New York Life Ins. Co. v. Majet

• Decision Date: 05 April 1937
• Docket Number: 32488
• Citation: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Majet, 173 So. 412, 178 Miss. 440 (Miss. 1937)
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW YORK LIFE INS. Co. v. MAJET

173 So. 412

178 Miss. 440

NEW YORK LIFE INS. Co. v. MAJET

No. 32488

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 5, 1937

Division A

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Insurance.

Code amendment of statute, declaring rents arising from demise of land by life tenant apportionable, by adding words "and a like apportionment shall be made in the case of annuities" held not violative of constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of law in application to annuities arising under disability provisions of life policies as requiring apportionment notwithstanding express contract to contrary where disability provisions contained no express stipulation that benefits should be apportionable (Code 1930, sec. 2179; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

HON. S F. DAVIS, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of LeFlore county HON. S. F. DAVIS, Judge.

Actions by Mary T. Majet, administratrix of the estate of William N Majet, against the New York Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff after consolidation of the actions, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, for appellant.

The provisions of the life insurance policy for the payment of a stated sum at regular intervals and for the waiver of premiums due under said policy during the lifetime and continued disability of the insured does not constitute an annuity.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Majet, 173 Miss. 870, 161 So. 156; Universal Life Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Mill, 153 Miss. 358, 121 So. 849; Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 98 A. 1072; People ex tel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 184 N.Y.S. 345; In re National Provincial Life Assurance Society, L. R. 9 Eq. 306; Carroll v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S. 9 Fed. Sup. 223; Curtis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 N.E. 553.

The identical contract now before the court has been held to be an indemnity contract and not an annuity.

Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 153 Miss. 276, 120 So. 450, 62 A. L. R. 999; Brownstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 A. 273; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dumler, 149 Miss. 361, 115 So. 43; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 813, 85 So. 93; Peek v. New York Life Ins. Co., 219 N.W. 487; 1 R. C. L. 118 sec. 3. Before there can be an apportionment of a right, such right must be vested; no right vested in the insured unless he lived and remained disabled for a full year.

Peek v. New York Life Ins. Co., 219 N.W. 487; Langevin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 171 A. 392; 2 Couch Encyc. of Insurance Law, sec. 354; New York Life Ins. Co. v. English, 72 S.W. 58; Howard v. Benefit Assn. of Railway Employees, 39 S.W.2d 657; Woods v. Provident Life Ins. Co. of Chattanooga, 42 S.W.2d 499; Farlen v. Fidelity'& Casualty Co., 192: N.Y.S. 513; Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Serio, 171 Miss. 726, 157 So. 474; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dumler, 149 Miss. 361, 115 So. 43; Henry v. Henderson, 81 Miss. 752; Stover's Appeal, 77 Pa. 282.

Even if the contract here involved creates an annuity, which is denied, still section 2179, Mississippi 1930 Code, does not require an apportionment thereof contrary to the intent of the contracting parties where it is otherwise provided in the instrument creating the annuity.

Hemenway v. Hemenway, 50 N.E. 456; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 48 L.Ed. 788; Carter v. Cox, 44 Miss. 148.

The provision, "and a like apportionment shall be made in the case of annuities," at the conclusion of section 2179, Code of 1930, applies only to annuities arising from demised land.

Section 2179, Code of 1930; Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. City of Greenville, 69 Miss. 86, 10 So. 574; Leinkauff v. Barnes, 66 Miss. 207, 5 So. 402; Anderson v. City of Hattiesburg, 131 Miss. 216, 94 So. 163; Henry v. Henderson, 81 Miss. 752; Hamner v. Yazoo Delta Lbr. Co., 100 Miss. 349, 56 So. 466; State v. Traylor, 100 Miss. 544, 56 So. 521; Potter v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 101 Miss. 823, 58 So. 713; Jones v. Jones, 72 F.2d 829; White v. Hopkins, 51 F.2d 159; Fulton v. Schuky, 191 N.E. 3.

The statute as construed violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that the same deprives the appellant of its property without due process of law and denies to it the equal protection of the law.

Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A. L. R. 1238; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Tafoya, 70 L.Ed. 664; Nebbia v. New York, 78 L.Ed. 940; Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 80 L.Ed. 475.

H. Talbot Odom, of Greenwood, for appellee.

Under the doctrine of stare decisis this case should be affirmed.

The insurance policies and the parties involved on this appeal are identical with the policy considered by the court in the case of New York Life Insurance Company v. Majet, 173 Miss. 870, 161 So. 156, decided by Division A of our court through Justice Cook on April 29, 1935. Not only are the policies identical, but the parties and their attorneys are the same. The same issues are raised with the exception that it is now claimed that the construction given section 2179 of the Code of 1930 requiring all annuities to be apportioned renders the statute repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution.

15 C. J. 916-919; Zama v. Separate School District, 120 Miss. 444, 82 So. 313; Marts v. Lindsey, 124 Miss. 142, 87 So. 12; Knox v. Wyoming, Mfg. Co, 138 Miss. 249, 103 So. 11; White v. Williams, 159 Miss. 732, 132 So. 573, 76 A. L. R. 757.

Counsel argue that our Legislature has recognized the distinction between an annuity and disability benefits. They then quote from section 5274 which enumerates the kinds of insurance authorized. This same argument was made by apellant's counsel on the other Majet case in their suggestion of error. And in their present brief, as in their suggestion of error, their argument as to the above statute was followed by a quotation from the case of Universal Life Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Miller, 153 Miss. 358, 121 So. 849.

Not a single new case is cited on this proposition. It, therefore, would seem idle on our part to attempt a further discussion of these authorities as we did in the other Majet case, since the court has specifically rejected these cases as having no application on the question of whether or not the disability benefits under the policies in question amounted to an annuity.

3 C. J. 200-201.

The term annuity has been variously defined, but the definitions, although differing in form, are substantially alike in meaning. In general terms, it is a yearly payment of a certain sum of money granted to another in fee for life or for years, and chafing the person of the grantor only.

2 R. C. L. 2; 1 Standard Encyc. of Procedure, pages 987-8; 1 Bacon's Abridgment, page 268.

An annuity is a yearly payment of a certain sum of money granted to a person for life, or years, or in fee chargeable upon the person of the grantor.

Wharton's Law Dictionary, 43; 2 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, page 387; 2 R. C. L. 5; Ballentine Law Dictionary, page 84; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, page 73; Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 153 Miss. 276, 120 So. 450; Peek v. New York Life Ins. Co., 219 N.W. 487.

Contracts of insurance are presumed to have been made with reference to the law of the land, including the statutory laws which are in force and are applicable, and such laws enter into and fora a part of the contract, as much as if actually incorporated therein. And this rule applies as well to certificates in mutual benefit societies, associations, and the like.

1 Couch on Insurance, sec. 150; Peek v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 219 N.W. 487; Assurance Co. v. Phelps, 77 Miss. 625, 27 So. 745; Bacot v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 96 Miss. 223, 50 So. 729.

The next contention of the appellant is that even though the contract does create an annuity, that section 2179 of the Code of 1930, does not require an apportionment where otherwise provided in the contract. In answer to this contention we say first that, regardless of the wording of the contract, section 2179 above mentioned is written into the contract and must prevail in case of a conflict between the statute and the contract itself.

1 Couch on insurance, sec. 155.

We are rather surprised that counsel should contend at this time that the Legislature did not intend to make all annuities apportionable, because the logic of the court in the Majet case, supra, on this point is unanswerable.

Under the 4th division of counsel's brief they now contend that the amendment to section 2179 making all annuities apportionable only applies to annuities arising out of demised lands. They made the identical point in their original brief in the Majet case, supra, stating that the amendment was only intended "to change the common law rule in regard to an annuity in favor of the beneficiary of a will arising out of demised lands." They stated further, "The Legislature did not attempt to change the common law rule in regard to various other types of annuities. "

The first and cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine the intention of the Legislature. This is so elemental as to need no citation of authority. Since then, the intention of the Legislature having been determined in the Majet case, supra, and expressly approved by counsel in their suggestion of error as aforesaid, the many authorities cited and argued by counsel in Division IV of this present brief on statutory construction have no application and do not require further consideration.

It is lastly contended that section 2179 of the Code of 1930, as construed by this court violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States. This contention is without merit, and the...