Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson County, Kentucky, s. 73--1403
| Decision Date | 11 December 1974 |
| Docket Number | 73--1408,Nos. 73--1403,s. 73--1403 |
| Citation | 510 F.2d 1358 |
| Parties | NEWBURG AREA COUNCIL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. John L. HAYCRAFT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
John G. O'Mara, Thomas L. Hogan, Louisville, Ky., Robert Sedler, Lexington, Ky., Thomas L. Hogan, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants in No. 73--1403.
John A. Fulton, William A. Blodgett, Jr., Will Fulton, E. Preston Young, J. Donald Dinning, James W. Stites, Jr., Stites, McElwain & Fowler, Louisville, Ky., for defendants-appellees in No. 73--1403.
Darryl T. Owens, Charles J. Lunderman, Jr., Louisville, Ky., Robert A. Sedler, Lexington, Ky., John G. O'Mara, Thomas Hogan, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants in No. 73--1408.
Henry A. Triplett, E. Preston Young, J. Donald Dinning, James W. Stites, Jr., John A. Fulton, William A. Blodgett, Jr., Louisville, Ky., for defendants-appellees in No. 73--1408.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and McCREE and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated school desegregation cases were originally before this Court in Newburg Area Council, Inc., et al., v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Kentucky, et al., and John L. Haycraft et al. v. Board of Education of Louisville, Kentucky, et al., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), in which it was held:
(1) That neither the Independent Louisville School District nor the Jefferson County School District was a unitary system, both operating dual school systems from which all vestiges of state-imposed segregation had not been eliminated; and (2) That all vestiges of state-imposed segregation must be eliminated within each school district in the county, state-created school district lines to impose no barrier in accomplishing such purpose.
The judgment of the district court, dismissing the action as to the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts, was reversed and the actions were remanded for further proceedings, with the statement that to accomplish the elimination of remaining vestiges of de jure segregation, 'we do not require the use of any particular method nor approve in advance the use of any particular device.'
The petitions of the defendant School Boards for certiorari were granted and on July 25, 1974, the Supreme Court entered the following order:
The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgments are vacated and the cases are remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and without briefing or oral argument affirm the judgments.
By this Court's order of August 8, 1974, the parties were directed to file supplemental briefs addressed to all questions applicable to the reconsideration by this Court of its prior opinion and ruling of December 28, 1973. Thereafter, extensive briefs were filed by the parties and the actions were set down for hearing on oral argument on October 14, 1974.
After full reconsideration, pursuant to the order of remand of the Supreme Court and its ruling in Milliken as to inter-district remedies, we are of the opinion that our prior ruling was correct and that it should be and it is hereby reaffirmed.
At the outset, we construe the Supreme Court's opinion in Bradley v. Milliken, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069, 1974, and its order of remand in the present cases, as in no way requiring a reconsideration of our prior opinion insofar as it held that both the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts were operating dual school systems from which all vestiges of state-imposed segregation had not been eliminated as required by law.
Therefore, in this opinion, we address ourselves only to our prior holding that the district judge in approving or formulating a plan of desegregation for Jefferson County, Kentucky, would have the power to require that state-created school district lines could be disregarded. On this issue, we find that there are material and controlling distinctions between the facts of the present cases and the facts before the Supreme Court in Milliken, in which the court held that state-created district lines could not be disregarded in devising an appropriate desegregation plan for the City of Detroit only:
(1) A vital distinction between Milliken and the present cases is that in the former there was no evidence that the outlying school districts had committed acts of de jure segregation or that they were operating dual school systems. Exactly the opposite is true here since both the Louisville and Jefferson County School Districts have been expressly found by this Court to have failed to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Consequently, as contrasted with the outlying Michigan districts, they are guilty of maintaining dual school systems.
(2) In Milliken, the metropolitan remedy would have involved some 53 school districts spreading over three counties, while the present cases involve only two and possibly three districts in a single county. 1 Hence, the inter-district remedy in this case would not be likely extensively to disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Kentucky, or even in Jefferson County, nor require the creation of a vast new super school district, as may have resulted from the broad metropolitan remedy considered in Milliken.
(3) In Kentucky, the county is established as the basic educational unit of the state (Ky.Rev.Stat. § 160.010), and the state legislature has referred to the boundaries of school districts as 'artificially drawn school district lines.' Ky.Rev.Stat. § 160.048(1). Statutes of this character were not in effect in Michigan and consequently were not considered by the Supreme Court in Milliken.
(4) In Milliken, the Supreme Court expressed some concern because of the serious administrative problems which could arise in Michigan if the Court should decree an inter-district remedy entailing the consolidation of a large number of separate school districts. In Kentucky, however, if the district court should find that a formal consolidation or merger of districts was required to effectuate an effective desegregation plan for the county as a whole, such administrative problems would to a large extent be obviated since the merger or consolidation in that state could be effectuated under the express provisions of a Kentucky statute. This statute authorizes the reconsolidation of school districts within a single county even without the consent of the county school board. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 160.041.
(5) A crucial difference between the present cases and...
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