New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey

• Decision Date: 01 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 417,D,417
• Citation: 596 F.2d 27
• Parties: NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, INC., et al., and Patricia Parisi, et al., Appellees, v. Hugh L. CAREY, Individually and as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Appellants, United States of America, Amicus Curiae. ocket 78-6072.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 27

596 F.2d 27

NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, INC., et

al., and Patricia Parisi, et al., Appellees, v. Hugh L. CAREY, Individually and as Governor of the State of

New York, et al., Appellants,

United States of America, Amicus Curiae.

No. 417, Docket 78-6072.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 13, 1978.

Decided March 1, 1979.

Robert S. Hammer, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, William A. Carnahan, Deputy Commissioner and Counsel, Paul F. Stavis, Deputy Counsel, Margaret M. Corcoran, Atty., Paul Litwak, Deputy Counsel, New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, Clarence J. Sundram, Asst. Counsel to the Governor, Albany, of counsel), for appellants.

Michael S. Lottman, Willowbrook Review Panel, Newark, N. J. (Murray B. Schneps, New York City, of counsel), for appellee Willowbrook Review Panel.

Jack Bernstein, Protection and Advocacy System for Developmental Disabilities, Inc., New York City, for appellee New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc.

Christopher A. Hansen, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City (Kalman Finkel, Legal Aid Society, Civil Div., John Kirklin, Director of Litigation, Carol Kellerman, Legal Aid Society, Civil Appeals and Law Reform Unit, New York City), for Appellee Class Members.

Before MANSFIELD and OAKES, Circuit Judges, and POLLACK, District judge. ^*

OAKES, Circuit Judge:

This appeal, on first view, might be thought to involve the power of a federal court to order a state facility for the retarded to hire additional staff at expense to the public fisc in order to meet court-imposed requirements. Upon further analysis, however, the appeal is from a limited order appurtenant to a rather complex organizational structure for the operation of the facility. The structure itself was established by the parties in a Consent Judgment settling the original proceeding in this litigation after a preliminary injunction granted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the late Orrin G. Judd, Judge. ¹ That court approved the Consent Judgment ² after trial had commenced on a claim under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, ³ brought as a class action on behalf of mentally retarded children and adults residing at Willowbrook Developmental Center (Willowbrook), formerly the Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded and now the Staten Island Developmental Center. In the close to seven years that the litigation has been pending, neither party has sought appellate review of the many determinations made by the district court. Here the state officials ⁴ responsible for the operation of Willowbrook bring the first appeal, involving the question whether the State should provide funding for a few additional staff for the Consumer Advisory Board, one of the advisory bodies established by the Consent Judgment. The state officials challenge the propriety of the order for such provision on the basis that it is contrary to the express terms of the Consent Judgment or constitutes an unreasonable interpretation or modification thereof, is vague and otherwise unenforceable, and requires additional appropriations from the State's treasury in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. We find the arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment of Judge John R. Bartels below.

In order properly to put the order appealed from in perspective, it is necessary to review the history of the litigation, the scope of the Consent Judgment, the operational structure under the judgment, and the district court's factual determinations as to the necessity for the staff.

HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION

The complaint was filed under Section 1983 on March 17, 1972, the plaintiffs being a group of parents, volunteer organizations, and individual residents at Willowbrook, which at that time had a population of approximately 5,700, officially 65% Over capacity, and was the largest institution of its kind in the country. The suit alleged that the conditions at the institution were physically so inadequate and the environment so destructive and dehumanizing that many of the residents had regressed and their condition deteriorated after their admission. The plaintiffs, who are here appellees, requested preliminary injunctive relief involving the hiring of more medical and supporting staff, prohibitions against the use of seclusion and physical restraints, separate bedroom and day areas for the residents, appropriate clothing, and comprehensive medical and hospitalization facilities. In New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y.1973), Judge Judd, after

                five days of hearings and on the basis of "a sheaf of exhibits, a folder of photographs, and hundreds of pages of affidavits considered as part of the record," as well as the court's visit to Willowbrook, found that Willowbrook consisted of approximately forty-three buildings with a resident population of 4,727 on December 10, 1972, reduced from 5,700 at the beginning of the action and a high of 6,200 in 1969.  Id. at 755.  Over three-quarters of the residents he found to be profoundly or severely retarded, having intelligence quotients below 35, with approximately one-third suffering from epileptic seizures and over half having been in Willowbrook for more than twenty years.  Twenty-seven percent of the residents he found to be there voluntarily, and their treatment did not differ from that given to those there under court order.  On the testimony of parents and the affidavits of others, the judge found numerous failures to protect the physical safety of the children and deterioration rather than improvement of their condition, with poor physical maintenance and in effect "conditions . . . hazardous to the health, safety, and sanity of the residents."  Id. at 756.  5 In a very careful opinion, Judge Judd held that plaintiffs had no constitutional right to treatment based on due process or equal protection but that plaintiffs' constitutional right to protection from harm in a state institution meant that the Willowbrook residents were "entitled to at least the same living conditions as prisoners."  Id. at 764.  The judge found that the plaintiffs did not have such conditions; accordingly, he granted preliminary relief including
                

1. A prohibition against seclusion. . . .

2. Immediate hiring of additional ward attendants . . . .

3. Immediate hiring of at least 85 more nurses . . . .

4. Immediate hiring of 30 more physical therapy personnel . . . .

5. Immediate hiring of 15 additional physicians . . . .

6. Immediate hiring of sufficient recreational staff . . . .

7. Immediate and continuing repair of all inoperable toilets . . . .

8. Consummation within a reasonable time of a contract with an accredited hospital . . . .

9. Periodic reports (to the court) concerning the progress of the defendants in meeting these requirements . . . .

Id. at 768-69. All requirements were based on achieving conformity with the minimum standards of the Accreditation Council for Facilities for the Mentally Retarded.

Subsequent to the intervention of the United States Department of Justice as amicus curiae in support of the plaintiffs, the latter moved to have several state officials held in contempt, a motion that Judge Judd denied; although he found that the defendants had not complied with his earlier order, he felt unable to allocate blame for the noncompliance. Trial commenced on October 1, 1974; and eight expert witnesses, numerous parents, and analysts from the Department of Justice testified in support of the plaintiffs' case. The case was almost but not quite settled midtrial; trial ended on January 6, 1975, with the defendant Thomas A. Coughlin's predecessor, Robert W. Hayes, the Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene in charge of Willowbrook, having described the institution as no longer a "major tragedy," as he had previously characterized it, but as still a "moderate tragedy." Settlement negotiations were renewed after a change of administration in state government and continued until April 1975 when both sides signed a Consent Judgment. Judge Judd approved the consent judgment on April 30, 1975, in a short memorandum opinion. New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.1975).

SCOPE OF CONSENT JUDGMENT

The Consent Judgment governs the operation of Willowbrook and the care and treatment of all mentally retarded members of the plaintiff class, that is, all persons who were residents of Willowbrook on the date that the lawsuit was filed. The judgment expressly incorporates an appendix of "steps, standards and procedures" (hereinafter Appendix A) covering twenty-nine single-spaced pages and dealing with twenty-three topics, all designed to secure the constitutional rights of Willowbrook residents to protection from harm. The judgment recites that these

"are not optimal or ideal standards, nor are they just custodial standards. They are based on the recognition that retarded persons, regardless of the degree of handicapping conditions, are capable of physical, intellectual, emotional and social growth, and . . . that a certain level of affirmative intervention and programming is necessary if that capacity for growth is to be preserved, and regression prevented."

393 F.Supp. at 717, Consent Judgment at 3. The state officials agreed that " 'within their lawful authority' " and " 'subject to any legislative approval that may be required,' " they would " 'take all actions necessary to secure implementation of' " Appendix A as well as " 'all steps necessary to ensure the full and timely financing of this judgment,' " all in a prompt and orderly manner. Id., Consent Judgment at 3-4.

Appendix A of the Consent Judgment describes the phasing in of various improvements with a thirteen-month...