Newell v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1946
• Docket Number: No. 3559.,3559.
• Citation: 45 A.2d 579
• Parties: NEWELL v. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

45 A.2d 579

NEWELL

v.JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INS. CO.

No. 3559.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Feb. 5, 1946.

Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Goodnow, Judge.

Assumpsit by Mabel M. Newell, the widow of Guy J. Newell, deceased, against John Hancock Life Insurance Company to recover under double indemnity provision of a policy issued by defendant on decedent's life. Plaintiff excepted to the granting of a nonsuit and to the exclusion of certain evidence, and the cause was transferred.

Judgment for defendant.

Assumpsit by the widow of Guy J. Newell, upon a contract of life insurance made by him for her benefit with the defendant. The defendant has paid the face amount of the policy, and in this action the plaintiff seeks to recover double indemnity for accidental death. By the terms of the policy such indemnity is payable when the accidental death is ‘caused directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes, by bodily injury sustained solely by external, violent, and accidental means.’

The defendant relies particularly upon two exclusions from coverage: (1) Where ‘death results, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially, * * * from injuries intentionally inflicted on the Insured by any person. * * *’ and (2) where ‘death results, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially, * * * from being engaged in any violation of the law.’

Trial by jury. The plaintiff excepted to the granting of a nonsuit and the exclusion of certain evidence. Transferred by Goodnow, J. The facts appear in the opinion.

McLane, Davis & Carleton, of Manchester (John P. Carleton, of Manchester, orally), for plaintiff.

Wyman, Starr, Booth, Wadleigh & Langdell, of Manchester (Robert P. Booth, of Manchester, orally), for defendant.

PAGE, Justice.

It is plain that the policy affords double indemnity only if the insured meets his death because of accidental means. The plaintiff takes the position that it could be found that the decedent met his death by accidental means as defined by the policy. Whether or not this would be true if the policy used the words ‘accidental means' without qualification, we need not inquire. What we have to decide is not whether there might be found an accidental means that is causal but whether there is evidence of such means which is causal ‘directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes.’ Or the test might be put conversely. Does evidence appear that the death was not caused ‘directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially’ by causes excluded from coverage, either (1) ‘injuries intentionally inflicted’ on the decedent, or (2) injuries flowing from a violation of law by the decedent?

The insured died on March 4, 1943, as the result of injuries sustained during an altercation that day with one Palmer, a truck driver. Newell was Palmer's foreman. The two men had never got along well together. Palmer, at Newell's direction, was reluctantly loading building supplies on a truck, and Newell was literally prodding him. As Palmer carried a piece of Akron pipe down a stairway, Newell followed, physically pushing him. Palmer expostulated. Reaching the foot of the stairs, Newell told Palmer that he was ‘through,’ to go home. Palmer suggested that they go outside and ‘settle it,’ where there was more room. Replying that he did not have to go outside, Newell took off his coat, put up his fists, and started for Palmer. Palmer dropped the Akron pipe and struck Newell in the jaw with either his fist or the heel of his hand. Newell fell to the floor and sustained a broken skull, from which he died.

These facts are undisputed. Only two witnesses testified to the altercation, Palmer and another employee. They were in complete agreement that Newell pushed Palmer as they went down stairs, as to Palmer's invitation to Newell to go outside, and as to Newell's starting for Palmer ‘with his dukes up’ before Palmer could drop the Akron pipe.

As to the issue whether indirectly or in any part death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted on Newell by Palmer, the plaintiff, having the burden of proof of coverage, was bound to go before the trier of fact with some evidence to show that between the concededly intentional injury inflicted by Palmer and the death of Newell, there intervened some independent accidental means that deprived Palmer's blow of any causal effect, however indirect or partial. As to the burden of proof, see Trepanier v. Mercantile Insurance Co., 88 N.H. 118, 121, 184 A. 866, 185 A. 656; Lamb v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 88 N.H. 306, 188 A. 459; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Greenough, 88 N.H. 391, 190 A. 129, 109 A.L.R. 1096; Langelier v. Met. Life Insurance Co., 91 N.H. 529, 531, 17 A.2d 92. As to the principle concerning intervening causal means, see Simoneau v. Prudential Insurance Co., 89 N.H. 402, 200 A. 385.

In the Simoneau case, it is to be noted, the contract made no such exclusion of coverage as is here indicated. It is beyond question that even though Palmer...