Newell-Brinkley v. Walton

• Decision Date: 16 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–CV–416.,12–CV–416.
• Citation: 84 A.3d 53
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Parties: Sinobia NEWELL–BRINKLEY, Appellant, v. Diana Haines WALTON, et al., Appellees.

84 A.3d 53

Sinobia NEWELL–BRINKLEY, Appellant,

v.Diana Haines WALTON, et al., Appellees.

No. 12–CV–416.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted Dec. 5, 2012.

Decided Jan. 16, 2014.

Jonathan L. Gould, Washington, DC, was on the brief for appellant.

Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, and Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BECKWITH and McLEESE, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.

McLEESE, Associate Judge:

Officer Newell–Brinkley of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) injured her back while working. As a result, MPD permitted her to take sick leave that was not charged against her leave balance (“non-chargeable sick leave”). Before Officer Newell–Brinkley returned to work full time from her on-the-job injury, MPD began to charge her sick leave against her leave balance, because her blood pressure was high and MPD concluded that her blood-pressure problem was not work-related. Officer Newell–Brinkley challenged MPD's decision, seeking both reimbursement for previously charged sick leave and additional non-chargeable sick leave going forward. After an adverse determination by MPD, she filed a petition for review in the Superior Court. That petition was denied, and she appealed.¹ We remand to the Superior Court with directions to remand to MPD.

I.

The following facts are undisputed. Officer Newell–Brinkley sustained an on-the-job injury to her back in September 2009. She was treated for the injury at the Police and Fire Clinic. During this treatment, clinic doctors noted that Officer Newell–Brinkley had high blood-pressure readings and asked her to consult her private doctor about the issue. In February 2010, after a clinic doctor determined that Officer Newell–Brinkley's back pain was improving, Officer Newell–Brinkley was placed on half-time, limited duty. Five days later, she reported experiencing pain at work, and her supervisor sent her to the Police and Fire Clinic. At the clinic, Officer Newell–Brinkley's blood-pressure reading was very high. The clinic doctor placed Officer Newell–Brinkley on full-time sick leave until her blood-pressure issue was addressed. After that, MPD began charging Officer Newell–Brinkley for sick leave.

The parties dispute the cause of the high blood-pressure readings. Officer Newell–Brinkley contends that the high blood-pressure readings were caused by a combination of her back pain, medications she took for the pain, and stress arising from the pain. MPD asserts that Officer–Newell Brinkley's high blood-pressure readings were not caused by her back injury.

When she discovered that she was being charged for sick leave, Officer Newell–Brinkley filed a supplemental worker's compensation claim. The Director of MPD's Medical Services Branch denied that claim, concluding that although Officer Newell–Brinkley's high blood-pressure readings were caused by the back injury, Officer Newell–Brinkley nevertheless was not entitled to non-chargeable sick leave, because she had not been diagnosed with “the disease ‘High Blood Pressure.’ ” Officer Newell–Brinkley then appealed to the MPD Medical Claims Appeals Hearing Branch, which concluded that Officer Newell–Brinkley had not proven that there was a causal relationship between the high blood-pressure readings and her back injury. The Hearing Officer also concluded that Officer Newell–Brinkley was not entitled to additional non-chargeable sick leave for her claimed back pain.

The Superior Court denied Officer Newell–Brinkley's petition for review of MPD's decision, finding that Officer Newell–Brinkley was not entitled to non-chargeable sick leave for her high blood pressure, because she did not make out a prima facie case that her on-the-job back injury had caused her high blood pressure and because substantial evidence supported MPD's conclusion that there was no causal relationship between her back injury and her high blood pressure. The Superior Court also found that Officer Newell–Brinkley had not preserved the alternative argument that her back injury entitled her to additional non-chargeable sick leave.

II.

A.

Officer–Newell Brinkley's claim to non-chargeable sick leave arises under D.C.Code § 5–633(a) (2012 Repl.), which provides MPD officers with a right to non-chargeable sick leave if they are unable to work “due to a performance-of-duty injury or illness.” See alsoD.C.Code § 1–612.03(j) (2012 Repl.) (“Sick leave may not be charged to the account of a uniformed member of the Metropolitan Police Department ... for an absence due to injury or illness resulting from the performance of duty.”). Section 5–633(a), which was enacted as Section 623 of the Fire and Police Medical Leave and Limited Duty Amendment Act of 2004, D.C. Law 15–194, 51 D.C.Reg. 9406, 9413, 9416 (Oct. 22, 2004), does not define the phrase “performance-of-duty injury or illness.” The parties appear to assume that the phrase should be given the same interpretation that this court has given to essentially indistinguishable language in various provisions of the Police and Firefighters' Retirement and Disability Act (“PFRDA”), D.C.Code § 5–701 et seq. (2012 Repl.). See, e.g.,D.C.Code §§ 5–707, 5–708, 5–708.01, 5–709, 5–710 (2012 Repl.).² We agree with the parties' assumption, and therefore construe § 5–633(a) in light of our prior decisions interpreting the PFRDA.

The PFRDA “serves as the worker's compensation plan for the District's police and firefighters.... Such remedial legislation is typically given liberal construction by the courts to effectuate its humanitarian purposes, with exemptions and exceptions narrowly construed and doubts resolved in favor of the employee.” O'Rourke v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' Ret. & Relief Bd., 46 A.3d 378, 389 (D.C.2012) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., Blohm v. Tobriner, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 2, 3, 350 F.2d 785, 786 (1965) (per curiam) (“[P]olicemen must of necessity engage in hazardous work as a part of their regular duties, and Congress has amply manifested a distaste for the resolution of doubts against them in the administration of laws passed for their protection.”).

This court has interpreted the PFRDA as affording claimants the benefit of a variety of presumptions or burden-shifting rules. See, e.g., Lamphier v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' Ret. & Relief Bd., 698 A.2d 1027, 1032 (D.C.1997) (applying burden-shifting framework for firefighter seeking disability retirement benefits based on claim that on-duty injuries aggravated preexisting condition); Baumgartner v. Police & Firemen's Ret. & Relief Bd., 527 A.2d 313, 315–16 (D.C.1987) (applying burden-shifting framework for police officer seeking disability retirement benefits based on claim of on-duty injury).³

Most relevant for current purposes, the court has held that once a claimant under the PFRDA establishes a prima facie case that “he or she was injured in an on-duty incident, the burden of proceeding shifts, and it is incumbent upon the government to adduce substantial evidence tending to disprove the inference that the disability resulted from the on-duty injury.” Pierce v. Police & Firefighters' Ret. & Relief Bd., 882 A.2d 199, 204 (D.C.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he evidentiary burden to prove a prima facie case is not onerous; there merely needs to be a sufficient basis to permit a reasonable inference that the disabling injury was incurred in the performance of duty.” Id. at 206 (citation omitted). If the government rebuts the claimant's prima facie case, the claimant must carry the ultimate burden of persuasion. See Croskey v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' Ret. & Relief Bd., 596 A.2d 988, 991–92 (D.C.1991) (“The ultimate burden of persuasion remained with Croskey.”); cf. Washington Post v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 852 A.2d 909, 911 (D.C.2004) (under WCA, once employer rebuts statutory presumption, “[t]he burden then reverts to the claimant to prove [causation] by a preponderance of the evidence”).

B.

We turn first to Officer Newell–Brinkley's challenge to the denial of non-chargeable sick leave based on her high blood pressure. The parties dispute three issues: whether Officer Newell–Brinkley's claim that her high blood pressure was caused by her work-related back injury should have been analyzed under a burden-shifting framework; whether Officer Newell–Brinkley presented a prima facie case that her high blood pressure was work-related; and whether MPD introduced substantial evidence to rebut any such prima facie case. We decide only the first issue.

1.

MPD does not dispute that it failed to apply burden-shifting principles to Officer Newell–Brinkley's claim that her work-related injury caused her high blood pressure. Rather, MPD contends that a 2004 amendment to the PFRDA displaced those principles. The provision at issue is titled “Processing claims of injuries allegedly sustained within the performance of duty.” Fire and Police Medical Leave and Limited Duty Amendment Act of 2004, D.C. Law 15–194, § 602(b), 51 D.C.Reg. 9406, 9413–14 (Oct. 22, 2004) (codified at D.C.Code § 5–708.01(b) (2012 Repl.)). In relevant part that provision reads:

The Director shall determine, based on a review of the unit commander's report on the cause of the injury or illness and after consultation with the Police and Fire Clinic physicians on the nature of the injury or illness, whether a member's injury or illness was sustained by the member in the performance of duty within 30 calendar days of a claim being reported to the Department. If the Director fails to meet the 30–day deadline, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the member's injury or illness was sustained in the performance of duty. Until the presumption is rebutted by a finding by the Director that the injury or...