Newell v. Acadiana Planning Comm'n Inc.
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 6:20-CV-01525 |
| Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
| Citation | 637 F.Supp.3d 419 |
| Parties | Melissa M. NEWELL v. ACADIANA PLANNING COMMISSION INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
John Oliver Pieksen, Jr., Bagneris Pieksen & Assoc., New Orleans, LA, for Melissa M. Newell.
Susan F. Desmond, Jackson Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for Acadiana Planning Commission Inc.
MEMORANDUM RULING
The present matter before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [ECF No. 17] filed by defendant Acadiana Planning Commission, Inc. ("APC"). For the reasons explained below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Melissa Newell was hired by defendant APC—or APC's predecessor—in April 2014.1 Newell contends that she was "repeatedly passed over for promotional opportunities, despite superior qualifications, due to her race and/or religion."2 Newell also contends that she was subjected to a "hostile work environment, again due to her race and/or religion."3 Newell alleges that she complained about these discriminatory actions and harassment to APC's Board of Directors on or around October 11, 2018.4 Newell further alleges that APC's Director requested that she withdraw her complaint to the Board and "just pray about it."5 Newell contends that APC then retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Board by terminating her employment on or about November 1, 2018.6 Newell filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and Louisiana Commission on Human Rights on August 12, 2019 (the "EEOC Charge"). On September 3, 2020, the EEOC closed Newell's file and issued a "right to sue" letter.7 Newell commenced the present action under Title VII on December 1, 2020, and APC filed a motion to dismiss Newell's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. APC filed its First Motion to Dismiss on March 26, 2021.8 The Court subsequently entered a Memorandum Ruling denying APC's First Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and ordering Newell to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies outlined in the Court's ruling.9 Newell filed a verified "Amended Complaint" on March 12, 2022.10 APC then filed its Second Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
At this point, the Court notes that, while styled an "amended complaint," Newell's current complaint is essentially a supplemental complaint that expressly incorporates all of the allegations of her original complaint without repeating the allegations in the original complaint.11 This "supplemental complaint" asserts additional allegations to support Newell's claims and address the Court's Memorandum Ruling. Ordinarily, "[a]n amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading."12 Where, as here, an amended complaint adopts and incorporates by reference the plaintiff's original complaint, both complaints are operative and must be considered in connection with a motion to dismiss.13 Considering Newell's original and amended complaints together creates a critical discrepancy in her timeline. Newell's original complaint states that she lodged her complaint with APC's board in October 2020 and was terminated November 1, 2020.14 Newell's amended complaint appears to identify the dates of her complaint and termination as October 2018 and November 1, 2018, respectively, without addressing the 2020 dates alleged in her original complaint.15 Similarly, Newell's amended complaint appears to allege conduct and statements made in late 2018 and early 2019—after she was allegedly terminated on November 1, 2018.16 Based on Newell's EEOC charge, it appears that the October and November 2018 dates for her complaint and termination are the correct dates, and the Court will rely on those dates in addressing the sufficiency of Newell's allegations.17
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Accordingly, to "survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.' "18 The facts alleged, taken as true, must state a claim that is plausible on its face.19 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."20 A complaint is not sufficient if it offers only "labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."21
APC first challenges Newell's disparate treatment claims under Title VII. Newell alleges that she was subjected to unlawful discrimination on account of race and religion.22 Title VII provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to . . . discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion . . . or national origin."23 An employer's action will be found unlawful if the employee can demonstrate that race or religion was a "motivating factor" for an adverse employment action, even if the employer was also motivated by other lawful factors.24 The pleading standard for a Title VII claim is governed by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.25—not the evidentiary standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.26 Under Swierkiewicz, "there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status."27 While McDonnell Douglas does not govern a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of the adequacy of a plaintiff's Title VII allegations, courts have looked to McDonnell Douglas in assessing a plaintiff's allegations where, as here, those allegations rely on circumstantial evidence of discrimination.28 The McDonnell Douglas framework requires a plaintiff to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she was discharged or subject to an adverse employment action by her employer; and (4) she was replaced by someone outside her protected class or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside of the protected group.29
APC first challenges Newell's Title VII "failure to promote" claims. Newell alleges that "she was repeatedly passed over for promotional opportunities, despite superior qualifications, due to her race and/or religion."30 Specifically, she alleges that "in late 2018 and early 2019, throughout her employment at APC . . . [she] stated her . . . desire to be considered for promotion to other position(s) within APC, when such positions became available, but [Monique Boulet] and APC failed to notify [her] when such potential promotions became available."31 Newell further alleges that "when a Director of Communications position opened up, believed to be in late 2018 and early 2019, again no APC email was sent out to Plaintiff, and Ms. Boulet again failed to inform Plaintiff of the opening, or to consider her for the position, until it was too late because interviews were already underway and the deadline to apply had expired."32
Newell, however, does not allege that she actually applied for any promotions and that her applications were denied. Failure to apply for a disputed promotion will bar a failure-to-promote claim absent a showing that applying for the promotion would have been a "futile gesture."33 This "futile gesture" exception requires Newell to show that she was deterred from applying for a promotion "by a known and consistently enforced policy of discrimination."34 Newell only identifies one specific promotion opportunity in her amended complaint—APC's Director of Communications position in 2018—but acknowledges that she did not apply for the position because she learned of the opening after the application deadline.35 Newell's amended complaint does not identify any other specific promotion opportunity where (1) she applied for the promotion, and (2) her application was denied.36 Nor does Newell plead any facts showing a "known and consistently enforced policy of discrimination" that would have made her application for a promotion a futile gesture.37 For example, Newell has not alleged that APC had a consistently-enforced policy of concealing promotion opportunities or discouraging members of her protected group from applying for promotions. While Newell does allege that Boulet and APC failed to inform her of promotion opportunities, this allegation alone does not show that an application would have been a futile gesture.38 In sum, the lack of any factual allegations showing that Newell applied for a promotion and was denied is fatal to her promotion-related claims.
APC next challenges Newell's claim that she was terminated on the basis of race and religion. Specifically, she alleges that "[o]n or about September 26, 2018, Ms. Boulet engaged in yelling and knocked items off my desk, talking about 'you people' and 'bad attitudes,' and then had someone call the police on me . . . ."39 Newell further alleges that on October 11, [2018], she met with certain members of APC's board and "addressed, among other things, the racial and religious discrimination [she] was being subjected to."40 She alleges that these board members told her that...
To continue reading
Request your trial