Newell v. Baca
| Decision Date | 15 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-00662-MMD-WGC |
| Parties | PATRICK NEWELL, Petitioner, v. ISIDRO BACA, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Pro se Petitioner Patrick Newell filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (ECF No. 6.) This matter is before the Court for adjudication of the merits of the Petition. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the Petition, denies a certificate of appealability, and directs the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.
Newell's convictions are the result of events that occurred in Clark County, Nevada on or about October 10, 2012. (ECF No. 20-10 at 2.) In its opinion affirming Newell's convictions, the Nevada Supreme Court described the crime, as revealed by the evidence at Newell's trial, as follows:
In 2012, appellant Patrick Newell sprayed Theodore Bejarano with gasoline and lit Bejarano on fire during an altercation at a gas station. Newell also threatened Bejarano with a small pocket knife, although Bejarano could not later recall this incident. . . . [a]t trial, Newell claimed that his actions were a justifiable battery because he reasonably believed that Bejarano was committing felony coercion against him at the time of the incident.
On June 19, 2014, a jury convicted Newell of battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm (Count 2), attempted assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), and performance of an act in reckless disregard of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm (Count 4). (ECF No. 21-3 at 3.) The jury found Newell not guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon (Count 1). (Id. at 2.) The state district court sentenced Newell to 72 to 180 months for Count 2 and 24 to 60 months for Count 3, to run concurrent with Count 2. (ECF No. 22-6 at 3.) Count 4 was dismissed. (Id.)
Newell appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. (ECF No. 23-6.) Newell petitioned for rehearing. (ECF No. 23-9.) The Nevada Supreme Court denied the petition without explanation. (ECF No. 23-10.) Remittitur issued on February 26, 2016. (ECF No. 23-13.)
On August 3, 2015, Newell filed a state habeas petition challenging the computation of his good-time credits. (ECF No. 23-3.) The state district court denied the petition on March 3, 2016. (ECF No. 23-12.) The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the petition on December 14, 2016. (ECF No. 23-17.) Remittitur issued on January 11, 2017. (ECF No. 23-18.)
Newell's federal habeas petition was filed on January 6, 2017. (ECF No. 6.) Respondents moved to dismiss the petition on November 14, 2017. (ECF No. 18.) This Court denied the motion on July 31, 2018. (ECF No. 32.)
Respondents answered Newell's petition on March 28, 2019. (ECF No. 42.) Newell replied on July 15, 2019. (ECF No. 55.) Thereafter, Newell requested an evidentiary hearing, that the matter be placed on calendar, and that the case be submitted for a decision. (ECF Nos. 56, 59, 60.) This Court denied Newell's motions. (ECF No. 61 at 3.)
Newell asserts the following violations of his federal constitutional rights: (1) the state district court's retroactive application of new limitations on the use of deadly force violated ex post facto principles and deprived him of a defense that would otherwise have been available to him when he committed his crime; and (2) the state district court's creation of new limitations on the use of deadly force and ex post facto application of theselimitations violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (ECF No. 6 at 3-5.)
In its order denying Respondents' motion to dismiss, this Court explained that it viewed Newell's two grounds as actually setting forth a single claim—that the state district court's retroactive application of new limitations on the use of deadly force violated ex post facto principles and deprived Newell of a defense that would otherwise have been available to him when he committed his crime in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (ECF No. 32 at 4.)
It appears that Newell was granted parole on or about May 9, 2019.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas corpus cases under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"):
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "if the state court identifies the correct governinglegal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10) (internal citation omitted).
The Supreme Court has instructed that "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has stated "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) ().
Newell argues that the state district court retroactively applied new limitations on the use of deadly force in violation of ex post facto principles and deprived him of a defense that would otherwise have been available to him when he committed his crime in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (ECF No. 6 at 3-5.) Respondents counter that the state district court's interpretation of NRS § 200.160 was expected and defensible. (ECF No. 42 at 7.)
At trial, "Newell's theory was that he was legally entitled to use deadly force to protect himself from a felony coercion" because the victim "was attempting to coerce Mr. Newell into giving him a ride." (ECF Nos. 6 at 10; 22-2 at 13.) In line with that theory, Newell proposed a justifiable battery jury instruction based on Davis v. State, 321 P.3d 867 (Nev. 2014), which was decided by the Nevada Supreme Court approximately threemonths before Newell's trial. (ECF No. 22-2 at 12-14.) Newell's proposed jury instruction provided that:
Justifiable battery is the battery of a human being when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person battered to commit a felony and there is [imminent] danger of such a design being accomplished. This is true even if deadly force is used. . . .
(ECF No. 23-6.)
Following discussion of Newell's proposed jury instruction (see ECF No. 22-2 at 12-17), the jury was instructed: "Justifiable battery is the battery of a human being, which does not result in death and is necessary for self-defense, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person injured to do some great personal injury to the person inflicting the injury." (ECF No. 22-1 at 36.) The jury was also instructed, over Newell's objection to the italicized sentences that were added by the state district court, that:
(Id. at 39.)
The state district court...
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