains all the evidence--and we being unable to say that it does contain all the evidence--we, of course, do not consider the refusal of the trial court to give to the jury at appellant's request the general affirmative charge to find in its favor. Sims v. State, 29 Ala.App. 398, 198 So. 258, certiorari denied Id., 240 Ala. 177, 198 So. 259; All States Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 239 Ala. 392, 194 So. 877. And that is true with reference to the action of the trial court in overruling appellant's motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant it a new trial, on the ground the verdict was opposed to the great weight of the evidence. All States Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, supra; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Kimbrell, 226 Ala. 114, 145 So. 433.
We are not so sure that we understand our duty as to considering appellant's requested written charges, other than the general affirmative charge, which were refused below, where, as here, it does not appear that the bill of exceptions contains...
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