New York State Employment Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Regional High School

Decision Date12 June 1997
Citation90 N.Y.2d 244,682 N.E.2d 960,660 N.Y.S.2d 359
Parties, 682 N.E.2d 960, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2632, 120 Ed. Law Rep. 226 In the Matter of NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, v. CHRIST THE KING REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

The New York State Employment Relations Board commenced this proceeding under Labor Law § 707 to enforce its order against appellant Christ the King Regional High School. That order directed the School to bargain in good faith with the Lay Faculty Association (the Union) and to reinstate certain teachers.

Supreme Court granted the Board's petition and denied the School's motion to dismiss and the Appellate Division affirmed (217 A.D.2d 701, 630 N.Y.S.2d 333). The School appeals as of right on a claimed substantial constitutional issue (see, CPLR 5601[b][1] ). On First Amendment grounds, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the United States Constitution, appellant seeks an absolute, threshold exemption from the operation of the New York State Labor Relations Act (see, Labor Law § 700 et seq.). Appellant believes that the State Act should not apply to labor relations between it and the Union.

I.

The School is a Roman Catholic secondary school located in Queens County, New York City. Prior to 1976, it had been operated by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. In 1976, however, the Diocese conveyed responsibility and title to appellant, contingent upon the School continuing as a Roman Catholic High School. The School employs lay and religiously affiliated faculty, and teaches both secular and religious subjects.

Also in 1976, the Union began representing the lay faculty at the School. During the spring and summer of 1981, the School administration and the Union met repeatedly to try to negotiate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. These efforts failed and the Union staged a strike beginning in the fall of 1981. The School discharged the striking workers and ended negotiations. This labor dispute has continued ever since.

The State Employment Relations Board (then called the Labor Relations Board) cited the School for alleged violations of the Labor Relations Act. The Board charged the School with refusing to bargain in good faith, and improperly discharging and failing to reinstate striking employees.

The School first challenged the Board in Federal court, asserting that the State Board's jurisdiction was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and that its claimed powers intruded upon the School's constitutional freedom of religion protections. The District Court dismissed the School's complaint, rejecting both claims (Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert, 644 F.Supp. 1490 [S.D.N.Y.] ), and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed (815 F.2d 219, cert. denied 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 102, 98 L.Ed.2d 63), without addressing the First Amendment contention.

Subsequently, the State Board's complaint was considered by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who rejected the School's constitutional arguments and ruled against it on a variety of grounds. The recommended relief was that the Board order the School to cease (1) requiring employees to refrain from joining or aiding the Union, (2) discouraging or interfering with membership in the Union through hiring, promotion or any other practices, and (3) refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union. The ALJ recommended additional relief involving reinstatement of teachers and associated remedies. The Board essentially adopted the ALJ's findings and recommendations and then commenced this Labor Law § 707 proceeding for judicial enforcement of its order. The School, in turn, moved to dismiss the petition, pressing its constitutional claims.

II.

We turn our attention first to the School's free exercise claim. The United States Supreme Court has articulated a more nuanced free exercise analysis in Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, expressly rejecting its previously utilized balancing test (id., at 883-885, 110 S.Ct. at 1602-1604 [citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1792-94, 10 L.Ed.2d 965; see also, City of Boerne v. Flores, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) ] ). Now, a generally applicable and otherwise valid enactment, which is not intended to regulate religious conduct or beliefs but which may incidentally burden the free exercise of religion, is not deemed to violate the First Amendment (id., at 878-879, 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1600).

Applying the Smith standard to the instant matter, we are satisfied that the State Labor Relations Act properly governs labor relations between the appellant School and its lay faculty (see, e.g., Matter of Hill-Murray Fedn. of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487 N.W.2d 857, 863 [Supreme Court of Minnesota applied Smith, too, and concluded that the application of its State's Labor Relations Act to a religious school and its faculty was not violative of the Free Exercise Clause] ). The general applicability of New York State's Act does not automatically and preemptively abridge appellant's rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The State Labor Relations Act is a facially neutral, universally applicable and secular regulatory regimen. It is intended to improve labor relations by encouraging good-faith collective bargaining (see, Catholic High School Assn. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1166-1167). The Act in no way implicates religious conduct or beliefs; nor does it purport to impose any express or implied restriction or burden on religious beliefs or activities (see, e.g., id., at 1169-1171 [applying the earlier balancing test to conclude that the then-New York State Labor Relations Board's exercise of jurisdiction over labor relations between parochial schools and their lay teachers did not constitute a Free Exercise Clause violation] ). Appellant's claimed burden, particularly in contrast to the sweeping threshold immunity that it seeks, is plainly incidental, inchoate and speculative.

Appellant School here, nevertheless, unpersuasively attempts to distinguish Smith, in part, by confining its application to circumstances involving criminal statutes. The plain language of Smith answers and refutes such an artificial demarcation (see, Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932; Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194-195 [quoting Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, supra]; see also, Matter of Hill-Murray Fedn. of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487 N.W.2d 857, 863, supra ).

Appellant alternatively urges that the situation presented by this case falls within an exception propounded by Smith itself. Smith concluded that the standard of general applicability may not apply to "hybrid" situations involving the Free Exercise Clause, when considered in conjunction with other high-ranking constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press (Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 881-882, 110 S.Ct. at 1601-1602). The School's argument suggests that the application of the State Labor Relations Act to it would interfere with fundamental rights of parents of students to direct the religious education of their children. This argument is flawed and unpersuasive because, as we analyze the matter, the Supreme Court in Smith did not intend its hybrid exception to turn back on itself in circumstances such as this singularly generic First Amendment setting and circumstance (see, Matter of Hill-Murray Fedn. of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, supra, 487 N.W.2d, at 863 ["the rights of parents in the education of their children * * * are altogether different than the rights of a religiously affiliated employer with respect to the control of and authority over their lay employees"] ). Rather, the Court expressly referenced the hybrid exceptional situations to free exercise settings in which other discrete constitutional protections are also implicated (Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 881-882, 110 S.Ct. at 1601-1602).

In sum, the core teaching of Smith and the assemblage of associated authorities and lines of analysis cogently bring us to the conclusion that appellant's free exercise claim, invoked with sweeping, threshold cloakage, cannot prevail. Whether individualized First Amendment eventualities and incursions may be legally cognizable in applied settings is not presented or properly before us, and we eschew any opinion, implication or drawing of inferences in that regard.

III.

We turn now to the School's Establishment Clause argument. Our conclusion is that the State Employment Relations Board's legislatively invested jurisdiction does not violate appellant's First Amendment rights in this regard.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, faced with this precise issue, determined that the then-Labor Relations Board's assertion of jurisdiction as between parochial schools and their lay teachers was valid. The court began by noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has made it clear, when discussing the Establishment Clause, that 'total separation is not possible in an absolute sense, [for s]ome relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable' " (Catholic High School Assn. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1166, supra [quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2112, 29 L.Ed.2d 745] ). The court further explained that " 'the line of separation, far...

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