New York State Inspection, Sec. and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo

• Decision Date: 18 December 1984
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Parties: , 475 N.E.2d 90 In the Matter of NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFCME,, et al., Appellants, v. Mario M. CUOMO, as Governor and Chief Executive Officer of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 719

485 N.Y.S.2d 719

64 N.Y.2d 233, 475 N.E.2d 90

In the Matter of NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFCME, AFL-CIO, et al., Appellants, v. Mario M. CUOMO, as Governor and Chief Executive Officer of

the State of New York, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 18, 1984.

Mark T. Walsh, Jr., for appellants

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., New York City (Ann Horowitz, New York City, Robert Hermann, Albany, and O. Peter Sherwood, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JASEN, Judge.

The statutory right to a safe workplace may not be enforced by means of a remedy at law which would require the judiciary to preempt the exercise of discretion by the executive branch of government.

In 1982, the Long Island Correctional Facility (LICF), situated on the grounds of the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, was opened as part of a plan to meet the immediate and long-term needs of the State correction system. The decision partially to convert the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center to a medium security correctional facility was made by former Governor Carey, and was met with early opposition. (See Cohalan v. Carey, 88 A.D.2d 77, 452 N.Y.S.2d 639, app. dsmd. 57 N.Y.2d 672, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77, 439 N.E.2d 886.) In January 1984, in his annual message to the Legislature, Governor Cuomo announced that the LICF would be closed as a part of the over-all capital expansion plan of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). In a subsequent press release, the Governor stated that the LICF would be closed on October 1, 1984, in view of the availability of 3,500 new prison spaces over the next year under the State's prison expansion program and an analysis of prison population growth projections.

Thereupon, petitioners commenced this article 78 proceeding, seeking to enjoin the scheduled closing of the LICF. The proceeding was brought on behalf of two classes of correctional personnel: correction officers, sergeants, lieutenants and civilian employees of DOCS currently employed at LICF (Class I); and, individuals employed in similar capacities at the Sing Sing Correctional Facility and other facilities maintained and operated by DOCS (Class II). The gravamen of this proceeding is that the closing of the LICF would exacerbate the risk of serious bodily injury and death to persons employed at prison facilities, in violation of their statutory right to a safe workplace pursuant to section 27-a of the Labor Law. ¹

Two motions were submitted to Special Term: petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction and respondents' motion to dismiss the petition. Special Term granted petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 1984, thus enjoining the scheduled closing of the LICF pending a determination on the merits. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 7804 (subd. ) and CPLR 3211 (subd. pars. 2, 7) upon the ground, inter alia, that the decision to close the LICF involves the exercise of executive discretion and therefore presents a nonjusticiable controversy. By order dated July 9, 1984, Special Term, 124 Misc.2d 876, 478 N.Y.S.2d 243, denied respondents' motion to dismiss, finding that the claim advanced by petitioners under section 27-a of the Labor Law was justiciable by reason of this court's recent decisions in Klostermann v. Cuomo and Joanne S. v. Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 463 N.E.2d 588. Upon motion by respondents, the Appellate Division, Second Department, granted permission to appeal. In a decision dated September 21, 1984, the Appellate Division, 103 A.D.2d 312, 480 N.Y.S.2d 1, reversed both orders of Special Term, on the law, and entered an order dismissing the petition and vacating the preliminary injunction. We affirm for the following reasons.

The doctrine of justiciability, developed to identify appropriate occasions for the exercise of judicial authority, represents perhaps the most significant and least comprehended limitation upon the judicial power. (See Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government, p. 11.) Justiciability is the generic term of art which encompasses discrete, subsidiary concepts including, inter alia, political questions, ripeness and advisory opinions. At the heart of the justification for the doctrine of justiciability lies the jurisprudential canon that the power of the judicial branch may only be exercised in a manner consistent with the "judicial function" (Matter of State Ind. Comm., 224 N.Y. 13, 16, 119 N.E. 1027 ), upon the proper presentation of matters of a "Judiciary Nature" (2 Farrand, Records of Federal Convention of 1787 p. 430). Recognizing that we have no more right to usurp the authority conferred upon a coordinate branch of government than to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is granted, we turn to the critical inquiry presented by this appeal--whether petitioners' claims are justiciable.

As a reflection of the pattern of government adopted by the State of New York, which includes by implication the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers (Matter of LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 5-6, 41 N.E.2d 153; Matter of Guden, 171 N.Y. 529, 531, 64 N.E. 451), it is a fundamental principle of the organic law that each department of government should be free from interference, in the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either of the other branches (People ex rel. Burby v. Howland, 155 N.Y. 270, 282, 49 N.E. 775). With respect to the distribution of powers within our system of government, it has been said that no concept has been "more universally received and cherished as a vital principle of freedom". (Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns 477, 509 Within our tripartite governmental framework, the Governor, as chief executive officer, has the responsibility to manage the operations of the divisions of the executive branch, including the Department of Correctional Services. (Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 549, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732, 378 N.E.2d 95.) The lawful acts of executive branch officials, performed in satisfaction of responsibilities conferred by law, involve questions of judgment, allocation of resources and ordering of priorities, which are generally not subject to judicial review. (Matter of Lorie C., 49 N.Y.2d 161, 171, 424 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400 N.E.2d 336; Matter of Abrams v. New York City Tr. Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 992, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235, 355 N.E.2d 289; Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277; James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 368, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934, 366 N.E.2d 1291; Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 441, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 330 N.E.2d 53.) This judicial deference to a coordinate, coequal branch of government includes one issue of justiciability generally denominated as the "political question" doctrine. (Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277, supra; Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame, 50 N.Y.2d 994, 996, 431 N.Y.S.2d 475, 409 N.E.2d 948, app. dsmd. 449 U.S. 1119, 101 S.Ct. 933, 67 L.Ed.2d 106; Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 535, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 463 N.E.2d 588, supra.)

By seeking to vindicate their legally protected interest in a safe workplace, petitioners call for a remedy which would embroil the judiciary in the management and operation of the State correction system. The primary responsibility for administering the system is vested in the Commissioner of Correctional Services (Correction Law, § 112), who is...