New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice, Inc. v. Coughlin

• Citation: 103 A.D.2d 40,479 N.Y.S.2d 850
• Parties: NEW YORK STATE COALITION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 26 July 1984
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 850

479 N.Y.S.2d 850

103 A.D.2d 40

NEW YORK STATE COALITION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC., et al Appellants, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

July 26, 1984.

Oliver & Oliver, Albany (Dorothy M. Keller, Harlem Restoration Project, Inc., New York City, of counsel), for appellants.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany (Maurice K. Peaslee, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

Madeline Kochen and Arthur Eisenberg, New York City (Barbara Pollack, New York City, of counsel), for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

William J. Dean, New York City (Joan Vermeulen, New York City, of counsel), for Correctional Association of New York, amicus curiae.

Before KANE, J.P., and MAIN, WEISS, MIKOLL and LEVINE, JJ.

MIKOLL, Justice.

Plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin defendants from issuing bonds for prison construction. On April 15, 1983, the Governor signed into law the Prison Construction Act (L.1983, ch. 56), which authorized the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) to finance and participate in the development of correctional facilities on behalf of the State Department of Correctional Services (DCS). UDC is to issue bonds and notes in the amount of $380,000,000 to finance construction. Pursuant to the act, the Office of General Services (OGS) will construct prisons which will be rented by DCS for confinement of sentenced inmates. Under the act, $284,000,000 was appropriated from the State Capital Projects Fund to DCS for the construction costs of the project.

Plaintiffs, comprised of special interest groups and individual citizens and taxpayers, seek (1) a declaration pursuant to CPLR 3001 that the act is null and void because it violates article VII (§§ 8, 11) and article VIII (§§ 1, 3) of the State Constitution and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the issue of the bonds and any action toward affecting the act's purposes. Special Term granted summary judgment to defendants on all causes of action except the sixth one, which was severed, on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action. At issue in this proceeding are the following questions: (1) do plaintiffs have standing to challenge the statute and, (2) does the Prison Construction Act violate the State Constitution?

Plaintiffs contend that Special Term erred in determining that they do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Prison Construction Act. Plaintiffs urge entitlement to sue based on three premises: (1) as voters who have been denied their right to vote in a referendum submitted to the people at a general election pursuant to section 11 of article VII of the State Constitution, (2) as taxpayers under a commonlaw right, and (3) as citizen-taxpayers under section 123-b (subd. 1) of the State Finance Law.

Addressing the standing issue in Wein v. Comptroller of State of N.Y., 46 N.Y.2d 394, 413 N.Y.S.2d 633, 386 N.E.2d 242, the Court of Appeals held that a citizen-taxpayer does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the issuance of State bond anticipation notes under subdivision 1 of section 123-b of the State Finance Law, which grants a citizen-taxpayer standing with respect to State expenditures but does not apply to revenue raising. Plaintiffs urge, however, that if the "exception" of section 123-b (subd. 1) of the State Finance Law, which denies a taxpayer standing to maintain an action with respect to the issuance of State bonds or bond anticipation notes, is applicable, that section nonetheless does not bar plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the act under a common-law theory because section 123-i of the State Finance Law provides that "in this article shall abridge or alter rights of actions or remedies now or hereafter existing". In addressing the same issue, the Wein court concluded that in view of the clear legislative intent to prevent taxpayer challenges in such cases, it was inappropriate for the courts to confer standing. We find Wein to be dispositive and thus concur with defendants' contention that Wein is fully controlling on both the issue of common-law taxpayer standing and on the applicability of section 123-b (subd. 1) of the State Finance Law.

Plaintiffs' additional contention that they have standing as voters who have been denied their right to vote in a referendum submitted to the people at a general election, pursuant to section 11 of article VII of the State Constitution, is raised for the first time on appeal. The record before Special Term is bereft of this argument and is also missing the necessary supporting allegations that the individual plaintiffs here were voters. We, therefore, decline to address this aspect of the standing issue.

We do, however, find valid support in Ofenloch v. Gaynor, 66 Misc.2d 185, 320 N.Y.S.2d 362, affd. 35 A.D.2d 913, 317 N.Y.S.2d 267 for the individual plaintiffs' contention that they have standing as taxpayers. In Ofenloch (supra), the court granted taxpayers and residents standing to challenge the validity of a lease agreement between BOCES and a realty company to see whether it was bona fide or a device to obviate a required referendum authorizing purchase of school property. The court found that there was a sufficient threatened injury to a personal right to warrant maintenance of a declaratory judgment action by the plaintiffs.

In Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579, in relaxing the standing requirements of the State so as to afford a party the right to sue, the Court of Appeals referred to the circumstances where denial of standing "would * * * in effect * * * erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of legislative action" (id. at 364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579). Similarly, in Wein v. Comptroller of State of N.Y. (supra), the Court of Appeals noted that "may be that in an extraordinary case a taxpayer's standing may itself rise to a level of a constitutional right" (id. 46 N.Y.2d at 397, n. 413 N.Y.S.2d 633, 386 N.E.2d 242).

We conclude that such circumstances exist here. If the individual plaintiffs are not allowed to pursue the action, it is unlikely that a judicial challenge to the act's legality can be mounted. On this basis we grant the individual plaintiffs standing.

As to the organizational plaintiffs, we find to the contrary. Case law dealing with organizational standing indicates that an organization must have aggrieved members or a specific interest in the litigation in question if it is to be afforded standing (see Matter of Urban League of Rochester, N.Y. v. County of Monroe, 49 N.Y.2d 551, 427 N.Y.S.2d 593, 404 N.E.2d 715; National Organization for Women v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124, 314 N.E.2d 867). Here, the interests represented by plaintiffs are those of concerned citizens or taxpayers who wish to limit the number of individuals incarcerated in the State or, as in the case of New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc., those of citizens concerned with public finances or fiscal responsibility. The issue here is whether a constitutional mandate has been sidestepped. We conclude that the organizational plaintiffs do not have independent standing to maintain this action, absent substantiation of a specific interest or aggrieved members.

We pass now to the crucial question underlying this action--whether the Prison Construction Act violates the State Constitution. Plaintiffs contend that it contravenes section 8 (subd. 1) of article VII of the State Constitution in that it provides for a gift or loan of the State's credit to UDC. Section 8 (subd. 1) of article VII reads as follows:

The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any private corporation or association, or private undertaking; nor shall the credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation or association, or private undertaking, but the foregoing provisions shall not apply to any fund or property now held or which may hereafter be held by the state for educational, mental health or mental...